Cover picture:
A moment from the performance “The intimate ritual of social movement: Embodiments of migracy” by María Peredo Guzmán, performed at the 27th AEMI Conference in Husum, Germany, on October 6th, 2018
Source: AEMI
Selected papers

from the 26th AEMI Conference in Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 2016

European Migrant Diasporas and Cultural Identities

and from the 27th AEMI Conference in Husum, Germany, 2017

‘At Home or Alienated’ – Migrants and Receiving Countries between Integration and Parallel Society, between ‘Culture of Welcome’ and Xenophobia

Editors

Hans Storhaug, Maja Gostič, Špela Kastelic, Klara Kožar Rosulnik

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From the Editors

It is a great privilege to introduce this new double issue of the *AEMI Journal*, for the most part prepared by a new team of editors. Let us first introduce ourselves and explain the chain of events that has led to this moment. Hans Storhaug, the first and only editor of the *AEMI Journal* for 15 years, proposed in late January that the Slovenian Migration Institute should take over the editorship of the Journal as it has many decades of experience in editing and publishing its own academic journal, *Two Homelands: Migration Studies*. The new AEMI board agreed. After careful consideration at the Institute, three editors were named along with a mentor to supervise their work. The new editors Dr. Klara Kožar Rosulnik, Špela Kastelic, MA, and Maja Gostič, MA are working closely together with their supervisor Dr. Janja Žitnik Serafin, who has 30 years of experience as editor of academic journals and monographs. Besides, as Mr. Hans Storhaug pointed out in his foreword published in *AEMI Journal* 1 (2003), “[…] it was Janja Žitnik, research consultant at the Slovene Centre for Migration Studies, who at the annual meeting in Stavanger in 2002, formally proposed to the General Assembly that AEMI should publish its own journal. Her idea was unanimously supported and adopted, and this is the result.”

The decision on the 2017–2018 double issue was made by the new AEMI board in April 2018. The issue is based on a selection of papers presented at the 26th AEMI Conference in Santiago de Compostela (Spain) in 2016, and those presented at the 27th AEMI Conference in Husum (Germany) in 2017. The focus of the Santiago conference was on *European migrant diasporas and cultural identities*, whereas the theme of the Husum conference was *‘At home or alienated’ – Migrants and receiving countries between integration and parallel society, between ‘culture of welcome’ and xenophobia*. The papers from the Santiago conference were selected and partly edited by Hans Storhaug, while the papers from Husum were selected and edited by the new editors. The last article in this issue is from the conference in Turin in 2015.

Furthermore, we would like to address some of the changes that are coming with the new editorship. As Mr. Hans Storhaug pointed out repeatedly over the years of his editing of the Journal, there has been a great need for instructions for authors that would help them prepare their articles. It is necessary to adopt a uniform citation style and general guidelines that should be followed consistently throughout the Journal. Hence, we are publishing “Instructions for Authors” in this double issue and – hopefully – on the AEMI webpage. Moreover, we have set some additional criteria (e.g. the maximum length of the text, adequate level of English) for the selection of articles for publication. As there were no instructions available at the time when authors of this double issue were preparing their articles, we took the liberty of harmonizing the citation style of the Husum papers with the new guidelines as
much as possible. It was a bit more difficult with the Santiago papers as they were already edited by the previous editor, so we made a compromise there and edited those articles in a more limited way.

Perhaps we should also clarify the structure of this double issue compared to the previous ones. As we have not received the protocols of the last two AEMI conferences and as the AEMI board agreed that the protocol of each conference should be available on the AEMI webpage, we decided not to insist on publishing the conference protocols in this or the future volumes of the Journal. For this reason, we are only publishing – besides the selected papers – both conference programs and the welcome speeches from the Husum conference that were obtained from their authors specifically for the purpose of their publication.

It has been a great challenge as well as a privilege to take on the new editorship of the AEMI Journal. Special thanks go to Dr. Patrick Fitzgerald for his voluntary proofreading that has been ever so helpful to us. And finally, we would like to express our sincere gratitude and appreciation to Hans Storhaug for all the hard work he has done with the Journal throughout these past 15 years. As we admitted in one of our letters to the Board, we probably will not be able to meet the standards he has set but we will certainly try our best.
Programme of the 26th AEMI Conference
European Migrant Diasporas and Cultural Identities

28 September – 1 October, 2016
Santiago de Compostela, Galicia, Spain

Members of the Association of European Migration Institutions (AEMI) and other experts on migration issues met for a four day conference in Santiago de Compostela, Galicia, Spain – the conference was hosted by Consello da Cultura Galega and Arquivo da Emigración Galega (source: http://aemi.eu/aemi-meeting-2016-conference-program/).
WEDNESDAY, 28 September, 2016
18:00–18:30 Welcome
18:30–19:30 Opening lecture
Fernando Devoto, Research Institute of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the UCA, Buenos Aires, AR: The uses of ethnic identities between history and memory: An approach

THURSDAY, 29 September, 2016
9:00–10:30
SESSION 1: NEW MIGRATIONS IN EUROPE
Chair: Emilia García López, Council of Galician Culture / Galician Migration Archive
María González Blanco and Vicente Peña Saavedra, University of Santiago de Compostela, ES: New migrations from Galicia to Germany: Educational profiles and social networks
Sahra-Josephine Hjorth, Aalborg University, DK: Social media usage among Romanian labour migrants in Denmark: Exploring types of usage and implications
Sara Ingrosso, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich, DE: Italian newcomers to Germany and cultural identity
Rebeka Mesarić Žabčić, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, Zagreb, Croatia, HR: European migrations and cultural identities: The Croatian community in Germany
Laura Oso and Raquel Martínez Buján, University of A Coruña-ESOMI, ES: Mobility strategies and gender in a context of economic crisis in Galicia
10:30–11:00 Break

11:00–12:30
SESSION 2: NEW GLOBAL MIGRATIONS
Chair: Cathrine Kyø Hermansen, The Danish Immigration Museum, DK
Maria Giovanna Cassa, University of Milan Bicocca, IT: Nord-Sud mobility, negotiating a sense of belonging in Italian families living outwith Europe
José Manuel Estévez Saa, University of A Coruña, ES: Cartographies of contemporary migrations and transcultural identities in the 21st century English and American literature
Maria Beatriz Rocha-Trindade, Centro de Estudos das Migrações e das Relações Interculturais, CEMRI, Universidade Aberta, UAb, Lisboa, PT: Portuguese diaspora: Political potential of an expansive social reality
Cristina López Moreno, Sheffield Hallam University, GB: Spanish post-2008 migration outflows: Media narrative versus statistical “reality”
12:30–13.30 Lunch

13:30–15:00
SESSION 3: DIASPORA
Chair: Fernando Devoto, Research Institute of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the UCA, Buenos Aires, AR
Manuela Palacios, María Xesús Nogueira Pereira, Margarita Estévez Saá and María Jesus Lorenzo Modia, University of A Coruña / University of Santiago de Compostela, ES: Parallels between contemporary Galician and Irish migrant diasporas
Edurne Aróstegui, University of the Basque Country, ES: The construction of Basque-American identity through the analysis of literary sources
Dietmar Össes, LWL Industrial Museum – Westphalian State Museum for Industrial Heritage and Culture, Hannover Colliery, DE: Rise and fall of German immigrant communities in
Patrick Fitzgerald, Mellon Centre for Migration Studies, Ulster American Folk Park, Omagh, Northern Ireland: *Irish and Basque Diaspora: A comparative analysis*

15:00–15:30 Break

15:30–18:30

SESSION 4: IDENTITY AND RELIGION: PATTERNS OF COLLECTIVE BELONGING

Chair: X. M. Núñez Seixas, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich / Archive of Galician Migration

Federica Moretti, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, BE: *New regulations, old feelings: Houses, returns, disappointment*

Antonello Scialdone, ISFOL – Dept. of Welfare, Rome, IT: *On Cossack legacy and matriarchs in exile: Linking nation-building process and rhetorics of womanhood in Ukrainian diaspora*

Maria Luisa Di Martino, University of Deusto, ES: *Migrant women’s career paths in the Basque Country: A re-construction of Identity*

Inese Auzina Smith, Latvian Documentation Center and Archive, UK: *Documenting the history and cultural identity of the Latvian diaspora in Brazil*

Raphael Tsavkko García, University of Deusto, ES: *Historical background of the Basque Diaspora in Latin America: Integration and tensions*

Adam Walaszek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, PL: *From the May 3 Constitution Day celebrations to the “Bartek Bieda Show”: Polish and Polish diaspora culture in the United States 1870–1930*

Pernille Skovgaard Christensen, Aalborg University, DK: *Impacts of the Church? Processes of ethnic safeguarding in Mid-western Danish immigrant communities*

Simone Eick, German Emigration Center Bremerhaven, DE: *Becoming a Palatine: The “poor protestant refugees” from Germany and their different identities in London and N.Y. 1709–1760*

Elissa Gosso, University of Turin, IT: *“Iglesias de transplante”: Protestant migration to South America between autonomy and attachment to the Mother Church. The case of Waldensians*

FRIDAY, 30 September, 2016

9:00–10:30

SESSION 5: TRANSCULTURALISM AND HYBRIDIZATION

Chair: José Moya, Barnard College / Columbia University, US

Eleonora Angella, University of Naples l’Orientale, IT: *The making of a feminist paradigm: An Italian woman in Egypt at the outset of the 20th century*

Cenk Berkant, Mugla University, TR: *The Italian community of Izmir (Turkey) and its characteristic buildings in the city*

Solange Maslowski, Charles University in Prague, CZ: *Freedom of movement of persons in the outermost regions of the EU: The case of Reunion island*

Javier Colodrón, University of Santiago Compostela, ES: *Galicians: The baton of Cuban anarchism (1880–1898)*

María Fouz Moreno, University of Oviedo, ES: *Galician music, emigration and otherness: the presence of Galicia in the musical production of Argentinian composers from mid-twentieth Century*

10:30–11:00 Break

11:00–12:30

SESSION 6: MUSEUMS

Chair: Dietmar Osses, LWL Industrial Museum–Westphalian State Museum
for Industrial Heritage and Culture, Hannover Colliery, DE
Freja Gry Børsting, The Danish Immigration Museum, DK: *Letting go of the reins: Audience involvement at the Danish Immigration Museum*
Michalina Petelska, Emigration Museum in Gdynia, PL: *Polish identity on the other side of the planet: The cooperation between the Emigration Museum in Gdynia and Polish diaspora based on the example of the projects conducted with Polish New Zealanders and Polish Diaspora in America*
Chris Zisis, Institute of Cultural Anthropology / Folklore Studies, Hamburg University, DE: *Visual and material displays of migration histories in museums/exhibitions in Germany. Case study: Greek ‘Gastarbeiter’ in Germany. Towards collaborative museum work with immigration communities*
Antra Celmina, Latvian Abroad-Museum and Research Center, LV: *Genealogy as a method for the restoration of identity and diaspora-homeland ties after the Iron Curtain: The Latvian example*
Nonja Peters, Curtin University Sustainability Policy Institute, AU: *Developing a sustainable model in mutual cultural digital heritage: Tools and cases*

12:30–13:30 Lunch

13.30–16.00
**SESSION 7: EUROPEAN CRISES ON MIGRATION TODAY**
Chair: Maddalena Tirabassi, Centro Altreitalie, Vice Chair AEMI
Tina Magazzini, University of Deusto, ES: *Policing Roma integration between diversity recognition and deconstruction of the mainstream*
Paul Pauseback, Nordfriisk Instituut, Bredstedt, DE: *Looking back into the future? An outlook on the AEMI Conference 2017*
Jean-Barthelemi Debost, Musée national de l’histoire de l’immigration, Paris, FR: *How the Musée national de l’histoire de l’immigration respond to migration crisis in Europe?*
Open discussion on the European Migration Crises with the participation of: Riccardo Roba, Antonello Scialdone, Hans Storhaug, Laura Oso
16:00–16:30 Break

16:30–17:30 Closing lecture
José Moya, Barnard College / Columbia University: *Diasporas and cultural identities in a global perspective*
17:30 Closing address
Guided tour to Santiago’s Cathedral

**SATURDAY, 1 October, 2016**
9:30–12:30
AEMI Annual General Meeting (AEMI Members)
15:00 Walking of Santiago’s Pilgrimage Way

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Hans Storhaug
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Galician Music, Emigration and Otherness: The Presence of Galicia in the Musical Production of Argentinian Composers of the Mid-Twentieth Century

*María Fouz Moreno*

The ‘Other’ Galician Music

Since the late nineteenth century and especially after the Spanish Civil War there have been numerous migratory movements from Galicia to Argentina, with Galicians becoming the most substantial group of migrants in that country. The Galician emigrant community maintained many of the customs and traditions of their birthplace in the place where they settled, and among them music has played a very important role in serving as a link between past and present because of its ability to remind them of their place of origin. As Smith points out, international migration does not negate the sense of belonging which communities feel with respect to their places of origin, but rather migrants “transport and transplant with them their original identity, creating what some theorists have called ‘transnational community’” (Giménez 2011: 12–3).

As Elizabeth Sosa argues, ‘otherness’ “is an epistemological position which explores discursively the image of the cultures that made their space on the periphery and other interstices” (Sosa 2009: 39). In this way, according to this same author, ‘otherness’, as a category of analysis of culture “allows visualization of the peripheral subject from different angles, recognizes the conceptual expansion of radius and the generation of new approaches” (Sosa 2009: 39).

The point of view of ‘otherness’ allows us to analyze the image of those cultures that experienced development in different spaces from their place of origin, and this could be considered peripheral. This occurs with Galician culture, preserved or reinterpreted in different places of settlement of Galician emigrants. In this way, it can be seen how academic music influenced by Galician culture and created in migratory contexts, in this case in Argentina, has become a space for the ‘other’ in Galician musical historiography. This will be considered from two different
perspectives, firstly with the composers Juan José Castro and Roberto Caamaño and, secondly through the figure of Isidro Maiztegui.

Galician Academic Music of Argentina

The phenomenon of Galician emigration, which began in the late nineteenth century, brought with it a relocation of Galician music and an interesting resurgence of this outside the borders of the Iberian Peninsula, especially in the field of academic creation.

Despite the long migratory tradition of Galicia, and the importance of musical phenomena in emigrant communities, the history of Galician musical historiography is written mainly in relation to the music composed within its territory. This trend has prevailed and has created a vision of the history of Galician academic music, in which those ‘other’ composers who made their music on the periphery (within the concept of ‘otherness’ previously outlined) were excluded or relegated a secondary role in the process of construction of academic discourse.

There are a number of Galician emigrant composers and descendants of emigrants who have been widely involved in musical composition in Argentina but who are quite unknown today. Nonetheless there are some exceptions, such as the case of Andrés Gaos, whose figure was recovered thanks to the appearance of a number of academic works, publications, published scores, concert programs and recordings of some of his works.

Among the emigrant Galician musicians that continued their musical and compositional activity in Argentina, names like Egidio Paz Hermo, Manuel Prieto Marcos, Ricardo Pérez Camino, Juan María López, Juan José Castro Piñeiro, among others, stand out. Some of their compositions with reference to Galicia can be seen in Table 1.

As Aurora del Corno says:

Many of these composers [...] emigrated to Buenos Aires after carrying out distinguished work in Galicia [...], in search of new horizons and better circumstances, in some cases, in which to develop their art. It is probable that Galicia has recognized their importance but the impression remains that there was no real interest in making the name of these remarkable artists live on through their work, in all its aspects, beyond the limits of Galicia. On reaching the Galician capital, there was general awareness of the works they produced, but these works show great humility, an enormous love for their native Galicia, expressed in each musical phrase which referred to the region, more like a show of nostalgia than a show of the talent they possessed. The community honored them with recognition but did not provide them with sufficient support so as to continue to expand their art.

(Corno 1989: 139–140)

Given the brevity of this article, it is necessary to place special emphasis on those ‘other’ examples of Galician music by Argentine composers, descendants of Galicians, as is the case of Juan José Castro (Avellaneda, 1895 – Buenos Aires, 1968) or Roberto Caamaño (Buenos Aires, 1923–1993). Their family ancestry, the first generation of descendants of Galician
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPOSER</th>
<th>WORK</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ricardo Pérez Camino (Santiago de Compostela, 1842 – Argentina, 1915)</td>
<td>Himno a Galicia (1879)</td>
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<td>Himno a Pontevedra (1880)</td>
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<td>Himno a las Artes (lyrics by Emilia Pardo Bazán)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juan María López (A Coruña, 1855 – Argentina, 1939)</td>
<td>Fantasía Gallega, texto de Curros Enríquez (1894)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recordando a Galicia (1901)</td>
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<td>Segunda fantasía gallega (1902)</td>
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<td>Fantasía sobre motivos de aires gallegos (1902)</td>
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<td>Na Ruada, muiñeira</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egidio Paz Hermo (Puebla do Caramiñal – A Coruña, 1863 – Buenos Aires, 1933)</td>
<td>Adiós Ríos, Adiós Fontes (lyrics by Rosalía de Castro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>¿Onde vas? (lyrics by Aveliño Velloso)</td>
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<td>Sempre o memos</td>
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<td>Amor patrio</td>
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<td>O crebanto</td>
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<td>Noite de lúa ou Mingos e Rosa</td>
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<td>Matorral</td>
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<td></td>
<td>O consolo, (plot by Castro López)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alma Gallega</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alboradas, Alalá, Muiñeinas, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andrés Gaos Berea (A Coruña, 1874 – Mar del Plata, 1959)</td>
<td>Muiñeira para violín y piano (1891)</td>
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<td>Aires Gallegos, suite para piano (1905)</td>
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<td>Nuevos aires gallegos, suite para piano (1915)</td>
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<td>Sinfonía Nº2 En las montañas de Galicia (1917–1919)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rosa de Abril (Lyrics by Rosalía de Castro)</td>
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</table>
emigrants in Argentina, maintained their interest in Galician cultural heritage, and this is reflected in their compositions. As Julio Ogas notes, during the 1940’s “there is a large increase in Argentinian music with musical, programmatic or poetic allusions to Spanish culture” caused, among other factors, by its ‘descent or nationality’ or by the “recognition [...] of the intellectual values of exiled poets, imprisoned or killed during Franco’s regime” (Ogas 2005: 92).

Medieval Galician poetry and Rosalía de Castro’s Follas Novas appear in the repertoire of songs of Castro and Caamaño. The selection of these texts shows their commitment to the movement of recovery and promotion of Galician literary heritage, as well as the protection of the Galician language (mother tongue of their parents in this case) which takes place in exile. Similarly, it connects them with the determination of emigrants to maintain their language as a distinctive sign of identity. On the one hand, Juan Jose Castro creates Dos canciones de Rosalía de Castro (1948) based on poems by Rosalia de Castro “Eu levo una pena” and “Que hermosa te dou Dios”, and Cantares de amor (1951), with texts by the Galician minstrel Juyao Bolseyro. On the other hand, Roberto Caamaño composes Dos cantos gallegos op.3 (1945) based on the poems “A Xustiza pola man” and “Vamos Bebendo” by Rosalia de Castro (receiving awards at the International Competition of the Galician Centre in Buenos Aires in 1950); and also Dos cantares galaico-portugueses del s. XIII op. 18 (1954) based on “Ay madre, nunca sentiu” by Juyao Bolseyro and “Filha se grado eres” by the minstrel Lopo. As Marcela González noted, “the setting of these poems to music contains clear references to musical rhythms or melodic turns of phrase of folk and medieval Galician music.” (González 2010: 185)

However, the influence of Galician music with respect to sound stands out in De Terra Galega. Rapsodia para Coro y Orquesta by Castro. This work came about as a request from the Galician Centre in Buenos Aires in 1946. In this score, clear references to elements of Galician musical heritage, such as Alalá, Alborada or pandeirada, are highlighted. The aforementioned work (with its Suite Introspectiva) was recovered and edited in Galicia, thanks to the work of Joam Trillo and support from the Instituto Galego das Artes Escénicas e Musicais.

Along this line, we can also quote the figure of the composer on whom we will focus below: Isidro B. Maiztegui. In the same way as J. J. Castro and R. Caamaño, he forms part of the first generation of descendants of Galician emigrants in Argentina that decide to incorporate references to Galicia in their scores.

However, it is necessary to explain that there is a difference between them from the point of view of ‘otherness’: In the case of Caamaño and Castro we have talked of ‘otherness’ from the point of view of the deterritorialization of Galician culture (recreation and development of Galician culture in Buenos Aires).

Maiztegui is an immigrant musician who, after establishing contact with Galician culture through the Galician community of emigrants, arrives in Spain where he becomes familiar with the Galician musical and cultural environment. He then works with important Galician intellectuals and, as a result, begins to compose his Galician works. Despite this,
this composer stands as a ‘foreign other’ in Galician territory and he is excluded from the official History of Galician music.

‘Other’ Music in the Musical Identity of Maiztegui

As indicated in the introduction, the second focus of this article is on the analysis of cultural and musical circumstances leading a composer, born outside Galicia, to take on, as part of his own identity, that ‘other’ music bequeathed by his ancestors. In this sense, this study starts by observing the cultural and creative process that leads this musician to take Galician music as a constituent part of his idiosyncrasy, which situates ‘otherness’ within the scope of academic music from Río de la Plata.

One particularly interesting case is that of Isidro Maiztegui (Gualeguay, 1905 – Mar del Plata, 1996) who decided to integrate Galician music into his compositions after establishing direct contact with the native culture. In immigrant communities a sense of collective identity is maintained over time. As Núñez Seixas noted, this identity does not necessarily disappear in the second generation but, in some cases, is transmitted “in the form of ethno-cultural symbolic identity to their descendants, who maintain it as a form of voluntary and emotional affiliation, consistent with a type of pride in tradition and culture shared by the original group” (Núñez Seixas 2002: 18).

Maiztegui presents a multifaceted identity in his ideas and in his artistic work, shaped by segments created from the traditions received and selected (Argentine, Galician, Spanish), and by fragments which come together in his creative and intellectual work. The fact that is of interest here is the selection of the ‘other’ Galician culture as a constituent part of his identity and his work, influenced mainly by the oral transmission of Galician culture from his mother, an ideology linked to Spanish intellectuals exiled in Argentina and, above all, his nationalistic Galician consciousness formed through his close relationship with Galician emigrant communities and the links established with different Galician intellectuals in Argentina, as well as during the ten years that he lived in Spain (Luis Seoane, Isaac Diaz Pardo, Fernandez del Riego, etc.).

Galician influence is revealed in the scenic cantata Macías o Namorado (1956), Preludios galegos op.28 for piano (1957), songs for voice and piano Sin niño (1964), ¿Qué pasa ó redor de min? (1964), Longa noite de pedra y Tempo de chorar (1968), Paco Pixiñas. Historia dun desleigado contada por il mesmo (1970), Seis poemas Galegos de Federico García Lorca. Most of these works were composed during the period when Maiztegui emigrated to Spain.

At this point, it should be pointed out that this last work was created at the request of Professor Luis Perez Rodriguez, after a meeting with Maiztegui in Mar del Plata in August 1994. The score was included in the book O Pórtico poético dos “Seis poemas galegos” de García Lorca by Luis Perez and edited separately by the Consello da Cultura Galega. The world premiere of this composition was on April 12, 1996 in this same institution, with Maiztegui on piano accompanying the soprano Marta de Castro (Pérez Rodriguez 1998: 359).

The relevance of his Galician works within their catalogue and the manner in which they are extolled by this composer, demonstrates his strong commitment to
Galician culture. In these works, references can be found to customs and traditions from Galicia (cordel literature, religious festivities, etc.) and, above all, the clear influence of Galician music is revealed through the use or resounding allusion to certain traditional instruments, the use of resources from popular musical genres and, at other times, through the quoting of fragments of works from Galician academic music. These works are not only a tribute to Galicia, but they also entail the intention of a reevaluation of the cultural tradition inherited from his mother. In this way, for example, with works like Macías or Namorado or Paco Pixiñas, Maiztegui reinterprets elements of the Galician tradition to bring them to an academic plane, where the various elements that are part of Galician cultural heritage become features that represent a real identity.

It is also necessary to emphasize that in some of the film projects in which he participates as a composer – Mariñeiro (José Suárez, 1939), Viento del Norte (Antonio Momplet, 1954), Sonatas (Juan Antonio Bardem, 1959) and, to a lesser extent, in La venganza (J. A. Bardem, 1958) he includes elements of Galician culture through references to his music, using popular tunes and using musical instruments or traditional instrumental groups.

**Epilogue**

To conclude, the phenomenon of Galician emigration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought about fragmentation and a process of relocation of contexts of creation of Galician music. This is referred to in the following quotation from Pablo Cirio:

Galician music is like a coin with two sides, one showing the territorial Galicia and the other, the Galicia abroad. Both are inevitably different, but both constitute an inseparable unity, and one cannot be understood without considering the other, as each shows a different ‘side’ of the music of the Galician people. (Cirio 2006: 17)

In this way, ‘otherness’ as a category of analysis of the framework of Galician academic music, serves to highlight the importance of peripheral music generated in the context of migration, in this case from Argentina, from two points of view: On one side, through the study of the implications that generated the discourse of ‘otherness’ in creating the history of Galician music, we have highlighted the need to broaden the concept of “Galician academic music” and to include in Galician musical historiography those ‘other’ composers, immigrants or descendants of immigrants, who included references to Galicia in their works (as is the case of Juan José Castro and Roberto Caamaño).

On the other side, as a result of this approach, a new history of Galician music also brings together the discourses of both music and identity, generated from the contexts of migration and the consideration of those circumstances leading certain composers to take on, as part of their own identity, that ‘other’ music passed on by their ancestors (as in the case of Maiztegui).

Whereas Caamaño and Castro represent ‘otherness’ from the deterritorialization of Galician culture produced by the phenomenon of emigration, Maiztegui, as an immigrant musician, represents the
‘foreign other’ within Galician territory. However, we must bear in mind that both are part of the same reality because both are excluded from the official history of Galician music, despite the importance they had in sustaining a reinterpretation of a Galician musical identity from both sides of the Atlantic.

Bibliography


Notes

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New Migrations from Galicia to Germany: Educational Profiles and Social Networks

María González Blanco and Vincente Peña Saavedra

Introduction

In recent years of the new millennium the media have spread several reports on the current migration of Spanish youth. Among them – and to cite only a few examples for illustrative purposes – we find the following headlines: “Qualified Spanish immigration increases in Germany” (ABC 2012); “Iciar Bollaín portrays the disappointment and nostalgia of Spanish emigrants” (El País 2014); “Millennial Generation: 83% of young people believe they will have to emigrate to work” (El Correo Gallego 2015); “A total of 36,511 Spaniards emigrated to Germany in 2013, according to the Federal Bureau of Statistics” (España Exterior 2014); “The loss of 25% of young people aggravates the economic impact of aging in Galicia” (Faro de Vigo 2014); “Galician scientists concerned about the brain drain because of the recession” (Faro de Vigo 2012), “More than 30,000 people emigrated to other countries or communities in 2014” (La Voz de Galicia 2015), “Germany benefits from immigration” (Deutsche Welle 2014); “The number of Galicians who emigrate to other countries decreases, but those who move to other parts of Spain increase” (La Voz de Galicia 2015); “About 45% of Pontevedran citizens who choose to emigrate abroad are younger than 30 years old” (Faro de Vigo 2015); “Before, we exported unskilled labour; now, talent” (La Voz de Galicia 2016).

In addition to this summary of current news items, reference should be made to some of the authors who have worked the most in the field of emigration such as Xosé Manuel Beiras Torrado, Antonio Eiras Roel, Julio Hernández Borge, Xosé Manuel Núñez Seixas, Vicente Peña Saavedra and Ramón Villares Paz, of whom we will indicate some important works in the following section.

This media landscape reflects, to some extent, social concern about the phenomenon of emigration which has led to a debate about the quantification of the number of emigrants leaving Spain. In fact, there is no source that can identify relatively accurately the exact number of people who have left. And that is why the research presented herein is more of a descriptive and qualitative analysis of a sample of emigrants from Galicia to
Germany and their academic profiles, rather than a study with ambitions of completeness and representativeness surrounding the current Galician emigration into German territory.

This communication is the result of the research conducted in the year 2014–2015 titled: Approaching the emigration process of Galician youth in Germany at present: educational profile, employment and expectations.¹

Why did we decide to do research on this issue? The main reasons that have led us to this work have been personal, social and scientific. First, since childhood we have heard numerous anecdotes from endless stories referring to Germany that a person of our family who immigrated in the 1960s to a town near Frankfurt, used to tell us (anecdotes about German transport, recycling bottles, culture, agriculture, pollution, etc.). Following this flow of memories, our being able to visit Germany and see if what is known as the ‘economic locomotive of Europe’ was really the same country that was set in our imagination through the information made available to us and the news we saw or read in the media, would become, years later, the birth seed of this research.

Secondly, emigration is a systemic phenomenon that is a substantial part of the history of Galicia. And although current emigration flows show marked differences from the profiles exhibited at other times (19ᵗʰ and 20ᵗʰ centuries), its survival and revival in Galicia today is a relevant factor affecting one way or another each of the areas of the social fabric of the community. Therefore, we must bear emigration in mind as a component of marked influence on the future of Galician reality, since its impact, immediate and delayed, has left, and continues to leave, a huge imprint on the fabric of the country, as both classic and recent studies on the subject testify. In this regard, some publications of outstanding importance on the study of emigration must be cited in chronological order, such as those made by Xosé Manuel Beiras Torrado (Structure and problems of the Galician population [1970], The economic backwardness of Galicia, [1972]); the work of professor Julio Hernández Borge (Galician emigration to Europe from 1961 to 1975 [1976] and Past and present of Galician emigration in Europe [2007]), publications of professor Vicente Peña Saavedra (Exodus, community organization and school intervention: educational imprint of transoceanic emigration in Galicia [1991]; Galicia-America: historical relations and future challenges [1993]); the work of Antonio Eiras Roel (Contributions to the study of Galician emigration, a regional approach [1992]); the work of Carlos Sixirei Paredes (Emigration [1995]), the research of Professor Ramón Villares Paz (History of Galician emigration to America [1996]), and the work of professor Xosé Manuel Núñez Seixas (Transoceanic return emigration and social change in the Iberian Peninsula: some theoretical observations in a comparative perspective [2001]). And some recent news about current emigration, including: “Spaniards are migrants again” (UNRIC 2016); “Almost 100,000 Spaniards left the country in 2015, the highest figure since the beginning of the recession” (La Voz de Galicia 2016); “Almost 100,000 Spaniards emigrated in 2015, the highest figure since the financial crisis” (El País 2016).

Thirdly, at present, the research that is being done on emigration from within the field of education is still scarce and
we consider it necessary to document and visualize more transparently and deeply what is happening with this phenomenon from a pedagogical perspective. We believe that together with the subject dealt with from the sociological, economic, political, historical or demographic areas, it is essential to examine it from its educational aspect, since there are several implications involved in this domain.

Features of the Paper: Research Problem, Objectives, Methodology, Results, Conclusions
Having presented the reasons that prompted us to do this research, we now elaborate on the characteristics of the work described. The basis of inquiry that we considered was expressed in these terms: Have the most qualified and best trained (young) people from Galicia been emigrating in recent years? In relation thereto, the overall objective we set out was formalized in these terms: analyse the current emigration of Galician youth to Germany, while trying to focus mainly on their educational profile and type of employment done in the host country, in order to verify whether the phenomenon of brain drain, which the media talks much about, corresponds or not to the reality of those who have left.

In addition to this overall objective, we have formulated several specific objectives from which we highlight here those which are most relevant to the educational profile targets, self-perception, relationships and participation in social networks, and expectations of emigrated Galicians. They are the following:
- Identify and get to know the educational profile (academic studies and training) of Galician emigrant youth to Germany in recent years.
- Establish close contact with the object emigrant study group to collect information on their self-perception (feelings, emotions and opinions) regarding their emigration experience.
- Inquire into the main expectations and social relationships of the group of young emigrants from Galicia in Germany today.

The methodology used was of a mixed nature, both qualitative and quantitative. The former allowed us to have closer and more detailed contact with the population studied and the information it provided. The latter provided for the numerical treatment of much of the data collected directly from our informants.

The population under study was intentionally selected given they had the following characteristics:
- Young Galicians born in Galicia.
- Aged between eighteen and forty-one years old.
- Emigrated since 2007.
- Country of destination of their emigration project: Germany.

The initial size of the population with which we established contact totaled 77 people. After a review, and given that some of the selected people did not strictly comply with the requirements, this number was reduced to 69 people. Of this group, a total of 34 people were eventually involved.

How did we establish the approach and contact with the population? The main strategies and tools used to contact Galician emigrants were the use of the Internet and, more specifically, the social network Facebook. In this network we created our
own profile to carry out the research. Then we searched for groups of Galicians living in Germany. Some of the groups that we found are identified as: Berlín en Galego, Galegos na Alemania, Galegos en Baviera, Galegos en Heidelberg, Galegos en Hamburgo, Galegos en Bonn e arredores, Galegos emigrados, Gallegos en Alemania, Españoles en Hamburgo, Españoles en Stuttgart, Españoles en Alemania, Españoles en Duisburg, Españoles en Munich, Españoles en Berlín, Españoles en Saarland and Españoles en Frankfurt. Through the created profile, and by posting on different groups, we spread the message about the work we were carrying out. Gradually, through conversations with different emigrants, we succeeded in gathering approximately 50 potential participants interested in the issue. The use of social networks in the conducted study was the best option because the consulted databases (for example, the National Institute of Statistics [Spanish: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE], the Galician Statistical Institute, [Spanish: Instituto Gallego de Estadística, IGE] and EUROSTAT) as well as the literature available in Spain until the present date on this subject did not provide us with the information we needed regarding the educational profile of the current population of Galician emigrants.

The methodological tools we used were a questionnaire via the program Google Docs and an interview outline.

The final questionnaire we prepared was sent to emigrants through the Facebook profile and, in some cases, by email. The aforementioned questionnaire was finally composed of 69 items, divided into four thematic blocks: I. Personal Data, II. Educational profile, III. Employment, IV. Self-perception, social relationships and expectations.

In the case of the interviews, we established six core areas related to the core content of the questionnaire, and we carried these out via Skype during the months of May and June 2015. In the end, we managed to interview 9 people (6 women and 3 men) aged between 23 and 30. The application of this technique allowed us more direct, face-to-face contact with our interviewees which provided us more details about them by observing gestures or by hearing the voice of the interviewees, aspects that we consider very positive for generating a climate of confidence, peace and closeness with the collective.

Results: Educational Profile, Self-Perception, Relationships and Social Networks, and Expectations

Educational Profile
The main results regarding the educational profile showed that this is a youth group which is led by, with the same share of 23.5%, those who attended higher education (Master level or equivalent) or those with a three-year degree (Spanish: Diplomatura). Those were followed, secondly, by those who completed a five-year degree (Spanish: Licenciatura) (17.6%) and, finally, by those who completed a degree (14.7%). A total of 28 people had university degrees, 3 had coursed vocational training (higher or intermediate level), 1 had a degree in Secondary Education, 1 indicated that he had only completed baccalaureate and 1 had a degree in artistic education.

Overall, in terms of specialization, the Engineering and Architecture area...
was highlighted with 9 people who had studies related to it, and the area of Health Sciences with 7 people who had studied that. In addition to university studies, areas of vocational training (higher or intermediate level) referred to in the study were those of Graphic Arts, Image and Sound, Hotel and Tourism, and Health. Other studies indicated concerned arts education, among which the specialized fields coursed by some of the emigrants were music and visual arts and design.

Currently, most of the emigrants are not studying anymore, and those who continue to study are studying in German universities, artistic educational centers, on their own or at the National University of Distance Education (Spanish: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, UNED). The level of training received in Spain was weighted by the majority (55.9%) as ‘high’, followed by the assessment of ‘average’ by 35.3% and ‘low’ by 2.9%.

Regarding the prior knowledge of the German language prior to their departure, 52.9% affirm they did have some sort of knowledge about this language, although only 8 people had an official certification, while 47.1% did not have any knowledge at all. Other languages that they knew before departure to Germany and in which they did have an official certification were English, French, and Portuguese. In a very specific case, one of the subjects mentioned that he/she had certificates that were not official for the following languages: Basque, Catalan, Galician and sign language.

Self-Perception
To get to know their particular and personal views as emigrants, we asked them questions in the following lines during the interviews, getting the answers that follow:

How did you feel once you arrived in Germany? At first, what were your feelings, emotions and personal impressions in this country? Did you feel welcome? Some answers we got:

At first I felt pretty bad because it was a new town; I did not know anyone [...] I was lucky at work and the German people I met were very kind to me and gave me a nice welcome. I did not feel welcomed either by the Germans or the German bureaucracy. [...] I felt fear, loneliness...

How do you think Galician youth immigrants are perceived by the German society? These were their responses:

Where I am living we are all Spanish emigrants, or Südländer as they call us ... contemptuously. [...] they have the perception that we migrate there to steal their jobs ... [...] That we came here demanding a lot ... wanting to make a lot and that we do not make much effort ... [...] Everyone who is Spanish is very welcomed because of the training they have.

Currently, would you define yourself as a Galician emigrant, as a foreign worker, as just one more German, etc.? The overwhelming response mentioned, firstly, the status of ‘emigrant’, and secondly, that of ‘worker’. Some people proposed their own self-identification as ‘exiled’, ‘world citizen’ or ‘expatriate’.

Overall, according to the predominant response of the subjects of the sample (82.4%), the Galician youth immigrants
in Germany are kindly welcomed, although the level of integration in the German society is reputed as ‘medium’.

**Relationships and Social Networks**
The emigrant group in Germany participates in various activities and celebrations in the area where they live and keep in touch with Spanish people more than with German people. In fact, the Galician youth emigrants recognize that they keep in more direct contact in Germany with people who come from the Spanish autonomous communities of Galicia, Andalucía, Castilla-La Mancha and Cataluña.

The main means of maintaining communication and relationship between the emigrant population is essentially the Internet and, more specifically, social networks, among them Facebook, Linkedin and Twitter. These social networks play an important role, since the immediacy of response from members of the various groups facilitates the organization of different face-to-face meetings, announcement regarding housing availability or demand, or the search for multiple kinds of useful articles for youth emigrants, such as furniture.

An outstanding fact is that many of the people who are emigrants in the same region, city or town often create a closed Facebook group to keep in touch with people of the same origin living in that place. Other media used are mobile phones and the WhatsApp app and/or email.

**Expectations**
The main expectations that they described are related to the return to their country of origin and to the things they miss from before their process of emigration.

In the case of return, we asked the following question: *Do you plan to return to your country?* The answer obtained in the interviews confirmed that their desire is to return (82.4% assured that). However, the answers given by the interviewees raised doubts about this matter because, although they want to return to Galicia, they consider that if there are not particular social, educational, work related or economic changes (for instance greater job stability, better salaries, less abusive schedules, etc.), this return is not clear, or, at least, it will take longer than originally planned. In this sense, the vast majority marked the option *‘I don’t know’* as the one that best corresponded to their idea about returning to Galicia or not.

Their expectations of emigration previous to their departure from the country of origin were basically work upgrading, economic upgrading and, in some cases, extending their studies. As examples, we highlight some of the answers:

[…], […] I always wanted to go abroad for a few years but not to stay here my whole life. I wanted to find a job [...]. […] when I was told I was hired (for the job) I thought it couldn’t be true. I wanted to gain experience, learn the language.

**Conclusions**
The study carried out allowed us to reach the following conclusion about the research problem set out at the beginning: that the educational profile of the Galician collective of migrants in Germany is correlated with people that have a high level of education, both university and vocational training or arts education. Moreover, some emigrants continue to extend their training in Germany.
On the basis of the information gathered, it follows that it is necessary to carry out some changes in the education system and in the training of students. For instance, our informants have emphasized the need to improve the teaching of foreign languages, particularly regarding the methodologies used, and to also improve the teaching of use and management of Information and Communications Technology (I.C.T.).

With regard to self-perception, the vast majority of people identify and define themselves as an ‘emigrant’. However, young Galician emigrants feel perfectly integrated in German society and maintain various contacts with other emigrants through Facebook. Although in some cases, at the beginning, their integration in the host country was hard and they had to deal with numerous obstacles such as the language barrier or cultural differences, nowadays their feelings are that they are better off and more welcomed than in the first days and months after their arrival.

The only doubts that remain to some extent in the minds of the emigrated group are: When will we return? Where will we be in a couple of years? If socioeconomic status was clearly improving in the country of origin, maybe the answer would be easier and more immediate and there wouldn’t be long moments of silence in the course of the answers. They confirm that changes are needed in different areas (political, educational, economic, social or cultural) in order to encourage their return. They hope to return some day but they do not know when. They also hope the choice of emigration as an escape from the current situation never happens again, and that coming generations do not need to emigrate as they did.

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**Note**

1. This work was mentored and guided by senior lecturer Vicente Peña Saavedra of the University of Santiago de Compostela.
Historical Background of the Basque Diaspora in Latin America: Integration and Tensions

Raphael Tsavkko Garcia

Introduction
This paper presents the preliminary empirical findings of an ongoing PhD thesis examining the Basque diaspora in Latin America, more specifically in Argentina, and the political and ideological tensions within this diaspora, having the Euskal Etxeak (or Basque houses or clubs) as a focal point of analysis.

The objective of this paper is to discuss the historical basis of the Basque migration to Latin America and to present briefly some of the most important or reality shifting moments of the conflicts that have permeated a 600 years long diaspora. Those moments can be identified as generational, found within patterns of migration waves showing that, despite the clear formation of a diasporic identity, the most significant developments at the diaspora were also a reflex of tensions and conflicts in the homeland.

Basque Diaspora and Diasporic Identity
Diaspora can be defined as the “transnational collectivity, broken apart by, and woven together across, the borders of their own and other nation-states maintaining cultural and political institutions” (Tökölyan 1991: 5), also as a population dispersed from its homeland, with collective memory and idealisation or even mythical vision (Safran 1991: 83) of the homeland, as well as a strong ethnic consciousness and solidarity with co-members of the group (Cohen 1997:180) and an exacerbation of allegedly common and ancestral traits that are periodically reinforced (Billig 1995; Renan 2007).

The Basque Diaspora can be understood as the community of ethnic Basques that were born – or descended from those who were born – in the historical territory of
the Basque Country or *Euskal Herria*, comprising territories now divided by France (Iparralde or Northern Basque Country, part of the department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques) and Spain (Basque Autonomous Community and Foral Community of Navarre) and migrated elsewhere or, in the case of this article, to the Americas from the 15th century up to today.

It is possible to assume that the Basque Diaspora is a community (Angulo Morales 2002) of constant construction and re-construction of identities, a “sum of geographies, times, generations, and individual identities, by-products of living experiences and inherit traditions” (Oiarzabal 2013: 21).

These Basques at the diaspora – altogether with Basques in the homeland – form a nation, an ethnonational group (Connor 1994), a group of people who believe they are related since ancient times, maintaining traditions and heritage and passing it to the next generation, sharing a sense of uniqueness (Smith 1991) also with the Basques at the homeland, despite the fact that the Basque diasporic identity is much more than a mere reproduction of the homeland identity – though many of the conflicts within the diaspora follow in general lines those of the homeland –, but has added significant elements of the host-nation and also maintained traits long gone or abandoned in the Homeland (Oiarzabal 2013) and maintaining a culture of ethnical separation or even purity (Zulaika and Douglas 1996), an ‘imaginary coherence’ for a set of identities (Hall et al. 2003).

Basque identities were shaped by Basques’ own experiences of migration and its complex interrelation with nation-state building processes taking place throughout the American continent. The ethnic politics of Basque identity construction spread throughout the American continent by the establishment of immigrant associations and the work of ethnic leaders in diaspora communities. (Oiarzabal and Molina 2009: 701)

This Basque imagined community (Anderson 2005), or imagined transnational community (Appadurai 1997), is made up of individuals that may never meet each other, from Bilbao to Buenos Aires or San Francisco and Reno, but they imagine themselves as members of the same ethnonogroup, sharing common traits, despite the differences. “The different Basque diasporic groups preserve their ethnic identities by considering and ‘imagining’ themselves as a part of a global Basque ethnic community” (Totoricagüeña 2004: 10), therefore, they feel like members of the same Basque nation or ethnonational group (Connor, 1994) and it has lasted for centuries and through different migration waves, deterritorialised (Ortiz 1999, 2004; Haesbaert 2002, 2004).

Despite political and ideological differences, as well as nationalistic points of view, Basques in the Diaspora kept seeing themselves as one group, one nation, forming a Diaspora or Diasporic Identity (Totoricagüeña 2004: 147; Oiarzabal 2013: 28) that synthesises or combines both the Basque and the host-country identities in a transnational way (Vertovec 1999), meaning that it relates Basques both socially, economically and culturally within multiple boundaries and societies. As Oiarzabal (2013: 92) mentioned, “the
The self-perpetuation of Basque identity in the Diaspora is very much based on the pride and affection for assumed characteristics, such as uniqueness or singularity of such an identity.

The Basque diasporic identity is a (re)configuration of both the home-land—“ancestral ties, kinship relations, common language of communication, historical and imaginary memories and religious beliefs” (Gautam 2013: 7)—and the host country identities, the ideal of being Basque as well as being a member of the host society. It is the idea of integration, but not of losing one’s culture, of having multiple or transnational consciousnesses (Sorensen 1995: 107). Basques are physically connected to their host-countries, yet they remain psychologically and emotionally connected to their Homeland.

According to Totoricagüeña (2004: 102), the Basques managed to work with their ethnic identity altogether with the civic identity, the one of the host-country. The ethnic identity as the defining basis of Basqueness is still emphasized within the diaspora, the more civic identity has now become the centre of the homeland nationalism (Totoricagüeña 2004: 54).

During the second half of the 19th century Basque Houses or Euskal Etxeak were founded, structures that had not existed before, as Basques tended to organise themselves within the Real Sociedad Bascongada de Amigos del País, which served as a mostly economic but also political lobby towards the American colonies and also within religious entities, such as the Orden Tercera de San Francisco (Alvarez Gila 2010) or the brotherhood of Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu (Aramburu Zudaire 2002), and aid and beneficial institutions (Muru Ronda 1999: 100; Cava Mesa 1996: 137–139).

Diaspora associations create transnational networks that maintain varying degrees of personal, institutional, cultural, social, economic, political and business ties with the homeland and with other countries where there is a Basque presence: a globe-spanning network of attachments and allegiances. (Oiarzabal and Molina 2009: 699)

Basques founded the Euskal Etxeak not only as sort of clubs for them to gather, but also as institutions to help those in need, specially the newcomers looking for a better life. In this sense, Basque clubs or houses – and in some places even hotels – are a place to experience home or to simulate environments of homeland (Totoricagüeña 2004: 148) and a “place of sociability of the members of the Basque community” (Caula et al. 2002: 55). To some extent, they also tended to emulate homeland politics and even political disputes in political party and ideological lines, despite some local and unique characteristics.

The Euskal Etxeak were a means to strengthen ethnonational ties, as Eriksen (1993: 68) noted, “social identity becomes most important when it becomes threatened, which is often related to some kind of change, such as immigration.” The Euskal Etxeak – both the ones founded by Foralists, Carlists and those who came from Europe during the 19th century and those founded later by nationalists in the 1940s and so on – will play a central role during the 20th century, the role of the focal point of many tensions, political debates and conflicts.
Tensions within different waves of Basque migrants were something quite common in the diaspora, but we can observe at least three specific moments or major tension points, each coinciding with the shift in migration patterns and the arrival of a new ideological approach to the Basque question, rights and even identity that can also be understood as inter-generational conflicts of new migrants challenging the domination of a previous or older group:

1. The arrival of Basques after the Carlist Wars, the War of Independence and so on during the 19th century that brought a fuerista ideology, non-existent before within the diaspora. It was also a moment where the construction of the Spanish identity was being built and also the so called sub-national or peripheral identities within Spain (see Oiarzabal & Molina 2009).

2. The arrival of members of the PNV that brought with them the nationalist Aranist ideology opposed to the previous fuerista ideology at the end of the 19th century brought up more tension within the diaspora while they attempted to spread their ideology and also started taking over the direction of the Euskal Etxeak, not without a fight. The nationalist ideology of the PNV and their members will permeate most of the lives of the diaspora and of the Euskal Etxeak during the 20th century.

3. During the 1970s, the wave of consistent numbers of left-wing nationalists will threaten to – if not actually challenge – the PNV domination over the diaspora.

During the following years, conflicts will arise due to political and ideological differences on the view of the Basque path towards independence that will lead to splits within the Euskal Etxeak. The formation of a Basque government during the 1980s – with almost uninterrupted PNV dominion – and the internet in the 1990s and later will give a boost to the conflicts as in on hand the Basque government will fill the Euskal Etxeak with money and promises, on the other hand the internet will allow the left wing nationalist organisations to spread their ideology.

It is important to note that this is not in any way an extensive list, nor is there any intention in resuming centuries of migration and tensions in just three cases, but those are the most visible and, to some degree, profound conflicts that led to paradigm shifts within the diaspora.

Overview of the Basque Diaspora and the First Wave

During the Spanish Colonial period, Basques enjoyed leading positions all over the American colonies (Bilbao and Douglas 1975) constituting themselves as a self-aware ethnic group (Douglass 2006) and formed migration chains (Aramburu Zudaire 2002) that where based on cultural peculiarities and an “ancient and strong tendency towards mutual union of those originated in Vasconia, based in turn on a consciousness of its collective identity and communitarian singularity.”

The influx of Basques to the Americas before the 19th century was mainly of political and economic leaders of the colonial empire, as well as traders and merchants in many important and key cities (Morales 2002) such as Havana, Potosí, Buenos Aires, etc. and their number might be bigger than what is supposed (Aramburu Zudaire 2002).
The factors that led thousands of Basques to migrate towards the Americas afterwards, not only as representatives of the political elites and the Castilian Crown (Douglass 2006) were many, but it is worth mentioning that there was a growing need for labour in the so-called ‘new world’. Leaders of colonies in the Americas, such as the Río de la Plata (now Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and parts of Bolivia and Peru), searched for men to go deep into the territory in order to create villages, commercial outposts and to take possession of the land that, up until that point, belonged to various indigenous populations.

Additionally, after the independence of Argentina and Uruguay (but also of Colombia, Venezuela and elsewhere in the Americas), the new leaders sought to secure the rule of the newborn states by populating vast areas such as the Pampas (vast area of north-eastern Argentina and most of Uruguay); thus, many Basques migrated there to work with cattle and on agriculture colonies (Douglass 2006).

Amongst other reasons for fleeing the Basque Country were the many conflicts within Spain and France at that time, such as the Napoleonic Wars, the First (1833–39) and the Second (1872–76) Carlist Wars and the 1848 Revolution on the French side as well as, years later, the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) and the Francoist dictatorship (Totoricagüena 2004).

I believe that we can identify four different yet overlapping Basque migration waves, which I seek to analyse on the following pages. The periods are:

First, the so-called original Diaspora from the 16th to 18th century of Basques who were part of the Spanish colonial empire, and already analysed in this first section, possessed the main characteristic of being a wave made up mostly of Basques who took part on the Spanish Empire enterprise as administrative figures or leading traders and merchants.

The second can be traced to the 19th century, a wave of impoverished Basque migrants seeking jobs, especially in Uruguay and in Argentina, and also of refugees from the Spanish war of independence and the Carlist wars. The first and second waves overlap at some point during the independence of the many American countries and the borders of each wave, or phase, cannot be precisely defined as the process of substitution of the migration of Basque elites for peasants and later of Basque refugees as the process took over a century. During this period, the Euskal Etxeak, or Basque houses, started to be founded and they will be further analysed.

The third wave can be described as the one of refugees from the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s and the role of the members of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), which brought some tension to the Diaspora while politicising it.

The fourth wave is again a wave of refugees, but now mostly left-wing ones, during the 1960s and 1970s. Members of ETA, families of political prisoners and any left-wing nationalists persecuted back home. It was a wave with less human displacement, but with significant ideological repercussions in the years to follow.

It is important to have in mind the difficulties of identity maintenance a member of a Diaspora faced while dispersed, away from home, and with sporadic or even no contact with the Homeland.
The Second Wave

Y es que el asociacionismo vasco siempre estuvo en íntima conexión con movimientos políticos, en concreto con el carlismo y con el nacionalismo. En sus centros, los vascos hicieron práctica política activa, siendo muchas veces escenarios de agrias disputas. Aparte fundaron entidades exclusivamente políticas, con el fin de difundir las ideas nacionalistas de Sabino Arana entre la colonia establecida en Argentina. Fue también muy importante la participación de vascos en la organización y divulgación de la ideología carlista en la República. (Ortiz 1996: 128)

The main or most visible theatre of disputes and tensions between the so-called ‘old Basques’ and the second wave Basque migrants were the Euskal Etxeak, many of them founded in the second half of the 19th century as aid institutions and spaces of sociability or even sociality (Maffesoli 1996), understood as set of practices that go beyond the state rigid social control, a being-together that is independent of a goal to be achieved (Maffesoli 1996).

Tensions arose within such houses as newcomers from the wars in Europe came carrying political agendas or ideologies that were not an issue or relevant for the ‘old Basque migration’ (Douglass 2006: 35). The new migrants brought a political discourse, as well as a sense of ‘basqueness’ that was completely distant from the mostly ‘Latinized’ (Douglass 2006: 35) old Basques that were for a long time away of the homeland, sometimes for generations.

A struggle for power within the new-born Euskal Etxeas took place, in some cases with serious fractures, also in geographical lines, with Basques from Iparralde (France), Hegoalde (Basque Country) and Nafarroa (Navarre) organising themselves in their own groups or houses, which was the case of Mexico City and its Casino Español, Centro Vasco and Basque club of the Federal District (Oiarzabal 2013).

During this period the Spanish identity was being built, with little success according to de Pablo, Mees and Rodríguez (1999). On the other hand, the nation building of Spain “supported local and regionally based ethnic identities in order to reinforce the roots of national identity among the population” (Oiarzabal and Molina 2009: 703). In other words, during the 19th century, despite the weak penetration of Spanish institutions in, for example, the Basque Country up to the Carlist Wars, the Spanish identity itself contained local or sub-national identities or even regional identities (Álvarez Gila 1996: 175) as parts of the Spanish one (Oiarzabal and Molina 2009), the idea of a civic Spanish identity carried within the Basque own ethnic identity – as well as a Catalan or Galician ethnic identities.

According to Núñez Seixas (2004: 53), the 19th century Spanish state had a “lack of efficiency in its nationalizing process” expressed by an “inefficient educational system, […] a national army based in a discriminatory and classist military service, a scarce diffusion and a lack of consolidation of its own nationalist symbolism” and an inefficient administration of the state. Due to such problems, adds Núñez Seixas, the “social use of languages different from Castilian persisted with great force” leading to cultural movements
for the promotion of regional languages and identities. The Spanish identity, thus could be initially understood a civic one not opposed to the ethnic Basque, but complimentary, “an ideological synthesis” (Núñez Seixas 2004: 53), not without moments of tensions and conflicts during the process of nation and state-building of Spain.

In historical perspective state-building has generally been a coercive and often a violent process. State-building involves imposing a unified, centralised state and subjugating peripheral regions, securing border areas and imposing regulation, institutions, taxation and control. This has been a violent process because it threatens the interests of recalcitrant actors and it encounters outlying resistance which must be suppressed. It is also often accompanied by violent processes of national and ethnic exclusion. The consolidation of national political projects – including national identity – is a related process that has often been accompanied by significant instability as groups with vying political visions compete for control of the agenda. (Newman 2013: 141)

As mentioned, despite the conflicts over the Fueros issue – that became the starting point of the so-called ‘Basque Question’, according to Oiarzabal and Molina (2009) –, 19th century Basques still adopted the Spanish-civic identity, as it is important to note that the main idea of the Laurak Bat founders was not the one of independence from Spain, rather of the restoration of the previous legal arrangement, of the Fueros, which gave broad internal liberty for the Basques within Spain. It is not a mere curiosity that the official name of the Laurak Bat was, at the time of its foundation, Sociedad Vasco-Españoла Laurac Bat or Basque-Spanish Society (Ortiz 1996: 128).

Ezkerro (2003) describes that the main or first reason for the foundation of the Laurak Bat of Buenos Aires (fte Four in One, meaning the union of the Basque historical regions of Navarre, Gipuzkoa, Araba and Bizkaia, all of them in the Spanish state) in 1879 was to “manifest from the ‘ethnic unity’ of the four historical territories of the south of the Pyrenees, the ‘protest’ against the ‘constitutional unity’ imposed by the armed violence” or the suppression of the Fueros by Spain following the Carlist Wars (Cava Mesa 1996: 144). In other words, the foundation of Laurak Bat was in itself a manifesto against the abolition of the Fueros (Cava Mesa 1996: 143), a strong and direct political statement. In the following years new tensions will arise with yet another shift within the diaspora, with the pression of the nationalists in favour of an Aranist approach rather than purely foralista that would provoke ruptures (Cava Mesa 1996: 146).

In Uruguay, the local Laurak Bat (founded in 1876) faced in just six years after its foundation a split when a small group decided to leave the club to found a new one, promoting the abolition of the Fueros and opposing the idea of a Basque unity (Irigoyen Artxetxe 1999: 79).

The Spanish-American War of 1898 may be a key turning point for Spain, but for most Basques, or at least for the migration waves, there were other more significant turning points (Irianni Zalakain
It is true that there is an overlapping of waves, from the first to the second, as the independence of the many countries in America happened not in the same year, but within a century long period of time, also refugees from the Carlist War, for instance, starting arriving in the first half of the 19th century. We can say, with some degree of certainty, that the second wave started while the ‘old Basques’ of the first wave were still acting as protagonists. The tension between these two waves will arise specially in the second half of the century, lasting up to the eve of the 20th century.

What differentiates the first and second waves is the political refugee characteristic and the peasant characteristic (Douglass 2006: 71), much unlike the members of the previous wave that enjoyed status and normally went to the Americas willingly. Although – according to Douglass (2006) – many of the Basque refugees from the Carlist wars and so on that were skilled, had a profession such as of doctors, lawyers, etc., found themselves in better positions within the host societies in Latin America (not only due the long standing presence of Basques that could receive them and make arrangements, but also because of the language, as all of them spoke Spanish), the majority of migrants were made up of unskilled and semiskilled peasants “seeking a better future in a new land” (Douglas 2006: 71) and hoping to “remain peasants against the advance of the big cities and the urban modernization” (Álvarez 2002: 30).

**Nationalists Arrive**

At the beginning of the 20th century the ideas of Sabino Arana – the founder of modern Basque nationalism in the 19th century – arrived in the Diaspora by the hands of Basques that were reflective of both migration for economic reasons, but also to work as propagandists of the Aranist ideology (Tápiz 2002: 183). Basque nationalism became yet another source of tension within the Diaspora community and the Euskal Etxeas that led to factions and even the foundation of rival ones in Mexico City and Buenos Aires (Douglass 2006: 35). Also the type of migration shifted once again.

No longer impoverished peasants went to America, but now many political refugees from the Spanish Civil War (Álvarez 2002: 30, 56), many of them with connections to the PNV (Spanish Nationalist Party founded by Arana), but also others with ties to the Spanish Communist Party and so forming a new and political wave of migrants different from the previous two waves, of colonial elites to poor peasants and political refugees that weren’t at all nationalists, as seeking the independence of an imagined Basque Country.

The following years, over 150 thousand Basques flew from the Basque Country to the Diaspora, most of them to the Americas, influencing directly on the process of identity construction and identity maintenance of the old Basque migrants. The number of political exiles was bigger than ever, as were the tensions brought by them. The new patterns of migration shifted from the one of economic hardship to, in the twentieth century, political oppression greater than the one experienced in the second half of the 19th century.

The 19th century migration wave was
mostly made up of peasants (although with a significant amount of migrants escaping wars and conflicts within Spain), while the 20th century wave was made up mostly of city workers and of nationalist individuals.

Considering specifically the nationalist migrants, Tápiz Fernandez (2002: 183) discerns three periods or phases in which the nationalist ideals of the PNV members reached, developed and settled in the Diaspora: the first from 1903 to 1910, a “moment of growth and development of the nationalistic ideal in the Americas,”5 the second from 1910 to 1920, a regression of such ideals, and finally from 1920 to 1936, the full implementation of the nationalistic ideals, almost as a preparation of the many refugees to come from the Spanish Civil War.

Only in the 1920s the PNV started to grow in the Diaspora (as well as in the Basque Country itself). It is important to recall, as does Tápiz Fernandez (2002), that the growing of the PNV and of the nationalist ideology was not linear and it was an ‘imported’ phenomenon, meaning that it was born in the Homeland and brought to the Diaspora, and that – after some years and a certain amount of pressure – it started to create roots and to dominate there. It is important to note that the PN-Vistas first took control of the Euskal Etxeas and then started expanding to the colonies of Basque migrants, a movement that was somewhat easier than the previous, as the ideal of a Basque nation and identity was already part of the ideology of mostly Carlists Basques (Alvarez Gila 1996).

The Basque Houses were, at that point, on the one hand a sort of aid centre for those in need, and on the other hand a club for Basques to share and perpetuate their ‘Basqueness’. With the arrival of nationalistic political-minded Basques, mainly members of the ‘old Basques’ disliked the idea of turning the Basque houses also into propaganda centres for the resistance against Franco as well as for the independence of the Basque Country. A struggle for power began, with ‘old Basques’ trying to keep the houses as they were, a safe haven, and the newcomers trying to turn them into political strongholds for pressuring Spain and the host countries to act against Franco and to assure the ‘ancient rights’ of the Basque people.

The idea of ethnonational and identity maintenance of the first Euskal Etxeak, public spheres or centres for the dissemination of Basque culture, music, history and etc. was somehow subverted by newcomers with ties to the PNV and with nationalistic/Aranist ideology that demanded more from the diaspora. They turned the Euskal Etxeak into political strongholds for pressuring Spain and the host countries demanding a politicisation, an ideological commitment to the independence of the Basque country that went further ahead of the simple defence of the former status quo, or the Fueros. The defense of the Basque identity was, at that point, starting to become defence of the independence of the land of the Basques, from Araba to Lesser Navarre, from Hegoalde to Iparralde and Navarre and that would settle definitively during the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s.

As Oiarzabal (2013: 167), noted, “During the 1930s and onward, Diaspora associations and communities were influenced by thousands of Basques who were forced into exile as a result of the
Spanish Civil War and World War II. This implied a certain degree of Basque nationalist politicization."

[... ] homeland politics are found 'embedded' in diaspora discourse or identity, culture, and homeland. The diaspora political discourse is exemplified by means of multiple cultural and folkloric activities and symbols. The so-called diaspora's 'cultural' ethnonationalist dimension makes assertions that are political in nature. In other words, this dimension disguises to some extent manifestations or expressions of Basque nationalism. (Oiarzabal 2013: 171)

It is interesting that in the 1970s most of the Euskal Etxeas changed their statutes to impose some 'non-political' or 'apolitical' status on them (Totoricagüeña 2004: 75) when of the arrival of left-wing political refugees, many of them imbued with Abertzale ideology.

**New Nationalists**

Excluding Australia, the PNV had the advantage of a developed network and established communications with diaspora Basque centres, and the majority of Civil War exiles were familiar with PNV names, strategy and goals. The ETA disagreement with the PNV, and subsequent splits within ETA, confounded an already extremely complex nationalist movement. The change in rhetoric of the New Left to class struggle and class identity rather than ethnic and cultural struggle and identity was not well received by Basques who had not lived in the provinces perhaps for decades. (Totoricagüeña 2004: 75)

The majority of the third wave migration was made up of Basque nationalists with connections to the PNV that fought against Franco and that arrived in the Diaspora with a few of the Basque institutions abroad (Basque clubs) already on the hands of sympathizers. As I mentioned in the previous section, as in the past these clashed with members of the previous wave(s) and seized control of many Euskal Etxeas. Those were the ones who competed for the control of the Euskal Etxeas in their exile against the Basques from the previous waves in terms of imposing nationalistic ideals, despite the fact that members of both waves tended to be Christian conservatives as well as integristas.

The fourth wave, on the other hand, was made up almost entirely of left-wing refugees that were also in general nationalists or Abertzale, with some sort of link to ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or Basque Land and Freedom) or ETA members, as well as a small percentage of exiles still fleeing from the Francoist regime, and a few running from ETA itself.

ETA was, according to Granja Sainz (2000: 76), the result of the radicalization of a younger generation that would put an end to the PNV monopoly, to say, of the Basque society (Granja Sainz 2002: 179), and that would be successful in creating “a community with a totalizing vocation” (2002: 180). The PNV kept its hegemony over the Basque Country population; the same happened to the diaspora, but now faced a challenge with a more radical group disputing the same spaces. Among those spaces were the Euskal Etxeas. One
of the main difficulties of ETA exiles was not only the fact that PNV was already well implanted all over the diaspora, but as well its ethnic instead of racial ideal of Basqueness (Granja Sainz 2000) and, of course, due to the socialist ideals of those exiles instead of the catholic/conservative ideology of the PNV.

[...]

As mentioned in the previous section, during the 1970s some of the Euskal Etxeas changed their statutes to impose some 'non-political' or 'apolitical' status to them (Totoricagüeña 2004: 75), in other words, they kept defending to some degree the independence of the Basque Country on the lines of old Aranism sometimes, in more a 'modern' way, but forbade the political activities of the newcomers, generally left-wing nationalists or Abertzales.

According to Totoricagüeña (2004: 94–96), during the 1990s one way for homeland political groups such as the Herri Batasuna (the radical left wing party of that time) to communicate with the diaspora was through sending e-mails and publications to the Euskal Etxeas for it, then, to be distributed among members, but many times the material was simply deleted or destroyed by the, then, PNV-led clubs.

It is important to keep in mind that the migration wave of the 1970s was not as big in terms of the number of arrivals as the previous ones, but it was, anyway, consistent in a sense that it created visible tensions even today in the Euskal Etxeas and in the diaspora itself as it imposed a need to take a political stand in otherwise so-called ‘apolitical’ institutions (Oiarzabal 2007, 2013) – despite the fact that most if not all Basque organisations claim a territorial unity that is part of a nationalistic ideology, an imagined community with nationalist ideals and goals of independence.

The Euskal Etxeas are political institutions per se and they have also been used or manipulated by consecutive PNV-led Basque governments since the end of the Franco dictatorship (Oiarzabal 2007: 110–125), sometimes as proxies for the spread of the PNV view of Basque nationalism, other times as ‘ambassadors’ of the Basque Country or simply as a tool for propaganda, to show, for instance, that Basque Country is more than ETA and that Basques are a peaceful people.

Younger members of the Euskal Etxeas, refugees and sympathisers of ETA’s struggle putted pressure on the Euskal Etxeas to support the fight of the Basque group – considered also a fight for the Basque Country and the Basque people – and that triggered consistent pressure from local governments, some with ties to the Spanish Francoist regime of the former democratic regime. The political activities of some of the “radical” members of the diaspora and of the Euskal Etxeas started creating embarrassment and trouble for the directors of the clubs (Totoricagüeña 2004).

Oiarzabal (2013: 180–181) gives us an example of the political tensions within the Euskal Etxeas for the support of some of its members or organisations within
its structure by describing the expulsion of the Eusketxe (Eusko Kultur Etxea, or Basque Culture House) of the premises of the Laurak Bat in 2004. According to Oiarzabal, the Eusketxe, an umbrella for the Ekin editorial and the Euskaltzaleak (Basque-language initiative), was evicted from the Laurak Bat, in Buenos Aires, after decades due to the support of the group for left wing ‘radical’ nationalist ideology and Basque political prisoners (ETA and alleged ETA members).

Dictatorial regimes in Argentina and Uruguay supplied daily reminders to Basques in those countries of how life in homeland continued. Worldwide attention to the plight of the Basques as an oppressed people lent credence and justification for ETA actions. However, soon media coverage focused on ETA activities themselves, not the rationale or objectives behind them, leading host-country populations to equate Basques with violence and terrorism, a burden that diaspora Basques everywhere have had to carry. (Totoricagüeña 2004: 77)

Groups such as JO TA KE Rosario, Asociación Venezolana de Amigos de Euskal Herria (Venezuelan association of Friends of the Basque Country), Asociación Diaspora Vasca (Basque Diaspora Association), the Euskal Herriaren Lagunah (Friends of the Basque Country), the Red Independentistak (Independentist Network) among others have, for decades, online and offline, if not competing, sharing space and the minds of the Basques in the Diaspora, promoting a more radical nationalistic agenda, maintaining ties with the Basque Nationalist or Abertzale left wing parties in the homeland and spreading support for Basque political prisoners.

Conclusion

The Basque clubs were initially safe havens and aid centres for Basques in which they were able also to promote their language, culture, dances – their identity – to newer generations and also worked as a place for those who were born in the Basque Country to feel home among equals.

The first tensions came, in some cases like the Euskal Etxea of Montevideo, just a few years after its foundation, Basques who felt more or just alike Spanish ended up splitting and founding their own clubs, Basques from the French side (or Iparralde) or from Navarre also, in some cases, sought to create their own institutions.

The initial pledge for respect of the Fueros soon changed into a more nationalistic approach, and within a period of less than 50 years the Euskal Etxeas were in general connected or under the influence of the PNV and their ideology. Then, new nationalists came around, new ideas and a different view of the needs of the Basque Country and its independence process, sometimes a more radical approach, but in general Basque clubs in Latin America tended to welcome refugees and sustained long debates on the ‘ETA issue’, many times disagreeing with the Basque government in condemning or not the group or its political violence.

From the basic promotion/maintenance of ethnonational identity (Connor 2004) to proxies of the Basque government (not without tensions and disputes) and spaces for the promotion of a diasporic identity and of homeland-diaspora politics, the
Euskal Etxeas are not only a reflection of the homeland, but also autonomous entities in constant move and evolution that, for sure, reflect the complicated and special relationship between homeland and diaspora.

It is also important to mention the role of the internet (Oiarzabal 2013) in helping the process of maintaining the Basque identity as well as in strengthening diaspora-homeland ties, and on the other hand promoting even more politicisation of the Basque diaspora members (Tsavkko Garcia 2014a).

With the process of the end of ETA and in the midst of a long process of disarmament and international verification (despite the lack of interest on the side of the Spanish government), the Basque diaspora tends to change once again – and perhaps more profoundly as well – with the influx of migrants escaping from the deteriorating economic conditions of Europe and more specifically of Spain and the Basque Country.

Abstract
The formation of the Basque diaspora in Latin America can be divided into several different periods. First, the so-called original diaspora, from the 16th to 18th century, of Basques who were part of the Spanish colonial regime. The second can be traced to the 19th century, consisting of a mixture of impoverished Basque migrants seeking jobs, especially in Uruguay and Argentina, and of refugees fleeing from the Spanish War of Independence and the Carlist wars. The third wave is identified by, but not only through, the considerable number of refugees from the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s. The fourth wave came during the 1970s, with refugees from the Franco Dictatorship, ETA members and sympathisers. In this paper I argue that each new wave of migrants brought tension to the diaspora, having the Euskal Etxeak, or Basque houses, as a focus point. The main idea is to analyse the different tensions and political discussions of this set of diasporic waves in Latin America.

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**Notes**

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2. In the original: “antigua y arraigada tendencia a la unión mutua de los originarios de Vasconia, basada a su vez en una conciencia de identidad colectiva, de singularidad comunitaria” in Álvarez Gila, Oscar and Morales, Alberto Angulo, *Las migraciones vascas en perspectiva histórica*.
(s. XVI–XX) (Bilbao: UPV/EHU, 2002), 158.

6. *Euskal Etxea* is the singular version, while *Euskal Etxeak* the plural.

7. “continuar siendo campesinos frente al avance de las grandes ciudades y del proceso de modernización urbano”.

8. “momento de crecimiento y de desarrollo del ideal nacionalista en América”.
Introduction
Since the start of the 2008 economic crisis, an increasing number of qualified and highly educated young women and men from southern Europe have been leaving their countries of origins, often moving to other European countries in search of better opportunities. This new economic migration wave was described in the German press in the first half of the 2010s as Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge (economic refugees), an echo of a term that had been already used from the 1960s in local public opinion to define people who left their homeland with no political motivation seeking for an improvement in their standard of living. What distinguishes post-modern migration flows from the traditional ones seems to be the lack of a structured recruitment like in the 1960s. The current flow results from a conscious individual choice to leave. Moreover, post-modern mobility is not only economic and political; it also results from a constantly evolving cultural pattern of life that, because of its specific features, cannot be identified as a traditional migration flow.

Newcomers’ identity attitudes towards the target society in social and linguistic behaviors represent a still unexplored field of study in the analysis of new mobility. This paper will focus on the linguistic and cultural identity attitudes of Italian newcomers settled in the urban area of Munich. The Bavarian city stands out as a relevant example not only for its geographical proximity to Italy, which traditionally led to strong relationships and to a considerable migration flow to Munich, but also because of the synergy of modern infrastructure, technological development and the presence of multinational companies, which have been attracting a large number of people.

The first part of this contribution will focus on the problem of attempting to define the composite group(s) of newcomers who form a part of the so-called comunità italiana in the city of Munich. The main section presents the most relevant empirical findings on identity attitudes and perceptions, which result from data gathered in German and Italian in May 2014 in the form of semi-structured interviews with 21 Italian people aged 21–45, who have settled in Munich and are employed in various professional contexts. This method represents the key to discovering their deep world and to revealing their perceptive
viewpoints. Through the discourse analysis of the complete transcription of all the orally recorded contents, this methodology permitted a subject-centered perspective in the analysis, illuminating processes for their self-construction from a social and linguistic perspective.

**Current Immigration Forms and New Mobility**

According to data provided by the Munich Statistical Office, the number of people with Italian citizenship living in the Bavarian city on the 31st July 2016 comprised 27,758 people, 16,464 men and 11,294 women. Data provided by the same source reveal only 20,847 registered residents at the end of the year 2005 and 21,038 residents at the end of 2010. This means an increase of almost 7,000 people in the last ten years, most of them between 2011 and 2016 (Table 1 and Figure 1).

Working with statistics reveals the extremely difficult issue of quantifying the phenomenon of the new mobility. Due to the lack of borders and freedom of movement, short-term stays, seasonal workers and others cannot be registered and included in any statistics. Nonetheless, data provided by local municipalities may permit a better comprehension of the phenomenon in comparison to Italian consular sources, based on the AIRE (Register of Italians Living Abroad).

In fact, facilities – such as renting accommodation or signing an employment contract – are only permitted after registering at the local German registry office. Although registration in the Italian consular register and an official transfer of residence are officially compulsory one year after leaving Italy, the dark figure is still very high. Within the framework of this essay, a direct comparison between German and Italian sources was not possible, but recent studies, participant observations and the interviews carried out for the analysis revealed that a large number of newcomers said that they were not registered in the AIRE register. Such incomplete statistical data offer a partial and incomplete picture of intra-European mobility, because people in a changing and continuous development can hardly be categorized and quantified.

Heterogeneity and fragmentation also play a central role in the attempt to describe the composition of new arrivals. Despite the growing presence of well-educated and qualified young Italian

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**Table 1: Italian population in Munich according to gender from 2001–2016 (courtesy of the Munich Statistical Office)**

<table>
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<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>8.430</td>
</tr>
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<td>13.204</td>
<td>8.315</td>
</tr>
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<td>12.635</td>
<td>8.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12.655</td>
<td>8.192</td>
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<td>20.871</td>
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<td>31/12/2007</td>
<td>21.064</td>
<td>12.748</td>
<td>8.316</td>
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people, newcomers are included in widely differing professional fields in Munich society. This is mainly due to their motives for leaving Italy. On the one hand, there is increasing internationalization and the attraction of new experiences that are facilitated by rising opportunities in the European Union; on the other hand, there is the recent economic crisis in southern Europe as a result of the lack of guarantees and perspectives in the country of origin. Therefore, contemporary migration flows are difficult to categorize within a unanimous general definition. Even the word “migration” could be questioned. New trends also introduced the term “expat” in an attempt to describe and define the subcategory of immigrants in a good employment situation who are often in a given place for a short time. According to the definition provided by Gatti (2009), expats:

appear to be a special subgroup of immigrants characterised by a high level of education and a relatively high professional status [...], between 25 and 35, here for a limited time, [...] this group is also formed by artists, scientific researchers, engineers, etc., as well as by the families of many who have a stable professional position. (Gatti 2009: 5–6)
If the heterogeneous subgroup of new arrivals is included among the whole Italian population living in Munich, which also comprises traditional old migrant workers and their offspring, it can be seen that despite the same migratory background, the Italian population does not form a close social community. It is a rather large and not homogeneous group, difficult to subsume among its various components; hence it is difficult to talk about a community to define people who in some cases just have a common citizenship. This leads to the question if the term comunità italiana, which should imply by its etymology cohesion and a common membership, is the correct one to express such a complexity. If it is not, local and Italian institutions and associations in Munich that were founded in the last decades to increase a sense of togetherness among the traditional migrant workers have to face a great challenge to adapt to present issues. The need for such a framework is relevant when considering identity issues in personal and social approaches to the topic of migration.

Theoretical and Methodological Aspects
The pilot study was carried out in Munich in 2014 and aims to investigate the perception of language and identity attitudes of individuals belonging to a group, which is difficult to categorize. The survey sample involved 21 Italian citizens, 12 women and 9 men, aged between 21 and 46, who have been living abroad for no more than 15 years and have been settled in Munich for less than 5 years. The oral survey provides access to the subjective and deep side of the migration experience. The semi-structured interview permits on the one hand a structure and an orientation throughout the interview, and on the other the opportunity for the test persons to express their opinions openly and to re-call the subjectivity of their migratory experience. Migration change involves new dynamics in the development of cultural identity. For this reason, the young Italian newcomers interviewed were asked to talk about their new experience and their confrontation with the local language, and to express the way they perceive themselves as individuals.

Before the presentation of empirical results, it is necessary to focus on the conceptual explanation of identity, a term which is a constant and complex subject of academic and public discussion. If postmodernism is characterized by pluralism and the multiplicity of paradigms in all areas of life, most recent theories also argue about plurality in identity. In this regard, the model developed by Keupp (1999) tries to describe this pluralism of identity by considering the complexity of contemporary cultural and historical times. Identity does not act at a single level and is not represented by a simple issue, but is an endless biographical process formed by dominant parts, feelings and biographical narratives. According to his definition:

Identität verstehen wir als das individuelle Rahmenkonzept einer Person, innerhalb dessen sie ihre Erfahrungen interpretiert und das ihr als Basis für alltägliche Identitätsarbeit dient. In dieser Identitätsarbeit versucht das Subjekt, situativ stimmige Passungen zwischen inneren und äußeren Erfahrungen zu schaffen und unterschiedliche Teilidentitäten zu verknüpfen. Auf dem Hintergrund von
Pluralisierungs-, Individualisierungs- und Entstandardisierungsprozessen ist das Inventar kopierbarer Identitätsmuster ausgezehrt. (Keupp et al. 1999: 60)\(^6\)

This concept of a patchwork identity-composite may be included in the contemporary debate concerning the modern liquidity in current migration issues, as this approach considers the complexity of the subject within its social, historical, and cultural background.

**Multiple Identity Patterns**

Migration is a unique and individual process. Comparative evaluations in qualitative analysis in case studies may therefore be difficult to investigate, as every single person has his/her own background, personality, education and a series of collected experiences. Nonetheless, similarities and parallels could be found in the different speech sequences in the analysis provided, too. Through the exploration of language and content analyzed in the interviews, construction processes of a multiple self within composite identity patterns could be demonstrated in Italian newcomers in Munich.

First, the old ethnic sense of belonging related to one single nation appears obsolete in the autorepresentation provided by the oral histories, as different ethnic patterns are now acting simultaneously. One of the most relevant aspects is that the perceived cultural identity transformation is in most cases conscious and acknowledged by the informants. As indicated in example (1), multiple identity perceptions range from local to global attitudes and go beyond one single ethnic affiliation, creating a composite identity perception.\(^8\)

Multiple perceptions obtained from the interviews confirm the hypothesis that new immigrants are considered to belong to different worlds simultaneously. Such glocalism indicates that they are and feel themselves to be bearers of different identities, which coexist in one individual simultaneously. The speaker recognizes this complexity and is able to express his local self-perceptions, identifying himself as Sicilian and European at the same time. The source identification with his home region is not cancelled, but exists side by side with the acquired feeling of being European. The contexts where these overlapping and intersecting multiple identities are situated may be better explained in example (2). Here the informant tries to express her heterogeneity, describing her way of dealing with transformations including different feelings of ethnic membership.

We can’t say I am the typical Italian girl […] but we negotiate it. […] I am rather German, but […] my lifestyle is Italian. I eat pasta, I don’t eat at six o’clock. My habits are Italian. Regarding my approach towards life, towards my professional life, I am rather German. [F25-2013 – Engineer (00:26:19–00:27:27)]

The multiple self and the awareness of a transformation are here perceived in the varying fields of daily life, fields that have been defined by Keupp (1999) as
The individual transformation process is recognized by the speaker herself. Original habits and traditions can be identified with the country of origin; professional life can be identified with the country of destination. According to this example, cultural identities are built within personal experience and are inserted into the various activities in everyday life, transforming the individual progressively. New contexts and activities also contribute to this transformation, with the acquisition of new abilities and skills in daily life shaping a more complex individual. Previous habits belonging to the culture of origin are therefore joined to others belonging to a different world in one single person, resulting in a complex individual who is aware of this transformation process.

Moreover, if multiplicity indicates on the one hand that the sense of a composite sense of belonging is impressed into their self-perceptions, on the other hand new migrants are not able to find any individual and social membership in any place. The bi-directional state of isolation and exclusion provided in example (3) emphasizes the partial and undefined sense of broken identity, which derives from the liquidity of all patterns.

I felt like a stranger in Italy […] and now I feel like a stranger here. [M30-2013 – IT worker (00:41:32–00:41:40)]

The relevance of the example lies in its meaningfulness from a linguistic perspective, too. The pragmatic use of a past tense referring to Italy and the present tense with regards to his current location seems to indicate not only a conscious separation from two different worlds, but also a permanent self-perception of non-belonging. In which geographical place the individual is located does not play any role, a limited and unsettled belonging place will be perceived. Whether this is a structural deficiency in current migration forms, is not known. Still, the continuous lack of constancy and sense of affiliation within one place is one further characteristic of new mobility which remains unstable in its continuous identity-building processes.

**Multilingualism and Multiple Identities**

According to the sociolinguistic approach in the identity definition by Bucholtz & Hall (2005), “identity does not emerge at a single level […] but operates at multiple levels simultaneously” (Bucholtz & Hall 2005: 586). With regard to this, the social means of conveying cultural and linguistic identity are given at an interactional level by linguistic signs. Language is the medium of expressing these compound issues, shaped by strategies in performative acts, grammatical constructions and linguistic interactions. Identity is the result of such interactions. In this respect, performative acts by a multilingual subject work as an indicator of individual and social attitudes, whereas language represents the medium to conceive and understand the full range of interactions. Hence, language is not just a tool to convey information, but also a central practice to understand social meanings.

A sense of identification with the locals may be therefore expressed by the pragmatic use of language, as provided in example (4):

You can really understand what people say and become part of those
people. [F24-2011 – Student and Italian teacher (00:15:55–00:16:05)]

In other words, language is able to measure perceived inclusion and exclusion by certain language signs. The value of the example given lies in the expression of a personal sense of belonging in the self-perception of her own social identity, which is given by expressing language signs. The pragmatic use of a third person form indicates to what extent language performs the role of an indicator of personal and social inclusion, assuming in this concrete case that the person who is speaking does not feel herself entirely included. For this purpose, language arises from the interaction constituted by the social action and is “viewed as the emergent product rather than the pre-existing source of linguistic and other semiotic practices and therefore as fundamentally a social and cultural phenomenon” (Bucholtz & Hall 2005: 588). The involvement of language signs in immigrant discourse is therefore required to communicate multiple identity patterns, because a self-multiplicity is given by language performances. Within the context of contemporary migrations, newcomers experience a fragile and fluid distance from and closeness to both the country of origin and the country of destination. A state of isolation and separation may also occur, as given in example (5):

It doesn’t matter how much you study German and how well you speak it. You are a stranger. People in Munich are very kind. But you can’t become German or someone from Munich. [M30-2013 – IT worker (00:29:30– 00:29:45)]

Phenomena of isolation and cultural detachment are present in immigrant discourse. The inability to find the one’s own place among local people is expressed in the performative act, conveying a meaningful and powerful identity positioning, given by the lack of relationship between self and other. Under these circumstances, it is possible to observe another type of self-detachment. The speaker refers to himself using the second person. Is this another sign of a further absence of inclusion? This separated self is compared to local people, who are referred to — as in example [4] — using the third person. It is not a matter of discrimination, but membership is perceived as unattainable. Hence, language is the way of performing and transporting the expression of this postmodern patchwork identity pattern.

**Outlook: Multiple Identity Patterns in Ingroup Communication**

All the Italian interviewed newcomers stated that they used a certain specifically ingroup communication with fellow countrymen settled in Munich or in other urban areas of Germany. This is done to convey and express details and concepts of their particular migration experience. Therefore, further investigations will have to be conducted to determine whether a certain linguistic variety of their native language is developed among newcomers who have a multilingual repertoire. The discourse analysis reveals first the pragmatic use of certain lexical items and neologisms. These elements emerge from contact between the Italian source language, the German target language and other lingua franca (in most cases English). This defines communication in the intragroup relationship.
For example, the newly coined term *anmeldarsi* occurred frequently in all narrations and was perceived in full consciousness as a neologism created among the Italian population to express a newly shaped identity pattern in the new migration context. This is a verb which derives from the German substantive *Anmeldung* (here: registration) and consequently from its reflexive verb *sich anmelden* (here: to register oneself). Among the Italians in Germany, this new term indicates the process of registering at the local German municipality at the moment of arrival. The same reflexive form from the German is maintained, while the Italian *-are* ending (which is most frequently chosen in the creation of neologism into the Italian language) suggests a process. It is not known for certain if it is possible to talk about a diatopic variety of the Italian language, a common interaction code which is spoken by Italian immigrants settled in the area. What may certainly be assumed is that the pragmatic use of certain terms reveals ingroup identity behavior expressed by using language signs.

**Conclusions**

Contemporary migration flows reflect the fragmentation of post-modern and global society. Newcomers have not been recruited like traditional migrant workers; they left their homeland as individuals. People who left their country because of the economic crisis also made the choice to leave individually. They are difficult to quantify, and statistical data are not able to include the instability of their displacement. The old concept of the term *comunità italiana* to define people with Italian citizenship who live in the metropolitan area of Munich should be revised in favor of a more appropriate term which could reflect all aspects and facets of the heterogeneity of the Italian population set in this urban area. Not only because newcomers are employed in widely differing professional contexts, but also because this term links them to traditional migrants who arrived in the second half of the 20th century and their offspring who are employed in widely differing professional and social contexts in local society.

In this respect, identity is a process acting at multiple levels simultaneously as a product of social, cultural and linguistic practices. This multiplicity ranges from local to global attitudes (diatopic) in the various identity parts within other individuals (diastratic). Language is the medium of expressing an identity positioning. Because of this, the existence of a diatopic variety of the Italian language, which has been and is being developed among the Italian population in Germany, can be hypothesized. Cultural words are adopted by the multiplied individual, influencing their interactions. The semi-structured interviews conducted with Italian newcomers to Munich permitted the discovery of a deeper and more complex world. Complex attitudes demonstrate the need for Italian associations and institutions in the target destination to review the old parameters, which were conceived and developed for traditional immigration. This challenge will hopefully lead to a better comprehension of today’s migration issues.
Bibliography


Sozialgeschichte 42, 257–74.


Notes

2. Courtesy of the Munich Statistical Office (Statistisches Amt München).
3. All the data provided by the Statistisches Amt München refer to people settled in the City of Munich and include people with a dual nationality, too. Information courtesy of the Munich Statistical Office.
5. For the entire explanation of the patchwork identity model developed cf. Keupp et al. 1999: 218.
6. Identity is understood as the individual framework of a person, within which he/she interprets his/her experiences as a basis for everyday identity work. In such identity work, the subject tries to create situational coherences between inner and outer experiences and to connect differing partial identities. Against the background of pluralization, individualization and de-standardization processes, the inventory of copyable identity patterns is weakened (Keupp et al. 1999: 60 – Translation into English S.I.).
8. For easier comprehension, all the examples provided in the present contribution have been translated into the English language.
9. Informants have been anonymised within the following schemata: sex, age, year and month of arrival in Germany. Professional status is also given for a better understanding of the social background. Finally, the recorded time during the interview is indicated.
Programme of the 27th AEMI Conference
‘At Home or Alienated’ – Migrants and Receiving Countries between Integration and Parallel Society, between ‘Culture of Welcome’ and Xenophobia

5–7 October, 2017
Husum, North Frisia, Germany

WEDNESDAY, 4 October, 2017
18:00–20:00 Informal meeting at the Nordfriesland Museum NISSENHAUS

THURSDAY, 5 October, 2017
8:45–9:15 Welcome
Dr. Uwe Haupenthal, Director of the Nordfriesland Museum
Hans Storhaug, Chairman of the AEMI
Dr. Paul-Heinz Pauseback, Head of the Emigration Archive of the Nordfriisk Instituut

9:15–9:45 Opening lecture
Thomas Steensen: What is a Frisian and how to become one – an inclusive approach to minority affiliation

10:00–11:00
PART I, SESSION 1: EUROPEAN EMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES I
Chair: Marie-Charlotte Le Bailly, Red Star Line Museum, Antwerp
Maria Jarlsdotter Enckell, Åland Islands Emigrant Institute: Going West North-West to the Pacific North 1817-1867
Patrick Fitzgerald, Mellon Centre for Migration Studies, Ulster American Folk Park, Omagh, Northern Ireland; Queen’s University Belfast: Paddy’s Big Apple: A review of Irish migration to and through New York City
Wolfgang Grams, Routes to the Roots, Research and Travel: “Ei söppohß jahr än emmigrent” - Als die Deutschen Ausländer waren. Learning from the 19th Century German American Migration Experience

11:00–11:15 Break

11:15–12:15
PART I, SESSION 2: EUROPEAN EMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES II
Chair: Maddalena Tirabassi, Centro Al-
treitalie, Turin
Michalina Petelska, Polsk-Skandinavisk Forskningsinstitut, Copenhagen: A scientific melting pot: Polish immigrants and scientists in New York in the 19th and the first half of 20th century
Imanol Galdos Irazabal, Department of culture of the city council of Donostia, San Sebastian: Boise: A Model of a Welcoming City
Christina A. Ziegler-McPherson, historian of American immigration policy and assimilation theory: Cautionary lessons from the Americanization movement of the early 20th century
12:15–13:30 Lunch

13:30–14:30
PART II, SESSION 1: EUROPEAN RESEARCH CENTERS AND CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION
Chair: Cathrine Kyø Hermansen, The Danish Immigration Museum
Špela Kastelic, Slovenian Migration Institute ZRC SAZU, Ljubljana, Slovenia: Social impact of migration studies: The case of Slovenian Migration Institute
Brian Lambkin, Mellon Centre for Migration Studies, Ulster American Folk Park, Omagh, Northern Ireland: The Development of a ‘National’ Diaspora Centre in Ireland
Vinzenz Kratzer, PhD candidate at the European University in Frankfurt/Oder: History of state migration research in Germany
14:30–14:45 Break

14:45–16:00
PART II, SESSION 2: PAST AND PRESENT MIGRATORY ISSUES
Chair: Adam Walaszek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
Dieter Bacher, PhD candidate at the University of Graz, Anne Unterwurzacher, senior postdoc-researcher at the Center for Migration Research in St. Pölten/Lower Austria: Similarities and differences: Challenges and possibilities of linking research of past and present migration phenomena and their context as a chance for “evidence-based policy“
Dietmar Osses, Hannover Colliery, Dortmund, Westphalian State Museum for Industrial Heritage and Culture: Segregation, assimilation or integration? Migration and football in Germany 1900–2015
Rafał Raczyński, research officer in Emigration Museum in Gdynia and assistant professor at the Pomeranian University in Slupsk: The perception of immigrants from EU countries in British society in the context of Brexit
Agnieszka Kulesa, PhD candidate at the Warsaw School of Economics, researcher at the Centre for French Culture and Francophone Studies, University of Warsaw; Nicolas Maslowski, director of the Centre for French Culture and Francophone Studies, University of Warsaw: Anti-racism and anti-discrimination approaches in migration policies of the Central European states: The state of play and challenges for the future
16:00–16:15 Break

16:15–17:45
PART II, SESSION 3: CONTEMPORARY MIGRATORY ISSUES
Chair: Emilia García López, Consello da Cultura Galega, Santiago de Compostela
María González Blanco, PhD at the University of Santiago de Compostella; Vicente Peña Saavedra, Senior
Lecturer of History of Education at the University of Santiago de Compostela: Possibilities and limits of the statistical sources for the study of educational and cultural profiles of Spaniards in current emigration

Laurence Prempain, associate researcher at the University Lyon: Evolution of the perception of German Jewish refugees in France: From “Victims” to “Undesirable” (1933-1938)

Cathrine Kyø Hermansen, Sahra-Josephine Hjorth, Anders Thorkilsen, The Danish Immigrant Museum: A better understanding of the past is essential to deal with contemporary migration – our research project “MiClue”

18.00 Dieter Harrsen, Landrat/Chief executive of the district of North Frisia: Greeting

FRIDAY, 6 October, 2017
9:00–12:30
PART III: “WHAT IS HOME?”

Chair: Paul-Heinz Pauseback, North Frisian Emigration Archive, Nordfriisk Instituut

Antra Celmiņa, Latvians Abroad – Museum and Research Centre, Riga: Going (Back): The Meaning of Home, Belonging and Identity for Western-born Latvian Repatriates

Gorka Alvarez Aranburu, Director for the Basque Community Abroad; Benan Oregi Iñurrieta, Officer for the Basque Community Abroad: A home or a country? What did Basque emigrants leave behind?


10:00–10:15 Break

10:15–11:15 SESSION 2

Chair: Gorka Alvarez Aranburu, Director for the Basque Community Abroad

Nicolas Monnot, Monica Berri, Civic-Wisers & Designers Civique, Common.language: “WHAT IS HOME?”: Diachrony and synchrony, glocality, fear, humanity & memory

Andelko Milardovic, Institute for Migration and Ethnicity, Zagreb, Croatia: Global Migration, Parallel societies in the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Xenophobia

Sarah Clément, Generiques, Paris; Jean-Barthelemy Debost, Musée national de l’histoire de l’immigration, Paris, France: The built heritage of migrations in Europe – different cases study in France. What about the migrations in the European year of cultural heritage in 2018?

11:15–11.30 Break

11:30–12:30 SESSION 3

Chair: Brian Lambkin, Mellon Centre for Migration Studies, Omagh

Solange Maslowski, Center for Comparative Law of the Faculty of law of Charles University in Prague: Mahoran and Roma migrants, second-class Union citizens?

Nonja Peters, Sustainability Policy Institute, Curtin University, Australia: Place identity and belonging related to the Dutch diaspora among mixed race indigenous groups in South Africa and Namibia, Indonesia and Western Australia

Maria Beatriz Rocha-Trinidade, Universidade Aberta in Lisbon, Portugal; the founder of the Centre of Studies on
Migrations and Intercultural Relations,
CEMRI in Lisbon: New Initiatives in the Portuguese Museology Program

Sarah Clément
Hans Storhaug
Maddalena Tirabassi

12:30–13:45 Lunch at the “Tine Café” at the harbor

13:45–17:00
PART IV: ROUND TABLE: REFLECTIONS ON AEMI POLICIES
Chair: Hans Storhaug, president of AEMI
Uwe Schmitz, Mayor of Husum: Greeting
Sebastian Tyrakowski, host of next AEMI Conference: “Challenges of Contemporary Migrations” – an outlook on the AEMI Conference 2018 at the Emigration Museum in Gdynia, Poland
15:30 Break
16:00–16:15 María Peredo Guzmán, performing a short solo called: “The intimate ritual of social movement: Embodiments of migracy”

20:00–22:00 AEMI Dinner at the “Ratskeller” Restaurant in Husum

SATURDAY, 7 October, 2017
9:30–12:00 AEMI Annual General Meeting (AEMI Members)
12:00–13:00 Lunch
13:00–19:00 Excursion over “the border” to the town of Tønder/Tondern, Denmark

ORGANIZATION AND CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
Franziska Horschig
Paul-Heinz Pauseback
Marlene Kunz
Welcome Speeches

Dr. Uwe Haupenthal
Director of the Nordfriesland Museum and the Museum Association of North Friesland

Ladies and Gentlemen, distinguished guests:

On behalf of the Nordfriesland Museum and the Museum Association of Nordfriesland I wish to give a warm welcome to each one of you. And I would like to wish you an interesting and successful conference.

The venue and date for your meeting in Husum have been chosen well. For quite some time now, we – together with our curator Dr. Paul Heinz Pauseback – have engaged ourselves with the emigration of Ludwig Nissen, later founder of the Nissenhaus, to New York. After a number of unsuccessful attempts, Nissen made a fortune in the New World, and we owe our museum to that very capital. Thus our house is causally embedded in issues of migration. Nissen’s achievements are a story of success. In his days, hundreds of thousands of people from Schleswig-Holstein emigrated, too – although with much less economic success!

Certainly, the history of the USA has been a story of migration to this day – even if this fact is ignored by certain political circles nowadays. Migration is a dominant feature of human history. To the best of my knowledge, today more than 60 million people are fleeing from political and ecological catastrophes. This is a fact that until most recently had been barely of interest to the inhabitants of our allegedly safe Europe. But this changed dramatically several years ago, even if it can be considered a balmy breeze here compared to the situation in other countries and on other continents. Suddenly humanistic values count for little, whereas political and economical burdens matter all the more. Uncertainty has been coming within reach everywhere in Europe overnight. This has to be hurdled in a democratic way within the next few years, without our open societies falling to pieces.

Meanwhile, the challenges are tremendous. No one should understate the problems – or, on the other hand, negate the chances that are opening up. After all, societies are always in motion, and culture depends on the disputes caused by unfamiliarity and otherness. Incidentally, this is what every museum is about!

We are all very anxious to hear the questions you will be asking during the next few days, how you reason them, and what approaches or solutions you will present. You are contributing not only to current political debates but also to the European idea, which should not be threatened by certain nationalistic tendencies.

I wish you every success with your conference. Thank you very much for your appearance, and again: Welcome to our museum!

Dr. Paul-Heinz Pauseback
Head of the Emigration Archive of the Nordfriisk Instituut

Ladies and Gentlemen – Friends from and of AEMI, let me put it this way: “A
dream has come true!"

After announcing this conference in Turin 2015 and offering an invitation to it in Santiago de Compostela last year, I am now opening the 27th Conference of the Association of European Migration Institutions hosted this year by the Nordfriisk Instituut and the Nordfriesland Museum Nissenhaus, where we are today.

Ahead of us lay three conference days full of papers, discussions, brainstorming and networking, and last but not least, of the fun and the delight of being together again with friends and colleagues – and of course of meeting new ones every year. My hearty thanks to all of you for coming here, and: “Welcome to Husum, welcome to North Frisia.”

Today will be our day of labor. We will hear 17 papers this first day, the even share of 15 minutes given to each speaker. The timekeeping will be rather strict; therefore the chairmen and chairwomen of the sessions have these yellow and red cards. Yellow means: still 5 minutes to go, red: one minute left, come to an end please. But nevertheless, we will take our time and will not hurry. There are breaks and refreshments enough, and we will take a walk to the harbor for lunch to get some fresh air. And you see this pipe: it is not the emergency break in case someone should happen to be color blind. I will use it before I or Mrs. Horschig would announce something technical to make sure that everybody is listening.

Let me now introduce to you Mrs. Horschig, who represents the Nissenhaus Museum as I represent the Nordfriisk Instituut. Like myself, she is also in charge of all matters concerning this AEMI conference. So feel free to ask either of us if any questions should arise or if anything is missing. This is a good opportunity to thank her for her work and always ready support. (Let’s give her, her boss Mr. Haupenthal and the team of the Nissenhaus loud applause). This goes too for Mrs. Marlene Kunz, the treasurer of the Nordfriisk Instituut, who cannot be here with us today, and for Thomas Steensen, our director, especially for his engagement in securing funds for this conference.

Let me now talk about two things we are all deeply concerned about. The first is migration, a basic human behavior with which we are all professionally connected in one way or another. And the second is Europe, a united, free, pluralistic, democratic and therefore strong Europe. Over the last years we have watched our dream fading, staggering, swaying right and left under heavy blows, trying to find its way into a common future. The only possible good future, I may add. And because the situation is so difficult, meetings like ours are so important. This is a European event. When we meet, we are part of Europe United. It is the initial goal of the founders of the AEMI that has become so important now: people from all over Europe coming together on friendly terms, working and having fun together. This fills the European Idea with life. Europe is not a distant vision then, symbolized just by as distant names as Merkel, Macron, Juncker or Tusk. No, when we meet, Europe gets a face, a voice, a name more familiar to us. Europe is Benan, the Basque, it is Maddalena from Turin, it is Emilia from Galicia, Maria Beatriz from Portugal – and Brexit or no Brexit – it is Brian and Paddy, our Irish friends. Yes, Europe on a personal level becomes a friend. And when we go back
home, we take this spirit with us – and that makes these annual meetings so very important.

This year we have our meeting here in the Nissenhaus Museum. An institution that has been built from the fortune Ludwig Nissen earned as a successful immigrant in New York and in his last will bequeathed to his city of birth, Husum. He is an example of a very successful self-made man and of a perfect integration in his new home country. As a very self-conscious German-American member of the Anglo-American elite, he had to show all his qualities as a good fighter during the time of the German-bashing of World War I. You can learn more about him and his times in the exhibition on this floor. The first part of our conference dealing with migration to the USA represents a homage to him.

Beginning in 2015, we are now in the third year of the so-called “Migration Crisis”. It has become more and more clear that we are at the beginning of a movement that will be the most important as well as the most crucial feature of the century, and we are also sure that we have no time to waste. Last year I cited Niall Ferguson, a well-known Harvard and now Stanford historian. In an interview with the German newspaper Die Welt he had compared Europe with the United States. Migration from the South, he said, will make the US a more Latin-American and more Catholic land. Migration from Islamic countries, he added, will make Europe more like the Near East. So the problems Europe will have to solve in the future will in this respect be more like the ones in the United States. US President Trump had fared well in his campaign with the promise to build a solid wall at the Mexican border to restrict illegal immigration. The EU struggles hard to find a way to get back the control over the outside borders, especially that vast border called the Mediterranean Sea. For the Schengen Area and the Dublin treaties will only work with an efficient border control and an even share of migrants and refugees for every member state.

Otherwise national borders will spring up again all over Europe, as Ferruccio Pastore showed us so impressively at the Turin meeting. I would not have believed in 2015 that this could be the case too at our next-door border with Denmark. But now this once vanished border has been closed again since 2016, now it is regularly guarded by the police again, who since last week have been reinforced by soldiers. After a visit to Hungary, the representatives of the People’s Party in Denmark are fond of a solid fence at the border. We will go on an excursion across the border to Tondern on Saturday – and maybe find out that on the West coast things usually are not as hot as elsewhere.

At the Turin conference we also learned that great parts of the African population are on the move. It will be a great challenge to cope with that and stick to our principles of freedom. No national state for itself can do that, only a new founded United Europe can be up to that task. In Santiago de Compostela I said it had become very clear that migration contains both positive and negative aspects, chances and dangers alike, as everything in real life does, depending on the people involved. Only in ideology and wishful thinking it is otherwise. Luckily this kind of idealism is on the retreat since then, but there is in my opinion still too much thinking of just that kind going on.
Therefore, migration policy should not be regarded as an attempt against the right political tendencies, or as a means to show that you are steadfast in your religious faith or of superior moral standards, and surely not as being used to polish up a certain bad national image. Migration policy is a value in itself; it does not need any additional and distracting impetus. It deals with human beings, affecting whole lives of millions of people, their fears, dreams and hopes – everything – and not always with a happy end. We know about the necessity and obligation to guarantee shelter to those whose lives and health are in immediate danger. But we have to accept that not all we want from others can come true, and that the more people come, the more will have to go back. So the main and only concern of migration policy should be the wellbeing of the humans it concerns: refugees, migrants and natives alike. And it should be pragmatic, quick, consequent and compatible in the whole of Europe.

We are far from that, I know. But what I also know is this. If this thing goes wrong, I am not so much worried about the migrants or refugees. It is not their fault that migration leads Europe into a crisis. They behave like all human beings – they are trying to save their lives and/or improve their living conditions. What I am afraid of is how we – the natives – might react, led by national egoism and driven by fear.

It is our job as researchers and scientists to speak up in time, to put forward facts and figures, our findings and our theories against the loud right-wing and left-wing ideologies, against maximum claims of pressure groups and against philanthropic naivety as well. Their usually loud and solidly founded opinions appear to me – whatever noble motives they may have or claim to have – more like a part of the problem than like a part of a future solution. Surely we all have our personal preferences but as scientists we should try to avoid this trap. So we should be able to enlighten the way a little bit with our findings. Philosophy, science and democracy have the same ancient root in Athens. Since then we know that the important thing is not a monolog promoting one’s own point of view. To defend one’s own sacred opinion at any cost is undemocratic at heart. What really counts is the much more tedious and troublesome open dialog between equals honestly searching for a compromise, which is always the best solution to a problem. And that is also the way a real United Europe will surely work.

I now wish us all another great AEMI meeting. Unfortunately, the Governor of Schleswig-Holstein, Mr. Daniel Günther cannot be with us today to open this conference. He is hosting the President of the German Republic, who is visiting Schleswig-Holstein today. But he will write a foreword for our AEMI Journal comprising this year’s papers. I suggest that we take this opportunity to express with a hearty applause how much we appreciate his support and interest in our work.

Now let us start our meeting with my introducing the keynote speaker of this year’s conference: Professor Thomas Steensen, the director of the Nordfriisk Instituut.

He will now tell us what it means to be a Frisian, what it requires to become a member of this minority and what history, culture and language have to do with it. And he will tell us about our special inclusive approach to minority affiliation,
which is so totally contrary to the exclusive national one. Maybe it could work not only for a minority but at the European level as well?

Daniel Günther  
*Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein*

Migration and integration are salient themes for Schleswig-Holstein. That is why I am so pleased that these proceedings of the Association of European Migration Institutions (AEMI) are now published. Results of an event so important for Schleswig-Holstein are documented here: results of the Husum Conference titled “At Home or Uprooted” that was co-organized by the Nordfriesland Museum – Nissenhaus and the Nordfriisk Instituut in cooperation with AEMI.

Schleswig-Holstein can contribute a lot when we speak about European migration movements. Besides the immigration of our people to the United States of America, our state also knows the consequences of the flight from a war and its aftermath – be it after the Second World War or nowadays. Through its Emigration Archive, the Nordfriisk Instituut has very well illustrated the topics of migration and integration.

As the Minister President of this state, I am extremely pleased when migrations in a wider European context are the subject of discussion in Husum. AEMI is a network of currently forty organizations in twenty European countries due to which it is bound to present this topic to European publics in a positive way. In doing so, AEMI has been making a valuable contribution to the united Europe, and the many speakers and conference guests have played a significant part in it.

I wish AEMI a lot of success with the coming conference as well, and I wish the participants many informative and stimulating lectures and discussions.

(Translated from German by J.Ž.S.)

Dieter Harrsen  
*Landrat / Chief Executive of the District of North Frisia*

You may not have noticed at first glance, but I have a kind of migration background myself. A long time ago, at the age of sixteen, my great-great-grandfather emigrated from the island of Pellworm, where he was born, to the USA. There he managed to make a small fortune, and in the year 1900, when he was thirty-four years old, he came back home. Now he had enough money to buy two farms including farmland on Pellworm.

When my great-great-grandfather went to New York, it was normal to do so. The United States was an immigrant country, and no president would have thought of building a wall against Mexico or other countries.

But the world has changed, and we are facing different challenges today. More than 60 million refugees have left their home countries. About 1.3 million have arrived in Germany since the year 2015 and about two thousand have been put up in Northern Frisia. Here they found a lot of people willing to help them; many people partly acted for the public authorities. Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, whom I am going to meet in Husum castle tonight, gave a speech on this year’s commemoration day for the German unity on Tuesday. There he pointed out that we Germans have not yet answered a rash of questions.

In his speech, Federal President Steinmeier said: “Other people’s hardship must
never leave us unconcerned." But Steinmeier also said that we have to try to bring in line the realities of the world and the possibilities of our country. This difficult discussion now lies before us. We will need a special law with which we will be able to manage and control immigration depending on our own standards. It will be one of the most important tasks of the next German federal government to start this discussion and involve the people in it.

Scientific support can help us deal with these challenges, and thus I wish you good results out of your conference.

Thank you for listening!

Uwe Schmitz
Mayor of Husum

Dear Mr. Storhaug, ladies and gentlemen:

I am very pleased to welcome you to the 27th AEMI conference here in Husum, in the Nordfriesland Museum Nissenhaus. I am grateful to Paul-Heinz Pauseback from Nordfriisk Institut, who asked me if I could address a few words to the participants of this meeting, and said that I should do this preferably in English. I have to admit that my schooldays were over a long time ago and that I usually use English for ordering food and drinks during the holidays. For this reason, I hope you agree I should not talk too long.

At first I would like to say that it is a great honor for Husum and me as its mayor that this conference is taking place in our little town this year, especially because I have heard where it took place in former years. I think that the topic you are engaged in has always been of fundamental importance for the whole of mankind, and is still very important these days.

When Ludwig Nissen left his hometown in 1872, he strived for a better life in a better world. These days, millions of people try to reach other countries because of poverty, political persecution and fear of war, and unfortunately we must admit that the rest of the world hides behind its own smaller problems. I am convinced this behavior is wrong, and so I am thankful that scientists like you deal with this topic, so that a united Europe has a chance to come true.

I suppose a certain question is going to be important during this conference: What does ‘a home’ mean? A place, a language, family, neighborhood or friends, religion, customs and traditions, and so on … But to leave you enough time to discuss all the aspects of your theme, I will come to the end now.

I wish your conference a lot of success, and I will be happy if you have the opportunity to spend some time to visit Husum’s attractions, for example the harbor or the historic center. Have a good time and thank you for listening.
A Home or a Country? What did Basque Emigrants Leave Behind?

Benan Oregi Iñurrieta
(edited by William A. Douglass)

Introduction: A Dualism: Etxea (Home) and Herria (Land)

According to Robin Cohen’s definition of diasporas, they are defined by nine features. Basque emigration meets all of Cohen’s criteria to a greater or lesser degree. Note that the term “homeland” appears in four of the nine criteria – but what exactly does it mean?

Searching the term “homeland” in Google, most of the millions of references are related to the popular series “Homeland” on Fox Channel; there is also a reference to a small town in California called Homeland (with 3,710 inhabitants). A more appropriate definition for present purposes refers to the “Country you were born in” (Cambridge Dictionary); “One’s native land” (Free Dictionary); or “A state, region or territory that is closely identified with a particular people or ethnic group” (Free Dictionary). In migration studies the term is opposed to “host country” or “host society”. Therefore, the issue of what emigrants left behind can be approached by disaggregating the compound noun “homeland” into “home” and “land.”

Etxea

The anthropological and psychological points of view look retrospectively inward towards a moral status, sentiments and processes that transpire prior to the decision to emigrate (fear of leaving, dread of failure, panic over the unknown, separation anxiety over whether one will ever see their beloved family again). The emigrant’s sacrifice implies abandoning “home” – the dwelling that represented security, wellbeing and affection; the warm hearth of winter. These factors characterize the migration experience whether departure is voluntary (as in the search for improvement in one’s circumstances) or involuntary (the flight from adversity).

The term for “home” in Basque is etxea. The etymon etx- can be found in many common Basque nouns such as etxekoak (family), etxaldea (neighborhood), but also as a part of the names of farmhouses, usually with a geographical referent. Examples are Goikoetxea (The House Above), Bekoetxea (The House Below), Etxandia (The Big House) and Etxeberria (The New House). These are but a few of the many
examples. It should also be noted that most Basques take their last name from such a house name. Thus, Etxeberria and its variants (Echeverría, Etxebarria, etc.) is the most common Basque surname—akin to Smith or Jones in English. Furthermore, given the inheritance practices that will be considered below, many Basques resided in the ancestral residence that bears their surname. In this regard, the emigrant left behind not only his personal and ancestral etxea, but also his etxekoak or extended family of the same surname.

**Herria**

Regarding the land or territory, in the Basque case the question of just what the emigrant left behind remains very controversial. It has also evolved over time. The European Basque homeland has been divided for several centuries by the Spanish-French border. Each of the traditional four Spanish Basque territories (Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, Araba and Navarra) and three French ones (Lapurdi, Benafarroa and Xiberoa) has its Spanish, French and Basque name. The “French Basque Country” is called in Basque Iparralde, whereas the four southern or “Spanish Basque” territories are designated as Hegoalde. In contemporary politics the three Basque entities of Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and Araba constitute an autonomous region within the Spanish state, whereas Navarra is its own autonomous community.

This reflects several centuries of tension between the independent Kingdom of Navarra and the Provincias Vascongadas of the Kingdom of Castile. As for the whole of the Basque Country, there are the Spanish terms Bascongadas, El País Vasco and Vasconia. The common French rendering is Pays Basque. Basque speakers denote their ancestral homeland as Euskaria, Euzkadi and Euskal Herria. Each of the foregoing terms has political connotations according to whether one is a Basque nationalist (of either a regionalist or independist variety) or a French and Spanish centralist. There have also been echoes of these distinctions at various times in different Basque diasporas as well.

**Basque Collectivism during the Colonial Era**

William A. Douglass and Jon Bilbao, co-authors of *Amerikanuak: Basques in the New World*, arguably the foundational “bible” of Basque diaspora studies, begin at the beginning with evidence that the mutiny during Columbus’s first voyage was instigated by the Basque crewmen on the Santa María (a vessel constructed in a Basque shipyard). When the admiral left a group of men behind on Hispaniola while he returned to Europe for reinforcements, the weakened “colony” was slaughtered by the indigenes after a schism in its ranks caused the “Bizkaians” (the generic Spanish term for Basques at the time was Vizcaínos) to retreat as a group to form their own settlement.

In 1540, the Basques resident in Seville and thereby engaged thoroughly in the “American Run,” founded the Congregación de Nuestra Señora de la Piedad (The Congregation of Our Lady of Piety) as a religious society. It was comprised exclusively of natives of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa and Araba—Navarrese were excluded. The first New-World Basque ethnic association was founded in Lima, Peru, on February 13, 1612. This Cofradía de Aránzazu de los vascos de Lima (The Lima Basque Brotherhood of Aránzazu) constructed a chapel and allowed Navarrese into the
membership. Hence, all “Spanish Basques” were eligible. Subsequently, there were other Cofradías de Aranzazu established in the New World. There was one in Mexico City dating from 1681 and other Mexican ones appeared in Guadalajara, Puebla de los Ángeles and Zacatecas. In 1715, the Basques resident in Madrid established a Real Congregación de naturales y originarios de las tres provincias vascongadas (Royal Congregation of the Natives and Descendants of the Three Basque Provinces), thereby excluding Navarrese. In 1767, Basques (including Navarrese) founded the Colegio de San Ignacio de Loyola (or The College of Saint Ignatius of Loyola) in Mexico City to provide asylum for indigent women, including some non-Basques. It has functioned continuously for 250 years down to the present. Finally, in 1764 the Basques of Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and Araba founded the Real Sociedad Vascongada de los Amigos del País (Royal Basque Society of the Friends of the Country). It was designed to foment liberal Enlightenment thought and scientific projects as part of the modernization of the Basque economy and society. Chapters were chartered throughout the Basque diasporas, including Manila. Eventually the Navarrese were incorporated, as were the Basques of Iparralde, but all non-Basque Spaniards and Creoles were excluded. Some scholars have even discerned the beginnings of modern Basque nationalism (essentially a twentieth-century and continuing movement) in this initiative.

Nevertheless, there are examples in which this Basque ethnic exclusiveness was denounced by non-Basque Spaniards and/or Creoles. In 1582, Basques and Extremadurans in Potosí engaged in a “race war” while contesting economic and administrative control of the rich mining settlement. In 1728, Gipuzkoan Basques established the Real Compañía de Caracas (Royal Gipuzkoan Company of Caracas), chartered by the Spanish monarchy as a trade venture that ultimately came to dominate the Venezuelan political and economic affairs. Indeed, this provoked a reaction against Basque ethnics by the Creoles.

It should be noted that it was in the Basque diasporas, rather than the homeland, that unity of all Basques received its greatest expression. While Basques in the homeland tended to see the world through the lens of their respective historical territory (Bizkaian, Xiberoan, Navarrese, etc.), it was in the diasporas that such inclusive notions as guztiak bat (“all as one”), denak bat (“altogether”), anaitasuna (“brotherhood”) and, more recently, zazpiak bat (“the seven are one”) gained currency.

The “New” Emigration

By the first half of the nineteenth century the majority of Basque emigrants were departing for southern South America, notably Uruguay, Chile and, above all, Argentina. Some were simply economic refugees leaving a relatively impoverished and overpopulated pre-industrial homeland; others were self-exiles fleeing the Napoleonic clashes and the two Carlist Wars that swept across the Basque Country. Basques, primarily from rural backgrounds, were established as sheep men throughout the pampas by the 1830s. However, this emigration thrust drew upon all sectors of Old-World Basque society – including the professional classes.

By mid-century the siren song of Cali-
fornia gold initiated the second “modern” movement. Yet Basque fortune seekers, like most of the “Argonauts,” failed. Several were drawn from the ranks of established Basque sheepherders in the pampas, and in the vast unoccupied (except by a few indigenes) rangelands of southern and central California they discerned an opportunity akin to that in Argentina and Uruguay. By the early 1870s, Basque sheepherders were crossing the Sierra Nevada mountains into the Great Basin states beyond. By 1900, to say “sheeperder” throughout the American West was to mean “Basque.” Since then the Basques have dominated the region’s sheep industry from herder to rancher.

In Latin America, Basques established both a rural and urban presence that encompassed a wide spectrum of occupations. In the United States the concentration of Basques in sheep husbandry meant that most of the immigrants were drawn from the rural Basque countryside. In both South and North America, the magnitude of Basque immigration was such that it quickly established the basis for extensive further chain migration, as established immigrants facilitated the emigration of their kinsmen and acquaintances. In short, continued Basque immigration received an external stimulus from the Basque diasporas themselves. In the Latin American case in particular, there was periodic public support of European immigration as governments sought to populate vast hinterlands with agriculturalists. In 1976, Argentine President Avellaneda promulgated a law of Immigration and Colonization that afforded land to newcomers, thereby formalizing what Juan Bautista Alberdi, the father of the Argentine constitution, stated in 1853 – “to govern is to populate”. Thus, there emerged professional recruitment in which emigration agents from both sides of the Atlantic enticed potential candidates for emigration.

Furthermore, during the last three decades of the nineteenth century, Basques, having lost their “foral” privileges after defeat in the Second Carlist War, were subjected to obligatory military conscription for the first time. It was a time in which Spain needed conscripts for its bloody wars against insurrectionists in both Cuba and North Africa. Consequently, many young males from Hegoalde crossed the Pyrenees surreptitiously and emigrated out of a French port to either a South or North American destination – to be received there in most cases by established kinsmen or acquaintances.

Then too, there was the flight of Basque political refugees, largely to Latin American destinations, after their defeat in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). These included Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Chile and Uruguay. In 1941, Argentina’s President Ortiz opened his country to these exiles.

Against the backdrop of all of these foregoing extraordinary circumstances, there was a constant factor spurring Basque emigration over the centuries – including the nineteenth one. Reference is to an inheritance system in which a single heir was designated in each generation for the family patrimony. The heir or heiress co-resided with his or her parents (the classic stem family household), while the disinherited siblings were dowered and expected to leave. Some married the heir or heiress of another rural etxea; others professed religious vows or migrated to employment in a nearby urban center.
However, over the generations, virtually every rural etxea produced multiple candidates for international emigration. Indeed, it was not uncommon for the residences of its etxekoak to encompass members in both Latin American countries and North America.\(^{11}\)

So, if Basques had a well-developed emigration tradition, constituting, as it were, one of Europe’s prime seedbeds of emigrants, there was also the pan-European explosion of transatlantic emigration from the mid-nineteenth century through the 1920s. José Moya speaks of the five “revolutions” that stimulated this massive population transfer: the demographic explosion in Europe; the liberal revolution, the agricultural revolution, the industrial revolution and the revolution in means of transportation.\(^{12}\) This transfer of Europe’s “huddled masses”.\(^{13}\)

**Basque Diasporic Ethnic Institutions**

In his “New World” the Basque emigrant also found an alternative “home away from home”. Reference is to the Basque hotel that emerged to accommodate Basque immigration into the host society. While present throughout the Latin American diasporas, the Basque hotel was less critical and pervasive there; given that the immigrants had some competence in the Spanish language and likely had established kinsmen or acquaintances in the venue disposed to provide both temporary respite and assistance in securing employment. Therefore, it was in the American West, where Basque immigration was both shallow-rooted and spread over an immense geographical expanse, that the boardinghouse or hotel became a critical social institution.\(^{14}\) Strategically located near railway stations to enhance their visibility for the immigrants, it was there that the newcomer could speak his language, eat familiar cuisine and share the comradeship of fellow ethnics (including over time that of Basque-Americans who frequented the hotels in search of their ethnic “roots”).

As early as the late nineteenth century in several Latin American countries, and the early twentieth century in the United States, Basques were founding another type of ethnic institution – the so-called Basque “clubs” or voluntary associations. Some had physical locales while others did not. Most encompassed both Old-World-born Basque immigrants and New-World hyphenated ones in their leaderships and memberships. In this regard, they were contexts in which to formulate (and, at times, contest) ethnic identity, while projecting it to the outside world. In any event, they were referred to, quite tellingly, as euskal etxeak (Basque houses). In short, these constituted the new “big house” in which to accommodate an enhanced form of extended etxekoak – namely the Basque community abroad in its many diasporic incarnations.

The earliest Basque euskal etxea (called Laurak Bat) in the New World was founded in 1876 in Montevideo,\(^{15}\) followed quickly by an association of the same name in Buenos Aires (1877). Laurak bat means “four in one” and refers to the four historical territories of Hegoalde.\(^{16}\) Their creation was part of a reaction against the loss of the fueros that was centered primarily in the homeland.\(^{17}\) These associations would protest against this loss in their annual assemblies as well; demanding their restoration. Consequently, this could be viewed as a diasporic expression of
the unity of all Basques everywhere in a common cause. In 1884, Montevideo’s Laurak Bat changed its statutes to include Iparralde Basques as well, and the name of its publication was broadened from Laurak Bat to El Euskaro (“The Basque”). The earliest such association in North America was the Centro Vasco-Americano, Sociedad de Beneficencia y Recreo (“The Basque-American Center, Beneficent and Recreational Society”) established in 1913 in New York City by the Basque collectivity resident in the key port of entry. This latter name captures perfectly the fact that all of these associations were initially intended to provide assistance to the destitute (e.g., return passage to the homeland, medical care and funeral expenses for indigent Basques) and subsequently evolved more into recreational and cultural organizations that taught the language and folk dances, sponsored sporting events like handball and jai alai and organized an annual festival that welcomed their non-Basque neighbors while projecting a positive image of the Basque ethnic identity.

The Basque Nationalist Movement
The politician writer and ideologue Sabino Arana y Goiri (1865–1903) is considered to be the father of modern Basque nationalism – a movement that informs Basque politics to the present day. During his short life (he died at 38), he designed the current Basque flag (1894) and founded the Basque Nationalist Party (1895). His maxim was Jaungoikua eta Lege Zarra (“God and the Old Laws”). Thus, Basques were to adhere to their traditional Catholicism and fuerism. The aphorism JEL came to identify the nationalists as the JELtzaleak, or followers of JEL. Arana romanticized rural life and symbols (in contrast to the urban industrial developments in parts of the Basque Country that were attracting job-seekers from throughout Spain that were marginalizing the language and diluting Basque culture). He emphasized Basque racial purity and denigrated Spaniards. An euskoberria, or “new Basque speaker” (i.e. someone who learns the language after childhood) himself, he authored a grammar and tried to renovate the Basque language by inventing many neologisms to replace foreign (primarily Spanish and Latin) loan words.

He coined the slogan Zazpiak Bat to refer to a unified Hegoalde and Iparralde within a single and independent Basque nation that he called Euzkadi – a politicized term that he preferred to the more benign Euskal Herria. Nevertheless, unlike other contemporary European ethnic movements, Arana did not consider territoriality to be an essential feature of nation. Arana wrote that “Nation is measured in terms of race, history, legislation, tradition, character and language … Our Euskeria would still be Euskeria if we took it to an island in the Pacific”. This emphasis upon ius sanguini instead of ius soli is scarcely surprising, given that Arana’s “entity,” the seven Basque territories had been pulled in differing directions – the kingdoms of Castile and Navarra; Spain and France – for a millennium. A corollary was that anyone who was descended from Basques was Basque – including diasporic persons to be sure. Indeed, there is the interesting phenomenon evident in the older diasporas of persons with one remote Basque ancestor, yet practically no knowledge of Basque history or culture, joining a Basque club. Then too, we might
mention the abortive 1897 project of Florencio de Basaldúa, a pioneer in the Basque Nationalist Party and emigrant to Uruguay and Argentina. He proposed to the Argentine government establishment of a vast Basque agricultural colony in the province of Tucumán that would receive 50,000 immigrants. If not a transfer of Euzkadi to the South Pacific, this might be regarded as creation of the eighth Basque territory – a Basque Country removed from Europe.  

Arana also felt that every Basque had an obligation to learn and use the language. He coined the motto Euskaldunon Aberria Euzkadi da (“Euzkadi is the Nation of Basque Speakers”). Despite the essentialism in these positions, Arana’s ideology contained the kernel of the postulate that “anyone who felt Basque and who was willing to learn the language was thereby Basque”. As we shall see, this has become a tenet of contemporary Basque nationalism.

In short, there were anomalies and irrecconcilable postulates sprinkled throughout Arana’s ideology. It could be alternatively exclusive and inclusive. It weighed race (descent), language and territory differently depending upon context.

**Basque Diasporas in the Post-Franco period**
The present Spanish Constitution was approved in 1978 after a national referendum in which the “no” vote along with the abstentions were in the majority in the three Basque provinces, excluding Navarra. However, shortly thereafter the Basque electorate, at the urging of the Basque Nationalist Party, approved a Statute of Autonomy under which each of Spain’s seventeen regions were allowed to constitute an autonomous community. In December of 1979, the Basques passed their own Statute of Autonomy of Gernika that established the autonomous community of Euskadi (Navarra constituted its own). Under its provisions Euskadi has its own president, parliament, police force and considerable control over fiscal matters. It raises its own taxes and makes an annual agreed payment to Madrid for the expenses of the national government (most notably its defense costs).

Article 6.5 of the Statute of Gernika states that “Given that Euskara or Basque language is the heritage of other Basque territories and communities” the Basque Autonomous Community is empowered to sign mutual cultural agreements (including with entities in Iparralde) with them to conserve the Basque language. Article 7.1 defines who is considered to be “politically Basque” as anyone residing in a municipality of the Basque Autonomous Community. This incorporates the forty percent, or so, persons without Basque genealogical credentials into the “Basque electorate” – a clear case of ius soli. Nevertheless, Article 7.2 incorporates into the Basque Autonomous Community persons from the Basque homeland living abroad and their descendants. While primarily an emphasis upon ius sanguini, in theory it could include the descendants of a non-Basque born in the Basque Country who now reside in, say, Argentina. Those whose last residence before emigrating was the Basque Country, and who retain their Spanish citizenship, can claim the same rights in the Basque Autonomous Community that are enjoyed by its residents.

Regarding its relations with the Basque diasporas, the Basque Parliament passed unanimously Law 8/1994. It committed
the Basque Government to foster maintenance of the Basque language and culture among the several diasporas around the globe that were founded beginning in the early nineteenth century in Latin America. It was in part recognition of the support given by many of these collectivities to Basque political refugees from the Spanish Civil War.

Article 3 of Law 8/1994 defines the three groups that constitute members of Basque diaspora. First, Article 3.1. defines the scope of those who are eligible under Article 7.2 of the Statute of Gernika: these are the “politically Basque” because they can vote in the elections under two conditions: last residence in the Basque Autonomous Community and retain their Spanish passport. Second, Article 3.2 regards those born in Euskadi, but evacuated from it during the Spanish Civil War, and who remain resident abroad. After eighty years, most are deceased and the survivors languish without targeted assistance from the homeland.

Third, Article 3.3 grants Basque community membership to members of Basque Centers (primarily euskal etxeak but also including certain Basque cultural associations as well) recognized by the Basque Government. This, in effect, expands the horizon of what constitutes “Basqueness” beyond those with specific connections to Euskadi. Thus, many of the recognized euskal etxeak are dominated by descendants of Iparralde and/or have considerable contingents of Navarrese in their memberships. The Autonomous Community of Navarre has nothing comparable to Law 8, although it has a grants program that provides assistance to eight Navarrese diaspora centers outside of Europe. Iparralde has no institutions providing assistance to the Basque diasporas, although some are under consideration.

According to Sho Hagio, “the elaborated article 3.3 shows a significant importance in that it expanded a new horizon of the Basque collectivity with its openness beyond the principles of nationality in terms of lineage and territoriality in terms of birthplace of the member of Basque centers”: Hagio mentions that there still remains the question of territoriality from the angle of the “homeland” or a vague image of home in their collective myths or aspirations, even if such a “homeland” does not contain a strict territorial sense. A deterritorialized diasporic situation might counterbalance a longing for a stabilized territory, as the Basque Government often incorporated various institutions and artists of Nafarroa and Iparralde into its diaspora projects. Professor Hagio even speaks about a potential leading to a “reterritorialization” of the “Basque mainland”.

At present, the official register of recognized Basque entities established by Law 8/1994, contains a total of 191 entries of euskal etxeak and cultural associations in 25 countries on five continents (all the inhabited ones except Africa). Altogether they number 36,000 members. Approximately half antedate the promulgation of the legislation; it might be posited that the proliferation of such associations subsequent to it might actually be in part in response to the financial support offered by Euskadi to the Basque diasporas.

Of interest as well is the fact that more than eighty Argentine Basque entities have constituted themselves into FEVA, or the Federación de Entidades Vasco-Argentinas (Federation of Basque-Argentine Entities). In 1973, modeling their initiative on
FEVA, North American Basques consolidated their more than 30 entities into NABO (North American Basque Organizations). We might consider these two organizations to be respective etxaldeak writ large. In these two diasporas (as well as Uruguay and Chile), the several euskal etxeak now share a common cultural purpose (fomenting the Basque language and identity) that make them “neighborhoods” on a national scale.

Conclusion
We might now underscore that much is happening with regard to both relations among the traditional Old World Basque territories and between them and the diasporas. In January of 2017, Jean René Etchegaray, President of the newly-created community of Basque municipalities in Iparralde (its first such collective institution) met with Euskadi’s President Iñigo Urkullu and the Navarra’s President Uxue Barkos to discuss common projects. This was the first such encounter ever and it underscores the growing awareness that all European Basques share a common ethnic heritage that can be best preserved by pursuing a collaborative agenda. By the same token, there is now considerable interaction between the various diasporas and the Basque homeland. Law 8/1994 of Euskadi’s Parliament played no small part in creating such bridges. FEVA and NABO both facilitate the visits of hyphenated Basque youth to their ancestral homeland. Both promote the tours in their respective host countries of Old-World Basque performing artists.

Finally, we might mention that the Internet now facilitates the existence of a planetary Basque etxaldea, as Basques from throughout the diasporas interact horizontally with one another and vertically with institutions and individuals in the ancestral European homeland. Indeed, it seems fair to say that the future Basque “nation,” whatever form(s) it may acquire over time, may be best configured from the eighth territory, i.e. the diasporas. It is there that the universalist and inclusive view prevails, rather than the territorialism and essentialism that sometime divide Basques from one another in the European homeland. It is important to remember that there are easily twice as many “Basques” (immigrants and their descendants) residing outside of the Basque Country than there are within it.

Notes
1. These include: “1) Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions; 2) alternatively or additionally, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions; 3) a collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history, suffering and achievements; 4) an idealization of the real or imagined ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration safety and prosperity, even to its creation; 5) the frequent development of a return movement to the homeland that gains collective approbation even if many in the group are satisfied with only a vicarious relationship or intermittent visits to the homeland; 6) a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history, the transmission of a common cultural and religious heritage and the belief in a common fate; 7) a troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance or the possibility that another calamity might
befall the group; 8) a sense of empathy and co-responsibility with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement even where home has become more vestigial; and 9) the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host societies with a tolerance of pluralism.” Cohen, Robin, “Diasporas and the State: From victims to challengers,” International Affairs 72 (3), July 1996: 507–20.


3. Ibid, 74.


5. De la Puente Brunke, José, “La Cofradía de los vascos de Lima” in Las huellas de América. I Congreso Internacional Arantzazu y los Franciscanos Vascos en América, Eusko Ikaskuntza, Donostia-San Sebastián, 2004: 103–113. The Virgin Mary was purported to have appeared to a shepherd on a Gipuzkoan mountain and is the object of Basque devotion to this day. There is a significant monastery on the site that has devolved a practical and political role in Basque history that is quite akin to that of the Monastery of Montserrat for Catalans.

6. Patron saint of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoan Basques. The College was also known as the Colegio de las Vizcaínas.

7. Douglass and Bilbao, Amerikanuak, 104–112.

8. Ibid, 81.


10. This is not to say that the Old-World divisions, as we shall see, were not at times manifested in the New-World settings as well. By the late nineteenth century some Basques in Buenos Aires, disaffected with the increasingly politicized agenda of Laurak Bat, the city’s main Basque association, founded El Centro Vasco Francés (“The French Basque Center”) and El Centro Navarro (“The Navarrese Center”). Ibid, 164.

11. During the twentieth century the list would come to include Australia, many of the countries of the European Union and even contemporary China.


17. The Basque troubadour, José María Iparragirre, author of the song Gernika’ko Arbola (“Tree of Gernika”) that is the de facto Basque national anthem for nationalists, emigrated to Uruguay and Argentina after the loss of the fueros. After a disastrous run as both a sheep-herder and tavernkeeper, the Basques of southern South America raised money to pay for his return to Europe. (Douglass, William A., “El vasco antitético: Iparragirre en América” in Mendibil, Gontzal Jose María Iparragirre: Erro-urratsak/Raiz
y viento, Igorre, Bizkaia, Keinu, 1999, vol. 2: 161–172. He also penned the song popular among Basque emigrants whose first verse is Gazte gaztetatikan erritik kanpora Estranjeri aldean pasa det denbora. Errialde guztietan tokio orak badira. Bañan bihotzak dio: zoaz Euskal Errira (“Since I was very young I have spent time abroad. But although there are good places everywhere, the heart says: go back to the Basque Country”).

18. Nevertheless, in 1877 a similar association was founded in Havana with the name Laurak Bat. Its founders were aligned with Spanish centralists against the Cuban independence movement. So in this case “four in one” meant that Spanish Basques were in accord with Madrid’s colonial policy. See Irigoyen Artetxe, Alberto, La asociación vasco-navarra de beneficencia y otras entidades vasco-cubanas, Vitoria-Gasteiz: Urazandi, Gobierno Vasco/Eusko Jaurlaritza, 2014.


22. This is a modification of Arana’s term “Euzkadi” that designates the entire Basque Country. That use is politically charged to this day and refers to an independent Basque state encompassing all of Hegoalde and Iparralde, irrespective of the desires of the Navarrese and French Basques (where such sentiment remains in a distinct minority). Use of the term Euskadi to refer to the Basque Autonomous Community does not have the same radical political connotation and is accepted by Madrid.

How the Welcoming of Jewish Refugees Fleeing Germany for France Evolved through Time (1933–1938)

Laurence Prempain

Introduction

A man without a passport is a dead man on leave. He barely has the asset to kill himself, and it is all that’s left to do. And with a passport? A passport will not grant you a work permit abroad. Of course not. But at least it allows you to starve easily. Without being constantly alert. And that is already something.¹

Eric Maria Remarque based his book, Les exilés in French, on his own story. He started being attacked by the German nationalist press back in 1929, and as of 1932 he was harassed by the judicial proceedings plotted by the Nazis, he chose to exile. His words echo those of Abbé Glasberg, a historical figure known for his help to refugees in France. In 1946, he clarified what is entitled by the word refugee according to his vision. He explains that:

The refugee is not only a foreigner, he is a compounded foreigner. Outlawed or fugitive, he is a victim of primarily political circumstances; deprived of governmental protection […], it lacks what a jurist called the third constituent element of the modern man, after the soul and the body: the passport.²

These two texts, published in 1939 and 1946 are milestones of a story that has continued since then, on other grounds. Millions of men and women, yesterday coming from Germany, Poland, and Russia, and nowadays from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan were and are still forced to exile to flee repression, discrimination, incarceration, and even murder. Until the 19th century, there was simply no term that properly defined these people. It is only during the two last decades of the 19th century that awareness was raised. In the wake of the 20th century, in the aftermath of the First World War, the phenomenon grew due to the dismantling of Empires, the creation of new Nations, and the inherent alterations of borders. In Russia, the Revolution, constant famine and the collapse of the White armies have dispelled more than a million and a half
of citizens between 1920 and 1921. They became “stateless due to a global, forced and automatic deprivation of their nationality based on ideological and political grounds”. In December 1921, Fridtjof Nansen, a Norwegian academic and explorer, was named High Commissioner of problems related to Russian refugees in Europe. Free movement was inherently crucial to these people, such that the Nansen passport was created in 1922. It is the equivalent of a travel document specific to exile population. Remarque’s book quotes one Russian who had this type of passport: “A Nansen passport? [...] Well then you belong to the stateless’ aristocracy.” It was in this international atmosphere that Hitler took power in the 30th January 1933.

As part of this contribution, I will demonstrate how the welcoming of Jewish refugees coming from Germany to France evolved with time, and how they shifted from being warmly welcomed to becoming “undesirable”, according to then terminology. Furthermore, I will explore the reasons that pushed France to preach the most extensive reception right before closing its borders. Hence, I will enlighten the measures taken by the French administration to restrict the hosting. Finally, I will acknowledge how the persecuted men and women, far from passively enduring their situation, actually reacted to find solutions which I call sidesteps and transgressions. These concepts will be explicitly highlighted based on concrete examples of life courses.

German Jewish refugees
The first victims of the Hitlerian regime crossed the French border on the 16th March 1933. These refugees were mostly militants from left-wing parties and many were intellectuals. They were fleeing Germany in the aftermath of the Reichstag fire which led to 4,000 arrests of potential suspects and regime opponents, conducted by the Nazis during the night of the 27th February 1933. Even though Jews were numerous, they were nonetheless often distant from any feeling of identity. Following the boycott measures put in place on the 1st April by an anti-Jew nationalist campaign, and specifically aimed at Jewish shops, the first departures began as Jews realised that living a decently normal life in Hitlerian Germany would no longer be possible. Between March and August 1933, Parisian police headquarters registered 7,304 refugees coming from Germany. However, this number does not include the additional 2,500 illegal immigrants.

This shows that Hitler’s rise to power had some nearly instant impact on the departures of some people who left the country immediately. However, the majority of those who were not as politicized began to leave Germany following the racial laws of Nuremberg enacted in September 1935. Chronologically, Austria’s annexation into Nazi Germany (Anschluss) in March 1938 led to another flood of refugees and indirectly triggered the violent outbreaks of the Kristallnacht between the 8th and 10th November 1938, therefore hastening more departures. In March 1939 Czechoslovakia, which had already lost the Sudetenland since September of that year, was invaded by the Hitlerian troops, hence further inducing the flight of Czech Jews and other refugees living in Czechoslovakia. To these population flows must be added those of the Ostjuden – essentially Romanian, Polish
and Ukrainian Jews. Thus, the Jewish population in France raised from 200,000 in 1933 to 300,000 in 1939.\(^7\)

France’s initial hosting attitude is known to be based on compassion from the Jewish community, as well as from other population groups, such as non-communist left-wing parties and unions, the Human Rights League, the International League against Anti-Semitism, the International Red Aid, some politicians and many academics. Edouard Herriot, mayor of Lyon, came forwards as part of this movement when he declared in April 1933:

> We must respond to violence only with peace and kindness. I am pleased that no political speech serving hatred has been pronounced during this meeting. We must defend those who suffer, stay loyal to our duty as human beings, and therefore work towards the emergence of a universal confidence and trust.\(^8\)

The nature of this welcoming can be questioned. The only plausible explanation regarding the opening of French borders, while immigration restrictions persisted in Great-Britain and the United States, lies in foreign politics. Indeed, at that time, France was diplomatically isolated. While the rest of Europe was seeking easing of tension, France welcomed thousands of refugees from Germany in an attempt to show the rightness of its uncompromising position against the Nazi system. It is in this mindset that the social deputy Jules Moch, speaking to the Minister of the Interior Camille Chautemps before the Parliament, on the 5\(^{th}\) April 1933 declared:

> I am certain that amid Europe’s madness, France will wish to remain a refuge to all victims of persecutions. Orders, is that right Minister, will be given to all our borders, so that those who will have managed to flee Nazi rifles or Reichswehr machine guns, will find in our country the fraternal welcome that has always been the glory and pride of France.\(^9\)

He even specified, in a ministerial circular to the Prefects dated 20\(^{th}\) April 1933, that if refugees did not own a visa, they would nonetheless be “allowed to enter the country with a simple statement of their status”, meaning declaring oneself as a refugee.

In fact, it is speculated that France was trying to regain a dominant position and therefore welcomed the oppressed without any restriction. The effects of such policy were immediate, as suggested by the French ambassador in Brussels: “It is justified for us to believe that the values advocated by our country will contribute to an improved international climate.”\(^10\)

This obviously suggests a better position amongst other leading Nations as well as a restored prestige on an international scale. Moreover, a sudden shift in the English position can be noticed. In the English press, *The Guardian* reflects on the crudeness of the English position and declared: “No Frenchman, be he nationalist, reactionary, or even anti-Semite, would ever be indecent enough as to consider German refugees as undesirable foreigners.”\(^11\) France regained its former prestige. With such behaviour, France denied being a warmonger, a spoiler, underlined its pacifist position and demonstrated how crucial its security policy against the rising Nazi Germany truly was. Therefore,
refugees promptly became part of larger foreign politics led by the French. Meanwhile, within the government, President Edouard Daladier was in favour of closing the borders, while the Minister of the Interior Camille Chautemps argued that France must maintain the current hosting situation to its broadest. It seems that the consequences of welcoming all refugees without restrictions were not carefully evaluated, especially because it is highly unlikely that politicians had considered this hosting as only temporary. These internal conflicts generated an overall impression of profound chaos. Whereas visa demands were supposedly "examined in the largest and most liberal state of mind", constraints and conditions were applied straight away. Finally, the official statement of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) claiming that the Jewish community would take entire control of the financial responsibility for refugees may have had a questionably precipitating role regarding the decisions of welcoming.

During the first weeks of the refugees’ afflux, the French Jewish community seemed to be fully committed to their cause. The AIU has assured that the entire cost of their hosting would be taken upon by the Jewish community to avoid refugees becoming an extra charge to the French state. However, the optimism of the first weeks was followed by deep concerns. One of the main reasons was that the leaders of the Jewish community in France had not considered the extent of the refugee flow and had not imagined that it would persist on the longer term. In other words, they only thought of it as temporary. Yet, very rapidly, fundraisings could no longer compensate for the ever-increasing financial need necessary for the refugees’ arrival. Faced with this urgent situation, the national French National Emergency Relief for German refugees threatened by anti-Semitism [Comité national français de secours aux réfugiés allemands victimes de l’antisémitisme], acknowledged by the French government as the main speaker of the Jewish community, was forced to seek help from the French government itself. Another reason lies on a sensitive issue – namely, the too pronounced Germanity of the German Jewish refugees. It is undeniable that in France, even amongst the French Jews, a very strong anti-German attitude persisted. Indeed, a journalist described:

At first, it’s true; they [German Jews] were warmly welcomed. But much has changed since. French Jews complain that the newcomers have brought along with them flaws that are specific to Germans. Too loud, too convinced of the superiority of German civilisation. In sum, true Fritzie [Boche].

Finally, another factor contributing to the anxious climate originated from political tensions emerging between the elite of French Jews and Jewish refugees. Indeed, some felt very strongly politically involved and urged the others to protest Nazi anti-Semitism. However, some leaders of the Jewish community in France advised these German Jewish activists to stay low in order to not stir up more anti-Semitism, implying no more protests. Hence, towards the end of 1933, the relationship between refugees and the National Emergency Relief had significantly deteriorated. Both parties felt ill towards each other; the former blamed the latter for insufficient
financial aid and condescending attitude while the latter criticised the former for its ungratefulness and irritation. At the same time, while the refugee situation evolved to becoming a “problem”, the meaning of the word itself was being clarified. It soon appeared that it differed significantly from the notion discussed earlier in the introduction where the refugee was defined as a person banned from his/her country in the name of Freedom. 

Danièle Lochack, a law professor, demonstrated this precisely by referring to Hannah Arendt, who wrote in 1951 that from now on, refugees were no longer persecuted, “neither solely or mainly based on their former actions of thoughts, but because there are born forever into the wrong racial or social category.” In addition, they were no longer perceived individually but rather as a collective whole due to the fleeing phenomenon that they were a part of. In other words, the logic was reversed, and one was collectively considered a refugee depending on the population group to which one belonged. One direct and immediate consequence was that French authorities began to treat refugees depending on their identity and on whether they were political refugees or Jewish refugees. Aurélie Audeval associated the former with a romantic vision and with the “very foundations of the French state inception”, while the latter “triggers [...] an attitude of charity and an irritation due to the burden represented, as well as suspicion regarding the reasons that led other States to get rid of this population.”

This type of suspicion can be linked to the extreme right’s attempt to radicalise the French’s hostility. Indeed, according to these extremists, nine Frenchmen out of ten were “anti-Semites by nature, or by reason, although none will publicly claim it”. It was not long before anti-Semites began to insinuate that Jewish refugees from Germany were blowing their horror stories out of proportion and that they were not in such a bad place after all, as Robert Brasillach wrote in 1941:

In Lyon …, I saw the first German Jews arrived. They were not so scared, they still had connections with some rich relatives in Frankfurt or Berlin. They were farsighted and anticipating the tough times ahead, yet their exile, which was at the time painless and without real persecution, was already amplified by the press of both continents as a tremendous lament.

To reach the French public opinion, partially receptive to the popular anti-Semitism movement, still “diffuse, unorganised, instinctive” at the time, the far right systematised its actions. Since anti-Semitism could only be expressed within a legal frame, all the ways that could potentially reach the population and its social activities were exploited, to win over the widest support possible in the goal to disregard Jewish German refugees: “Booklets, leaflets, newspapers, flyers and cartoons are the media most commonly used by Judeophobic movement.”

It is in this context that the Great Depression – initiated in 1929 – finally hit France. The shock was particularly significant since the French had thought they could avoid it and because the economists had not managed to read the foreshadowing signs. Between 1929 and 1936, unemployment raised by a factor of four, partial unemployment drastically increased, while working time decreased.
It is thought that in the early 1935, 2 million out of 12.5 million of employees were left with no job. Anti-Semites were quick to draw direct conclusions from this economic situation and used it to spread their ideas while the far right insisted that Jews were threatening the jobs of French. This disastrous economic situation in France, due to the Great Depression, prompted all governments (set up from 1933 to spring 1936) to give in almost entirely to the protectionist measures demanded by the extreme right. These measures were taken over by all moderate politicians, as well as by journalists, but were rejected by the majority of the centre-right and centre-left, who despite little ambivalence stood strongly against xenophobia. The measures then put in place by the successive governments aimed to restrict the hosting of refugees in France. For those already settled in France, the policy of national preference rendered their living situation materially difficult.

**Evolution of the hosting situation**

In 1933, following the short liberal period that only lasted a few weeks, the restrictions concerning the access of the French territory cannot be seen as a simple step back, as they were in fact part of the establishment of an even more severe regime, further worsened by the decree-laws of 1938. Vicky Caron recounts how France, despite its promise of never closing its borders, installed a policy in total opposition to its status as an asylum nation.

Back in July 1933, the Minister of Foreign affairs declared that refugees arriving from any country other than Germany would not benefit from the refugee status. The only ones who would have the possibility to try and obtain one were German citizens and stateless persons. This caused the French Minister of Foreign affairs to announce in September 1934 that Jews from Eastern Europe would not benefit from any specific refugee status. At the same time, from the 2nd August 1933 onwards, the border police were instructed to forbid anyone from entering the French territory unless they possessed a valid visa. Meanwhile, the French consuls in Germany and in Europe were told to reduce the number of delivered visas. On the 19th October 1933, the liberal regime that was put in place in April regarding the delivering of visas, was repealed. Instead, the previous regime was restored, with even further restricting measures, such as financial ones, where only those with sufficient financial funds would be given a visa. Finally, in February 1934, one could actually be asked to prove his/her status as a political refugee. In other words, consular authorities and border control officers were only allowed to hand visas or identity cards to those “capable of proving that they were physically threatened and that their life was in danger”.

In 1938, some decree-laws were endorsed and hereinafter not only determined how refugees were hosted but played a pivotal role in the conditions under which refugees would live in France. This legal arsenal attempted to limit and control the presence of refugees, and on a larger scale, of foreigners in France. The decree-law of the 2nd May 1938, despite discussing the refugee situation, more importantly reflected how much the mindset of the French population and the French state had evolved: moving away from the compassionate hosting
of the victims in 1933, they were now inclined to the idea of interning all the “undesirables”, as was planned in the decree issued on the 12th November 1938. From refugees to undesirables, this shift in terminology implies the change of public opinion as well as the state of mind of political parties.\textsuperscript{24} Men and women arriving from Germany were initially considered as refugees (in March 1933), but a shift in discourse quickly occurred, such that the terms “fake refugee”\textsuperscript{25} (in May 1933) and “so-called refugees from Germany”\textsuperscript{26} began to emerge. From there on, the distinction between the true and the fake refugee became a heated debate. Thus, Edouard Herriot declared on the 29th January 1935 in front of the Parliament:

Reason, common sense, justice, and the French and Republican mindsets encourage us to distinguish the genuine political refugee who deserves the protection that France has always offered to the ones victims of their beliefs, and to disassociate him/her from those pretending to be political refugees in order to conduct certain activities that are conflicting the rules of politics and of common law.\textsuperscript{27}

At the same time, the idea of a useful immigration progressed and Philippe Serre, head of the Sub secretary of State for the immigration, created on the 18th January 1938 following Edouard Herriot’s initiative,\textsuperscript{28} considered that the distinction must be made between useful foreigners and what is then called the undesirable, mainly Jews from Eastern Europe who entered the French territory illegally. This notion is not new, as the law of the 3rd December 1849 already allowed the expulsion of undesirable, but the administrative discourse during the 1930s contributed to its generalization.

While the administration debated the economic benefits and side effects of foreigners, the status of political refugee then required an administrative proof. It initially remained rather random, because the policy was not based on any established procedures, and thus no criteria had been clearly defined. The ultimate decision hence depended on official in charge of the case. Claire Zalc refers to the case of a refugee from Germany who provided a document to the French authorities clearly stating that he was explicitly threatened to be forced sterilized; yet the document was not considered sufficient evidence for an actual threat and he was denied the status of refugee. Therefore, it could be assumed that the decree-law of the 2nd May 1938 was a step forwards as it mentioned in Article 2 that “political refugees who, upon their arrival in France, at the first border post, claim their status according to the determined forms and conditions, will be subject to an administrative inquiry. The Ministry of the Interior will be the one in charge of the final decision.” These conditions were later made more specific in a praefectorial document stating that to benefit from Article 2 from the decree-law of the 2nd May 1938, one must:

Provide proofs to the status of political refugee by bringing forward the following supporting documents:

1° certificates from French consular authorities potentially inclined to testify on behalf of the person;

2° testimonies from groups, French or international figures, whose moral value is unquestionable;
3° press clippings relating the events that have led the person to expatriate, as well as documents (letters, registration of residence, etc.) proving that one was indeed temporally and spatially present when and where the events took place. The clips must demonstrate that the person was affected, either individually or as part of a larger category of people concerned by these same events;

4° documents that may establish that the individual was an opponent of his country’s regime and that this hostility exposed him to abuse or to property damages (press clippings, membership card, etc.);

5° documents testifying pursuit, prosecution, custody due to political events, etc. Furthermore, the individual will need to prove that he is not able to leave our country, by producing visa denial letters from consular authorities of at least three countries that could potentially host him. Failing that, one must prove that he indeed did request the consular authorities. Besides, please complete and return the leaflets attached and advise me on the chances of his expulsion.  

The decree-law from the 2nd May 1938 mentioned the term “political refugee” for the first time (Article 2), but this term did not withhold any promise of protection. Instead, it reflected the desire to control, and to eventually deport, as shown in the above document, which begins by demanding proof that one is indeed a political refugee and ends with the word “expulsion”. This decree-law was inherently aimed to monitor and control flux of foreigners, and it established the first step towards internment as it allowed house arrest for those who could not leave France. The decree-law from the 12th November 1938 worsened this clause, because it added the establishment of internment centres. The first one was opened in Rieucros, in Lozère, at the beginning of the year 1939. The notion of “concentration camp” is explicitly expressed in the ministries.  

It was also planned that in case of mobilisation due to war, all male foreigners aged from seventeen to fifty years old needed to be gathered within the shortest time possible in gathering centres specific to foreigners. When the war broke out, German nationals and former Austrians were therefore interned during many months in dreadful camps. Hence, it is clear that these decrees-laws left no solution to the problem concerning the refugee status and they were far from guaranteeing them the right to asylum. On the international scale, an international convention, issued on the 1st February 1938 and inspired by the one of 1933, was drafted and signed in favour of the refugees coming from Germany. France refused to sign it. The emigrant’s nationality remained the determining factor when deciding on the obtention of the refugee status. Therefore, Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe could not benefit from the international aid promised by the conventions of 1933 and 1938. In July 1938, during the Evian conference, France failed to pretend that it intended to remain an asylum nation. From then on, during the year 1939 until the beginning of hostilities on the 1st September, the French policy towards refugees was subject to many contradicting forces, drowning it into the most profound
confusion.

Regarding refugees, while the decree-laws insisted on being stricter, not only did refugees continue to arrive, but the number of illegal migrants kept increasing. In the beginning of the year 1939, out of 60,000 refugees present in France and coming from Eastern and Oriental Europe, 42,000 are thought to be illegal. Since the detention centres supposed to be in place following the decree-law of the 12th November 1938 were simply inexistent, illegal migrants were accused of violating the decree-law of the 2nd May 1938 and massively ended up in French prisons.

**Domestic policy**

In terms of domestic policy, several steps were taken in the direction of a national preference policy. Back in August 1932, on the 10th, a law aimed to “protect national manual force” had already been unanimously passed and intended to do so by establishing quotas of foreigners. The eager enforcement of these new measures from 1934 to 1936 suggests that they satisfied most of the French population. The French State then took further action by constraining all industries hiring more than 10% of foreigners to put forward quotas. The number of decrees increased: from only 72 between 1932 and 1933, this number raised to 170 passed in only six months as from November 1934, and finally reached 383 in the eighteen following months, thus summing up to 553 in three years. Edouard Herriot, during a public appearance at the city council in Lyon on the 21st November 1934 declared: “I will prove to you that I am convinced, as all of you are, that French workforce needs to be prioritized. [...] We do not need to hit hard, but to put our affairs in order.” Obviously, this measure was not meant to directly harm refugees, but they inevitably suffered from its consequences.

Simultaneously, the access to certain jobs such as lawyers and doctors was being restricted. *L’Étudiant français*, a monthly magazine part of the Students National Federation of Action française, a far-right movement, reported on the demonstrations that took place towards the end of January 1935 in the main French faculties of medicine, and wrote: “Against the invasion of métèques. All of France’s faculties are on strike to protest the invasion of the French medical community by foreigners.” All sources clearly state that these demonstrations were anti-Semitic, which is explicitly confirmed by Doctor Louis Goubin:

All these Romanians, and these Poles settling in France, who are they, actually? Everybody seems to ignore it, but is it not an open secret? Who still ignores that all of those who we persist to call Romanians are simply Jews? [...] It would be more appropriate, when discussing the invasion of the French medical community, to speak in terms of Jews instead of foreigners.

These demonstrations resulted in the Cousin-Nast law in July 1935. From then on, foreign students can no longer benefit from any exemption from examination, and all naturalized doctors must wait five years before carrying out his/her functions. Lawyers have similarly managed to obtain the same restrictions within their sectors. Thanks to several
medical members who sit in Parliament, they obtained the vote in July 1934 of a law proposal which prevented naturalized citizens’ access to the bar, or of holding a public office, during ten years after their naturalisation.

**Men and Women reacted**

Initially welcomed but soon rejected due to the economic crisis and upheavals hitting France in 1935, Jews who had taken shelter in France inherently depended on the French administration, which turned this population group from an inclusive space into an exclusive one. Therefore, confronted to this exclusion, men and women actively try to find solutions which I chose to call *sidesteps* and *transgression*. These words are not synonyms, yet they both suggest the presence of limits, implemented by the successive governments of the Third Republic. However, these words imply some non-overlapping actions as certain actions are deliberately opposed to the law, hence *transgression*; whereas others suggest a shift of focus toward the limitation, which therefore refers to *sidestep*, bypassing and avoidance. Therefore, *sidestep and transgression* are not interchangeable in the sense that the first refers to situations of basic imperatives (such as food and housing, work, supporting one’s family) while the second deals with vital imperatives (how to not be interned, to live, or at least to survive).

The difference between sidesteps and transgressions is a question of scale in which the unit of measure would be the degree of arbitrariness in the decisions taken by the French administration. However, we cannot and should not divide all behaviours solely based on these two categories, in as much as a strict line between sidesteps and transgressions cannot and should not be drawn. Indeed, many other factors can influence one’s decision process, such as context, his/her identity and his/her journey. Moreover, according to Jacques Sémelin, it is highly possible that fear of punishment hinders the shift to transgression. Sanction, disobedience, and insubordination frighten everyone. I will here share only one life story, the one of Laja and her husband Ela Mielnik. They arrived in France on the 22nd May 1933 and were coming from Germany, where they ran a business for ten years in Frankfurt. Their business was boycotted, hence forcing them to leave. They were foresighted as they brought along with them machines and raw material necessary to start over their business. Moreover, they did not go to Paris, like most Jewish refugees from Germany did, but to Lyon. Why Lyon? First, because they were less visible there; and second, because Lyon was an important economic centre. They had clients in Switzerland, Alsace-Lorraine and Sarre, such that this geographic position seemed strategic. However, the prefect of Lyon was suspicious, and he wrote that they

... say they are political refugees from Germany, [...] These foreigners *would be* Israelis [...] their business *would be* boycotted, but there *were not personally molested* nor threatened by Nazis [...]. They entered France through Strasbourg on the 14th September 1933 [...] They came directly to Lyon, where they run a factory of leatherwork. [...] I think it is wise to reject the MIELNIK couple.

The use of the conditional tense and other
keywords express systematic suspicion. And indeed, the French administration sent them an expulsion order; they had 15 days to leave France. Yet, they had nowhere to go and they could not go back to Poland, where they have never even lived. They were therefore imprisoned for eight days for “breaching an expulsion order”, in other words, because they had not left France. At the same time the president of Lyon’s Chamber of Commerce answered:

I am honoured to announce to you that the Professional Union of Travel items and Leatherworks’ makers in Lyon [Syndicat des fabricants d’Articles de voyage et Maroquinerie de Lyon], [...] indeed agrees that a foreigner running a leatherwork factory in Lyon can only be detrimental to other businesses. Besides, the special travel objects supposedly manufactured by M. MIELNIK can apparently be produced and exported by the same trade union.41

Hereafter, the couple initiated several strategies. First, they demonstrated how they could not move to another country by providing denial certificates of the countries that they had contacted. In a letter written in French on the 21st September 1935, Laja asked for a reassessment of their situation as she argued: “My husband and I have invested our money in this factory and we do not know where to go.”42 Second, they engaged with social networks to overcome the isolation and to increase their chances of being successful; these networks consist of the Committee of Assistance to refugees from Germany, the Polish consulate in Lyon and the Israelite cultural association. The last one wrote to Laja and Ela’s five employees who then addressed a letter to the prefect in which they asked to not be deprived of their job as it would “help them to avoid the problems linked to unemployment, especially because finding another job in Lyon in their area of expertise is impossible”. This last strategy did not work because they were eventually asked to shut down their shop, yet the expulsion order was postponed periodically for three months. Complying with the administration helped them legalising their presence in France, yet they fell into a situation similar to the one evoked by Remarque, where one can “starve smoothly”, as Remarque sarcastically adds: “Keep your head up [...]! You are lucky to live in the 20th century, the century of civilization, progress and humanitarian concerns.”43

Conclusion
This paper opened with Erich Maria Remarque’s quote from 1938 and concludes likewise. The initial hosting attitude in 1933 did not last: “The Man, in its extremes, is capable of grandeur, […], but, what Humanity misses most, is a certain medium goodness.” After 1938, the process of non-welcome of the refugees continued, in France and elsewhere. The public opinion, more concerned by itself than by the others, has seen those refugees as warmongers in a context of increasing tensions. Borders were all closed. Logically, the measures taken by the Third Republic paved the way. Indeed, the Vichy regime, which put an end to the Republic after the 1940 defeat, was an authoritarian and collaborationist regime. It maintained and then intensified exclusion orders. Since its initiation, the Vichy government has arrested, interned, and from 1942
onwards deported first adults, and then families, towards the Nazi extermination camps. However, to the inexorably dark and regular hammering of the steps of the exclusion, to this macabre ballet for life, respond *a pas de deux, a pas de biche, entrechats and pas chassés* before the grand *jeté*: strategies exist, shaped by men and women whose resilience lies in their desire to live. The exploration of these strategies of the everyday life is a promising field of research.

Finally, it is now the 21st century and refugees’ luck has not evolved. They are still pointed at as a compact mass without individualities or identities, a threatening onslaught. The image of this little child who seemed to be asleep on a beach has launched compassion. Aylan Kurdi, a 5-year-old Syrian child, found lifeless on a Turkish beach in September 2015, moved the entire world. Nevertheless, his death and the ones of tens of thousands of refugees remain the print of our century: “The Neandertal Man was shot down with a sledgehammer blow, the Roman with a sword, the plague was killing the Medieval Man; us, a scrap of paper is enough to annihilate us.”

**Notes**

21. Caron, Vicky. ibid., p. 61.
22. MAE, Europe, Z 434, p. 56. The Minister of Foreign affairs to the President of the League Of Human Rights, 7th September 1934.
28. Edouard Herriot asserts this. Le Progrès de Lyon, 16th February 1938.
29. Departemental Archives of Rhône (ADR), 4 M 422
32. Caron, Vicky, op. cit., p. 288. Numbers are from Pastor Marc Boegner.
34. Le Temps, 21th November 1934.
35. L’étudiant français, 10th February 1935, p. 3.
40. ADR. 829 W 60, n° 19 499 et 19 500. Letter from the prefect to the Minister of Interior, 19th February 1934. I underline.
41. ADR, 829 W 60, n° 19 499 et 19 500. Letter from president of the Lyon Chamber of Commerce to the prefect, 26th April 1934.
42. ADR, 829 W 60, n° 19 499 et 19 500. Letter from Laja Niewiadowski to the prefect of Rhône, 21th September 1935.
44. Remarque, Erich Maria. Ibid., p. 431.
“Does the government need a research institution on migration at all?” This question, rather rhetorically put forward by one of my interlocutors, is one core riddle of my dissertation project on knowledge production in the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF). It seems that there is a basic contradiction at work: On the one hand, expert knowledge is supposed to provide the base for political decision-making to improve its output; the BAMF has a legal commitment to produce exactly this kind of research. On the other hand, official researchers are confident to admit that this concept does not hold to reality: One government researcher called me “naïve” for believing that research had any measurable influence on policy making. Indeed, there is a steadily growing body of critical literature on the repeated failure of the political system to implement scientific findings. In this paper, I develop an alternative interpretation to policy failure similar to Foucault’s critique of the prison by turning the question around: Instead of what knowledge fails at achieving, I try to analyze what governmental knowledge produces (Cp. Foucault 1995: 276).

Indeed, a certain governmental perspective which influences policy discourse and public debate is clearly visible, so that it seems plausible that governmental knowledge production fulfills a certain role, albeit not the one defined by law. Discursively, this knowledge is visible in statistical concepts, such as Guest Worker (Gastarbeiter), Refugee (Flüchtling), Asylum Seeker (Asylbewerber) or Migrant Background (Migrationshintergrund). All these terms have both a root in social science and in politics, since they describe legal statuses and to a degree social groups. As this Ngram-Analysis from Google Books shows, these terms follow a distinct logic of seasonality, if analyzed against the corpus of Google books with several peaks (Graph 1).

The aim of this paper is to shed light on the conditions of the creation of this discourse on migration. In interplay between legal categories, administrative practice, statistical registration and scientific research, group designations or terms for social processes are created which in turn constitute the foundation for further social research.

The sources of the paper are for the most part the official historiography of
the Federal Office, which has issued several publications on their own history to commemorate anniversaries of the institution (Kerpal 2003; Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2013a; Kreienbrink 2013). These sources are especially helpful to illustrate the self-conception of the Federal Office but should be treated with some critical distance because of the tendency of teleological, conflict-hiding style of historiography that the BAMF shares with many other institutions. These sources are completed with my own field work in the Federal Office and other state institutions, as well as primary sources such as government reports, statistics and other official documents.

By and large, four different phases of development can be discerned: Starting with the expellee and refugee research and politics in the aftermath of the Second World War, policy and research pick up momentum in the late 1960s, when Guest Worker recruitment reached its peak. The years following the halt to recruitment in 1973 and the restrictive turn in the beginning of the 1980s are sometimes omitted in official historiography; it is labelled here as “the lost decade”, a phrase coined by historian Klaus Bade (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2005: 81). Migration research and policy after about 2005 is officially named “Migration and Integration policy”.

For several reasons, the Federal Office is a good object of scientific inquiry: Since 2005, this government body is responsible for implementing government migration and especially integration policies including the asylum process. Hierarchically, it is positioned between the ministry of the interior and the communal foreigner’s offices, so it negotiates between high politics and street level bureaucracy and is responsible for putting political concepts into practice. Furthermore, the Federal Office reflects in its history the development of German Migration politics in a nutshell: When the BAMF was founded, it was a small and relatively unimportant institutional backwater with a narrowly confined area of responsibility – the recognition of foreign national asylum seekers. The steady increase in asylum applications from the end of the 1970s, with a peak at the beginning of the 1990s, reflects the long-standing dogma of “no country of immigration”, which was put into practice...
by declaring several ongoing migration movements – Guest Workers, asylum applicants, or resettlers – as exceptions to the rule, for example as “temporary guests” in case of the first two examples, or countrymen returning home in case of the last. Meanwhile, following the belated “paradigm change” with the political recognition of immigration processes and the formulation of integration policies, the BAMF has gained new responsibilities. This is especially true for the field of integration policy, an “absolute novelty” as a BAMF official recalled in an interview, but also for migration research, because of a new research unit at the Federal Office. All in all, the BAMF can be considered as one of the key players in migration policy and knowledge production in Germany.

**Power and Knowledge**

When doing field work in state institutions, it seems that officials share an almost ritualized refusal of (academic) theory. In an almost emotional outburst, one government official rejected my questions about definitions of basic concepts like “migration” in government migration research:

> If we have a concrete question, we look which methods we can use to answer the question posed to us. In this we are not overly committed to a specific theoretical concept. We work flexibly with what serves best. If we refer to definitions [e.g. in the National Migration Report], [...] these relate to statistical data, and the statistical data depends on legal regulations.

The quote is illustrative in a way, because it reveals some basic mechanisms inherent to state migration research and in general the knowledge produced and used by official administrations. This knowledge is pragmatic in a sense that it is produced for the needs of the day-to-day administration; a knowledge organized in files on single individuals stored in large data systems for specific purposes, like the Foreigner’s Central Register (*Ausländerzentralregister*), which contains data on all foreigners in Germany and serves as the main statistical source for state research in Germany today. According to Christina Boswell, the so called “instrumental understanding of knowledge” is hegemonic both in scientific theory and in state institutions: Knowledge is produced and used for a certain aim, namely to inform policy-making and ensure a high quality of the political process (Boswell 2009: 8).

When looking at the relationship between knowledge and power, Max Weber's and Michel Foucault’s work offer widely discussed insights which I find useful for the construction of a makeshift framework of analysis. Following Max Weber as a starting point, his accounts of bureauocracies offer a utilitaristic perspective on knowledge, since only sound knowledge makes sure that a bureaucratic decision fulfills the standard of rationality and the rule of law. In this sense, administrative decisions are determined by scientific research.

Foucault deduces from his historical analysis of different state institutions (prisons, hospitals) an intimate relationship between knowledge and power in general, since systems of order in the “micro physics of power” are always both knowledge and power systems (Foucault 2015: 190). In bio-politics, he broadly
classifies three different styles of governmentality, depending on the grade of state intervention and control: Juridical systems, which discern only between legal and illegal, disciplinary regimes, which introduce gradual increments between illegal and legal to influence and monitor the behavior of individual subjects more closely; and security regimes, which steer pre-defined population groups on the basis of risk analyses (Foucault 2004: 24). Especially the latter two types constitute the above-mentioned “micro-physics of power”, which develops the more influence on the behavior of subject, the less this influence is visibly in open violence.

Both Foucault and Weber share a general optimism towards the functioning of bureaucracy. Weber is famous for his praise of rationalist bureaucracies, but also Foucault assumes that bureaucracies in general apply the knowledge that they create in a rationalistic, albeit rather manipulative way.

Weber saw bureaucratic forms of organization as the very embodiment of Reason in human affairs, so obviously superior to any alternative form of organization that they threatened to engulf everything, locking humanity in a joyless “iron cage”, bereft of spirit and charisma. Foucault was more subversive, but he was subversive in a way that only endowed bureaucratic power with more effectiveness, not less. […] Through concepts like governmentality and biopower, he argued that state bureaucracies end up shaping the parameters of human existence in ways far more intimate than anything Weber would have imagined. (Graeber 2015: 58)

Several researchers have found that in day-to-day practice, this ideal does not always hold up to reality where organizations seldom behave according to a rational, interest-driven ideal, formulating a neo-institutionalist approach to knowledge utilization (Boswell 2009: 41). However, in my field work experience, government officials frequently refer to the Weberian ideal of rationalist bureaucracies, especially in Germany, where legal competence is considered the most important skill of higher ranking officials – as opposed to, for example, managerial skills (Boswell 2009: 161). This concept can thus be considered highly influential on a discursive level but is not sufficient to describe the whole range of interactions between administrative action and scientific knowledge.

Following Boswell (2008: 279) and her theoretical framework developed in the field work in immigration authorities in Great Britain and Germany, I want to discern two different types of scientific knowledge that is used in migration politics. On the one hand, a pragmatic knowledge used for administrative action, especially for the forming of useful categories of population to create abstract rules of decision. This follows from the Foucault/Weber line of argumentation that good knowledge is paramount for ruling, whether in a rather idealistic or a rather manipulative style of administration and is referred to (in my understanding) by the government official in the quote at the beginning of this section. The other type of knowledge frames and directs the pragmatic knowledge and can be called symbolic. This knowledge delivers rather legitimacy than guidelines for administrative action and is located more diffusely in political arguments, organizational
structures and so on and not in statistical data on the population. However, symbolic knowledge feeds back on pragmatic knowledge in defining research interests, questions which are considered relevant for policy making, and implicit normative guidelines which are usually not openly discussed. The central hypothesis of this study is that symbolic knowledge influences pragmatic knowledge in an extent that the latter makes only sense within the confines of the first.

Four Phases of Government Migration Research

In the official BAMF-historiography (Heckmann 2013), the beginnings of state migration research are connected to the administration of German refugees and expellees in the aftermath of the Second World War until the beginning of the 1960s. After the war, millions of people were migrating for one reason or the other: Refugees from territories formerly belonging to Germany, ethnic German resettlers from Eastern Europe, persons who lost their homes due to war destruction, concentration camp inmates and forced laborers, or demobilized soldiers.

Remarkably, the most urgent measures were administrative ones. For example, the Bavarian Council for Refugees contacted the American Military Government in 1946 about the problematic deportation of hundreds of thousands of expellees from the Czechoslovak Republic to war-torn Munich. The complaints however encompassed not the deportation itself, but the fact that the deportees were not issued documents (Middelmann 1959: 287).

The social and economic hardship could only be overcome if a proper administrative system was to be installed first, and this required a comprehensive system which sorted the millions of migrants into distinct status groups, according to statistical markers. One of the few administrative acts which was uniformly carried out in all occupied zones of Germany was the census in 1946. The most important and difficult distinction was to be made between Germans and non-Germans, but this could not be done on the basis of citizenship alone, since many of the resettlers were neither born in Germany nor lived within its borders in the past. On the other hand, many non-Germans were still residing in Germany such as displaced persons, former prisoners of war, or former inmates of concentration camps and had to be registered separately. This distinction was paramount for the administration since every group was to be issued different resources.

To solve the problem of nationality, the concept of “ethnic origin” was created as an entry step to German citizenship, if individuals could prove German as a mother tongue or “commitment to the German people”. This concept entered official German legislation in 1953 (Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims 1953) and stands for an effect of problematic administrative continuity. For example, membership in the SS was recognized as “commitment to the German people” in the meaning of the law by administrative courts.

One result of the reestablishment of the administration was the more and more complex hierarchy of different status groups among the refugees. As mentioned earlier, the distinction German/non-German was the most important, and consequently this distinction was inscribed
in the name of the preceding authority of the BAMF founded in 1953: the “Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees” (Bundesamt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge). Within the German refugee population, various legal groups of refugees were created. Those who received the most support were expellees from territories that no longer belonged to Germany (Heimatvertriebene), such as Eastern Prussia or Silesia, followed by expellees who moved during the war to the territories lost to Poland and the USSR. Refugees from the GDR constituted a third, less privileged category.

At the same time, a very dense net of scientific surveillance over the refugee population was installed. After the census of 1946 another followed in 1950, and numerous demographic reports on housing, schooling and the work situation of the population. Additionally, larger statistical data collection measurements were carried out: Counting of farms in 1949, counting of production plants and workshops in 1950, counting of apartments in 1951, and so on. The corresponding scientific literature which emerged during the 1950s can be broadly separated into two main streams: a population science driven corpus, which deals mainly with the current situation of the refugees and expellees on the basis of this data, and a more historical-cultural body of literature with politically problematic roots.

The first group is in its outline and make up very similar to contemporary publications in population science and immigration research; even down to the design of the tables and the maps of Germany showing the distribution of various population groups across the country. Questions on the size, composition, distribution of the population in question are playing the main role, together with questions of the productive factors: Size and structure of financial assets, employment and income situation, as well as the level and extent of education. The perspective of these works is mainly abstract, research objects are usually formulated along the lines of state reason: Research on refugees means research about refugees in the meaning of the law; no factors of influence originating from other sources are considered. The perspectives of the state and of the social researcher meet in the expellee statistics, which condense all of these factors into numbers; these numbers are based on legal definitions, and usually on official registration files.

The second line of research stems from a rather problematic tradition of German ethnic research which was developed at about the end of the 19th century, when the question about “Germanness” and German citizenship was discussed in the context of different migration streams. The arguments about German ethnicity and blood were later used politically to legitimize both German supremacy in Central and Eastern Europe and the discrimination of people belonging to a perceived lower class of humans. This of course culminated in its most radical and violent outbursts in form of Nazi extermination policies (Aumüller 2009: 161). The logic of political legitimation does not disappear after the War; it rather takes new forms and replaces problematic concepts like “race” and “blood” with less contested terms like “culture”, which are understood in an equally essentialist way. For example, scientists argue against the cultural integration of expellees:
Not only the refugees from the GDR, but also the expellees are full citizens of the Federal Republic. They will not become assimilated Bavarians or Hessians but will stay Silesian or Pomeranian. Because of this fact, the territories occupied by Poland and the USSR are to be considered as federal states of the German Federal Republic (Nahm 1959: 154).

In this context, the somewhat selective representation of research in the official historiography is interesting: According to the official historiography, expellee research was designed as commissioned research to monitor the success of the economic incorporation of the expellees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2013a: 35). This may be true for the population science branch of the research, which served a crucial role in the development of expellee integration measures. In this context, it seems reasonable to assume a classic instrumental use of scientific knowledge in policy design. Also, there are several shared interests between politics and science, like a sound statistical base for both scientific research and proper administrative action.

Following Foucault, the expellee administration can be interpreted as a security mechanism of classification, which transforms a single case into a member of a status group. These groups are classified hierarchically, according to group-specific risks that discern these groups from a norm. Rights and obligations are distributed according to the principle of correcting unfavorable developments. Scientific research is an integral part of this policy style; it helps to design the status groups according to perceived needs and monitors the success or failure of certain political measures.

The second strand of literature however does not fit the tale of “ordering” research for policy design. In contrary, it seems plausible to assume that ethnic research was successful in adapting to the new political climate and offered welcomed arguments to bolster the political support for German refugees especially in the light of the beginning of the East-West Conflict. The expellee population was one of the most important ideological foundations of the upheld claim of formerly eastern territories against all empirical rationality (Pinwinkler 2006: 44). Another example for this influence can be found in the legal act supporting expellees: Expellees were especially encouraged to take up work in agriculture to facilitate the future reoccupation of the former eastern territories (Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims 1953: 35). This example shows that ethnic research has had measurable influence on policy-making in this phase.

**Guest Worker Phase**

After 1955, West Germany along with other European states installed recruiting schemes for unskilled laborers from several Mediterranean countries to counter shortages of industrial labor. The guest worker system was designed as a counter-model of classic immigration nations like Canada and the United States. The central concept was pendular migration for individual workers without the intention to transform into more permanent forms of migration. This was organized by several government authorities grouped around the ministry of labor and encompassing every step from recruitment in the home
countries to transport, housing, and the public administration of the workers.

In official government documents and politicians’ speeches, an economic-technocratic line of argumentation is visible: The measures discussed are in essence impersonal, the arguments are constructed around abstract objects like “labor force”, “shortage of labor”, or similar concepts from macroeconomics; it seems that no longer ethnic belonging but rather economic principles legitimize the policy in the larger sense: Volkswirtschaft instead of Volkszugehörigkeit. Especially after 1967, these arguments are visibly informed by the then dominant economic theory of Keynesianism with a focus on demand-driven economic development and the avoidance of mass unemployment, which could be “exported” through returning guest workers in the case of economic recession (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1968: 2). On the other hand, the ethnic principle and the many differences between Germans and non-Germans are frequent points of reference, like in the central political promise of the Guest Worker Regime, that “not a single German worker should suffer disadvantages from guest worker migration” (Dohse 1981).

The official historiography puts the beginning of the new era of migration research into the 1970s, a point of time when municipalities have already accepted the fact of a sedentary Guest Worker population against the official political line of temporality, and developed strategies of integration to counter further social disintegration. This is in a way correct since academic interest started to intensify around that time. However, the recruitment and placement administrations were accompanied by a rather elaborate system of statistics and reporting, which has had a clear influence on the formulation of scientific studies on Guest Workers. Essentially, the narrow focus on questions of the labor market, combined with a somewhat paternalistic concept of workers who passively react to economic or administrative pressures are characteristic for research of that era (Cp. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1973: 10).

Typical “Guest Worker” studies were commissioned by municipalities or regional governments to collect data on social aspects like housing, education, family structures, etc. By and large, the data resembles the one collected during the expellee phase and contains the standard catalogue of population science; albeit with a local focus and different methods of data collection since no central register of foreigners in Germany was available at the time (Mehrländer 1987: 89).

One central concept of the political discussion is the “Second Generation”, which was perceived as a “social time-bomb” (Wilpert 1984: 306). This concept is illustrative in a way because it embodies some features of the political discourse which are connecting the sphere of knowledge and the sphere of politics. First, it implies the professional care of children (this is what Second Generation refers to, of course). In the context of state authorities, this means above all schooling and social work, and indeed many publications of the era deal with the specific problems of schooling for foreign children, which established eventually the academic sub-branch of foreigner’s pedagogics (Ausländerpädagogik). Second, the discourse reflects failures in state planning, since the very concept of the Guest Worker regime was designed to not have a second generation, and the political steps
taken at municipal level were often in opposition to the official state line which continued to claim the non-permanent nature of the presence of foreigners against all empirical reality.

The third aspect refers to the security and danger potential of the Second Generation and can be placed in a larger security discourse on Guest Workers. According to Foucault, some typical features of a security discourse are a diffuse and immanent concept of risk connected to specific “risk groups” of the population or “risk areas”, as well as the future-oriented and preventive nature of politics designed to deal with this. One example for this policy is a steering mechanism of 1977 which forbids further inmoves of foreigners into neighborhoods with a high share of foreign population (Dohse 1981: 280).

The central competence of the ministry of labor in this field was replaced by the ministry of interior by the beginning of the 1980s. This illustrates the security turn in migration policy when foreigners were more and more conceptualized as a threat to public order (Eichenhofer 2013: 45). But it should be noted that the coordination role of the ministry of labor made increasingly less sense since the active recruitment of foreign labor was halted altogether in 1973.

All in all, the late Guest Worker Phase demonstrates state failures and proves central arguments of institutionalist approaches which go beyond rational knowledge utilization in administration and stress factors like institutional competition for influence, as well as policy failure and unintended policy outcomes.

**A Lost Decade**

The “lost decade” is a term coined by historian Klaus Bade and describes the general unwillingness to recognize the permanency of migration in Germany and the resulting lack of political reform from the end of the 1970s onwards. The main reason for this backlog was the official “no immigration” policy, summarized in the infamous dogma “Germany is no country of immigration”. It came into being by the end of the 1970s as a new general concept after the end of Guest Worker recruitment and gained influence especially after the conservative turn in government in 1982. “Germany is no country of immigration” is the political line of immigration policy in this decade and can thus be conceptualized as symbolic knowledge in the sense of the framework of analysis. This means that in theory, this principle was to be applied to all the policy related to immigration and foreigners and served as the ultimate justification for often contradictory measures which needed to reconcile the official line with pragmatic need for social policy on a local level. For example, “integration” was understood as a temporary measure to soften social burdens until foreigners return to their home country (Lanz 2009: 105). It also entailed a curious practice of “defensive knowledge refusal” by government officials, as historian Klaus Bade recalls in his autobiography:

> Even the word migration was officially shunned. […] As a result, in consultation with desk officers, one was informed, sometimes even with a hint of regret, that “if you mention migration here, I can’t continue to talk to you” or alternatively “I have to call for the head of department.” (Bade 2017: 19)
“No immigration” meant in practice “no immigration, except [...]” since the volume of the migration streams did in fact not decline during the 1970s and 1980s, but rather organized in a different way than before. The main channels of immigration and to some degree the main areas of knowledge production shifted from Guest Worker recruitment to asylum, ethnic resettlement and family reunification.

During this decade, ethnic resettlement from Eastern Europe reached a new peak, especially around the end of the 1980s, when hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans resettled to West Germany in wake of the political revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Both institutionally and politically, this was accompanied with the reestablishment of ethnic principle into the migration discourse, since resettlers received preferential status and treatment similar to the expellees in the 1960s. At the same time, the ministry of interior and the newly established office of the government’s commissioner for resettlers (Beauftragter der Bundesregierung für Aussiedlerfragen) made some efforts to frame this population movement not as migration, but rather “tried to present them to us as fellow countrymen”, as one government official in the Federal Statistical Office explained.

This rather generous treatment is contrasted with a more and more restrictive policy towards non-German migrants. The example of asylum is illustrative for the relationship between knowledge and policy on a pragmatic level in this decade. The Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees had to develop expertise on political struggles in a multitude of different countries, because then and now the asylum status is granted only if applicants prove their individual political persecution. In the asylum process, a dilemma is created between the protection of politically persecuted individuals and decision-making on the basis of pre-defined categories and conditions, which is inherent to bureaucratic work on a growing body of asylum processes. A too schematic way of decision-making is prone to exploits and could often be successfully challenged in court; a too individualistic way would produce extremely long process durations.

Numerous changes in asylum law were discussed and introduced but could not solve this basic dilemma until not the right to asylum, but the access to the process itself were more restricted. In 1980, visa for certain countries of origin (most importantly Turkey) were introduced as a requirement to claim asylum, and even more so after the introduction of “safe third countries” in 1992 (Kerpal 2003: 46), which drastically lowered the numbers of asylum processes. In this context, the category of asylum applicant was invented. Before the end of the 1970s, asylum was usually granted to refugees from Eastern Europe who usually fulfilled the requirement of individual persecution and were furthermore welcomed as a proof of liberalism and openness of Western societies in the context of the Cold War. With a growing influx from underdeveloped countries, alleged misuse of asylum law, and increasing process times, “refugee” was increasingly restricted to the bureaucratic understanding of the word, namely persons recognized as such by the Federal Office. The term “asylum seeker” signified both a transitory stage of governmental examination, but also
increasingly a general mistrust towards foreigners, in line with the general “no immigration” dogma:

It marks a shift from a period when refugees were universally assumed to need protection and were therefore called refugees from the moment they registered a claim, to the reverse situation in which their claims were presumed to be unfounded by state authorities, unless proven otherwise. The new term “asylum seeker” began to be used to describe an individual’s status during this period of doubt. The doubt itself began to constitute the status of asylum seeker to the extent that by the mid-1990s it was firmly established, [...] as a shorthand for undeserving and fraudulent (Haas et al. 2010: 6).

All in all, the 1980s are characterized by a policy of denial on a symbolic level, and a continuation of tendencies of securization towards the migrant population especially after the ministry of interior established its coordinating role in migration policy. In this phase the analysis scheme of pragmatic vs. symbolic knowledge seems to be especially productive since it makes effects of knowledge production visible which go beyond the notion of policy failure. The lost decade is a time where the two spheres of knowledge production frequently contradict each other and produce dilemmas for everyday-problems of the administration. One example for this is the above-mentioned field of pedagogics: Foreign pupils had to be alphabetized and schooled to avoid social conflict and meet legal requirements, but not integrated into the German schooling system to discourage permanent settlement. One solution for this dilemma was a mock-Turkish education program in special classes carried out by German teachers.

Migration and Integration Research

During the 1990s, the “no country of immigration” dogma and the corresponding administrative practices received more and more pressure. Politically, a new social-green government implemented reforms of the citizenship law and the organization of immigration in 2000 and 2005 based loosely on the recommendations of the “Independent Commission Immigration” (Unabhängige Kommission Zuwanderung) led by conservative MP Rita Süssmuth. This commission called for a “change of paradigm” (Unabhängige Kommission “Zuwanderung” 2001: 64), an expression I often encountered in documents and during interviews with government officials describing this decade. Although what the commission meant by this is the installation of regular immigration channels after the Canadian point-system which was never implemented, the principle acknowledgement of a sedentary migrant population as well as some legal and administrative changes (like the aforementioned upgrading of the Federal Office) justify this notion, as one government official in the Federal Statistical Office recalls:

als wir die, die ersten Mikrozensuszahlen in der Pressekonferenz [...] in Berlin präsentiert haben, wurde der Präsident im Anschlussinterview im Fernsehen gefragt: “Ist Deutschland ein Einwanderungsland?” Und […] er sagt: “Nein, Deutschland ist
ein Zuwanderungsland. Einwan-
derungsland würde ja – wie bei den
dklassischen Einwanderungsländern –
voraussetzen, dass man einen Plan
hat.”

When we presented the first data
from Micro census, the president
of the Federal Statistical Office, VK
was asked during the wrap-up inter-
view on TV whether Germany was
a country of immigration. And he
said “no, but Germany is a country of
in-migration. The term ‘immigration
country’ implies that – like in the
classic countries of immigration –
there should be a plan.”

The paradigm change is visible in the
organization of statistical data with the
introduction of the new category of
“Migrant Background” in 2005. This
new concept resulted from a crisis of
research. Increasingly, the distinction of
social groups based on nationality was
becoming less relevant as a social marker
due to a rise in naturalizations after the
new citizenship law and the continued
influx of ethnic Germans from Central
and Eastern Europe who behaved socially
like immigrants but were not recogniz-
able as such in the statistics. Like in the
1970s, pedagogics played a lead role. The
widely discussed PISA study of 2001
revealed great differences in education
achievements between foreign and home-
born students, based on a new statistical
variable which did not only consider
citizenship, but also place of birth of the
student and the parents. In 2005, the
Federal Statistical Office presented the
data on “Migrant Background” which
was attributed to almost 20 percent of
the population. Foreign-born persons
and their descendants are included in this
category excluding expellees but including
resettlers.

Both the concept of migrant back-
ground and the new competencies of
the BAMF are embodied in the newly
established field of integration policy
and the corresponding research unit, also
located at the Federal Office. Especially
in the first years of the new millennium,
a strive towards a scientifically grounded
integration policy can be discerned in
different authorities. The long tradition
of integration policy on the level of mu-
icipalities was continued in the creation
of communal integration concepts, many
of which included a monitoring system
based on statistical indicators (Friedrich
et al. 2012). In the first research report
of the newly established research group
of the Federal Office, a call for this policy
style is formulated as a program:

The establishment of an indicator
system to estimate integration capac-
ities is of utmost importance. Such
a system can only be implemented
on the basis of sound empirical evi-
dence. This requires detailed and
scientifically grounded reporting on
social issues in migration and inte-
gration. Also, precise policy targets
have to be formulated and indicators
which display these targets need to be
identified (Bundesamt für Migration
und Flüchtlinge 2005: 80).

In practice, most communal and federal
integration concepts systematize their
indicators on the basis of Esser’s assimila-
tionist theory which is most renowned for
the definition of integration dimensions.
Not only in the Federal Office, where several students of Esser were involved in founding the Research Group, but also for example in many of municipal integration concepts, this structure is visible so that Esser’s concept can be regarded as the most influential theory in state integration measures (Aumüller 2009: 106). Curiously, it seems that over time, the direct reference to Esser or to the theoretical structure as a whole seems to disappear; When Esser was quoted as a source for the four dimensions in earlier publications, these serve now as headlines for chapters or as a common-sense reference to integration (Eichenhofer 2013: 195).

Recently, the initial impetus for research-driven policy seems to have vanished in favor of a pragmatic compromise which puts measures like language courses into the center of integration policy and resigns from further development on a theoretical or practical level. The language courses are illustrative for this development. When introduced in 2005, they were praised as a central integration policy for new immigrants; two different studies were commissioned to evaluate the organization and course content as well as the success of the students in a longitudinal study (Bundesministerium des Innern 2006; Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2008). The contents of the courses itself were not changed. The concept of 2005 and the renewal of 2015 are almost identical (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2015). Instead, gradually, disciplinary measures are introduced. For example, more and more status groups are obliged to attend the courses (Bundesregierung 2016; Eichenhofer 2013: 60); also, non-attendance or failure at the final exam can have consequences for the temporary residence status since 2011. Also, in contradiction to basic conceptions of the term integration, the integration courses become more and more separated, following the recommendation of the BAMF research group that course contents should be tailored more specifically to target groups like women with children, or illiterates (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2013b).

Jutta Aumüller explains this development with some disappointment regarding indicator-based integration policy, which promised initially the unlocking of decades of policy backlog by scientifically grounded steering mechanisms, very much like the bio-politics towards resettlers in the years after the war. These scientific findings were to overcome the political division between multiculturalism and assimilationism which was connected to this backlog and recommend useful and practical solutions regardless of ideological views. One main problem of this concept is however that indicator-based research cannot function properly without the selection of desired values:

One current research approach is to measure political participation and to conclude that an immigrant group is integrated to the degree that, in aggregate, its participation resembles that of the native majority. On that view, immigrants will be integrated when their participation in alcoholism, drug abuse, pedophilia and pornography is similar to that of the majority. If that is not the kind of integration that is sought, how is it to be defined? (Aumüller 2009: 128)
All in all, there seems to be little consensus about the values behind integration policy, with the exception of language classes. All in all, the reference to integration as a “two-sided process” (Brandt et al. 2012) becomes rather rhetorical and both public discussion and political changes center on bureaucratic changes in the structure of integration courses with sometimes problematic results.

Summary
This brief overview over post-war German migration policy and research reveals some important mechanics of governmental knowledge production. Generally speaking, the framework of analysis seems productive, since both pragmatic and symbolic levels of knowledge production are clearly discernible in every phase. In this context it is interesting that the official BAMF historiography praises the virtues of the former type of knowledge as being applicable to politics, while analysis shows that the latter – as for example in the case of resettler’s farms – has sometimes a much more distinct influence on legislation.

The relationship between symbolic and pragmatic knowledge is subject to dynamic development. In some cases, it is sometimes symbiotic, like during the expellee phase when symbolic knowledge on ethnic bonding is reinforced by policy measures supporting the immigrating group. The argument of shared ethnicity is again used to explain the unproblematic economic integration of this population group (Wollenschläger 2003: 41). Sometimes, pragmatic knowledge contradicts symbolic knowledge, like during the lost decade, and produces quite irrational policy outcomes, like the ones discussed in connection with Foreigner’s pedagogics. This example shows clearly the confines of pragmatic knowledge which is grounded not only in a more universal system of values and bureaucratic principles of continuity, but also in a very time-specific political discourse of legitimacy.

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Notes

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Social Impact of Migration Studies: The Case of Slovenian Migration Institute

Špela Kastelic

Introduction
This contribution will in part present the work of the Slovenian Migration Institute of the Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts (ZRC SAZU) through time, and give a brief overview of the Institute’s latest activities – particularly those that could illustrate the general discourse on migration to and from Slovenia, and the dialogue between the Institute and Slovenian politics, civil services and the general public. The paper will be based mainly on the Institute’s projects documentation and my recent interviews with its researchers. The majority of the goals the Institute researchers try to achieve by these projects concern more efficient integration policies, including better organized dissemination of information for easier integration of migrants living in Slovenia and elsewhere, and the necessity to educate and train experts and broader publics in matters of migration and multicultural values. The focus of this paper will thus be on the Institute’s applied projects rather than its academic research programme and basic research projects. Many national and international applied projects conducted by the Slovenian Migration Institute are aimed at bringing forth a dialogue between researchers, target audiences, stakeholders and the authorities. I intend to outline the main positive as well as negative aspects of the work the Institute’s researchers perform on a daily basis when interacting with project users, at public events or lectures, during their seminars or in other similar situations.

Slovenian Migration Institute and its Beginnings
As Marjan Drnovšek (2007: 7) points out, “the tradition of migration research in Slovenia is not as old as in some other European countries.” There are of course many experts, institutions and organisations in Slovenia engaged in migration studies nowadays. The Slovenian Migration Institute (hereafter: SMI) remains, however, the only research institution in that country that is entirely specialised in and dedicated to the research of migration. A scientific approach to the investigation into such an important thematic field as migration is therefore its institutional
duty. (Kalc 2017: 7)

The beginnings of the Slovenian Migration Institute date back to the year 1963, with the establishment of the Study Centre for the History of Slovenian Emigration at the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts. With no office rooms or regularly employed staff, the Study Centre engaged in its programme a number of researchers from other institutions to form an interdisciplinary research group covering geography, history, sociology and other disciplines contributing to its main project, *The History of Slovenian Emigration*, funded by the Boris Kidrič Fund. The main objective of the Centre and its project was a “historical outline” that would “encompass all Slovene emigration /.../ in the period from the second half of the Nineteenth Century to World War II.” (Čebulj Sajko 1990: 22) Despite its best efforts, the work of the Centre slowly faded out toward the end of the 1960s.

New initiatives to continue the research into Slovenian emigration, stressing the need for a “separate academic institute”, emerged in 1981 at the international symposium on the 30th anniversary of the death of Louis Adamic, the most successful Slovenian emigrant writer. The idea was that this institute should expand and upgrade the efforts of its predecessor – the Study Centre, encompassing a carefully prepared interdisciplinary programme. (Žitnik Serafin 2017: 23) The initiative was fruitful and the Institute for Emigration at the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts was founded in 1982. In 1986, the Institute’s name was changed to the Institute for Slovenian Emigration Research, and it joined the also newly founded Academy’s Research Centre. (Čebulj Sajko 1990: 23–28)

Many factors contributed to the successful development of the newly established Institute. One and perhaps the most important one was the efforts of the Institute researchers to emphasize the importance of international migration and especially Slovenian emigration when discussing Slovenian historical developments. An important effect of these efforts was increased general interest in migration studies as well as an increase of migration related topics in various disciplines: geography, ethnology, literary history and sociology, and later on – in the 1980s – also in history. On the whole, migration studies have become a significant part of the humanities and social sciences in Slovenia, and the bibliography on the topic has shown notable progress in terms of its quality and quantity. International migration is today viewed as a constitutive social phenomenon that has co-created the economic, social and cultural landscapes on a local and global scale. (Kalc 2017: 9–10)

As the turn of decades from the 1980s to the 1990s saw a growing scientific, research and social interest in Slovenian emigration (Kalc 2017: 10), the Institute started issuing an international and interdisciplinary academic journal, *Two Homelands: Migration Studies* in 1990. One of its main objectives was to devote attention “to questions of Slovene emigration treated in the widest interdisciplinary way.” (Vovko 1990: 10) The journal enabled “both domestic and foreign researchers of Slovene emigration to publish the results of their work in a unique professional publication.” (Čebulj Sajko 1990: 29) Even today, the journal, which is now issued twice a year, is still the central academic journal in Slovenia.
dedicated to migration studies.

In 2001, the Institute also started publishing a monograph series titled *Migration*. The series now includes 27 scholarly monographs and collections of papers by Slovenian and foreign authors discussing Slovenian emigration, refugees, seasonal and return migration as well as immigration to Slovenia. (Žitnik Serafin 2017: 24–25) The rising number of new researchers from various disciplines that joined the research team in the following years brought new research areas to the Institute’s attention. Due to this broadening of the range of the Institute’s research topics – these were now becoming more and more connected with immigration to Slovenia – the Institute has finally changed its name to Slovenian Migration Institute (instead of Emigration) in 2009.

Its numerous applied projects now include various educational, expert and even operational activities that allow direct transfer of its research findings to practice. The broadening of the research subject and the ramification of the Institute’s other activities have also been encouraged by projects and programs financed from the EU funds. (Žitnik Serafin 2017: 27)

**Migration Studies and Social Impact of Project Work**

Since migrations tend to have evident impact on more or less all aspects of life in the countries of arrival as well as the countries of origin (Gold and Nawyn 2013: 2), it is not surprising that the purpose of the Institute’s elaborate work scope could never have been imagined as only academic. For example, in the past, some of the primary objectives of the research team were to include various government bodies, education institutions, archives, museums, cultural media and of course the broader publics in the Institute’s attempts to help find solutions for the challenges of Slovenian emigrants and their descendants. (Žitnik 2002: 231) As it will be explained below, similar practices are today still in use when addressing the challenges of immigrants to Slovenia and their descendants today.

The SMI researchers are included in various additional activities: they are lecturers in the framework of national undergraduate study programmes and national and international graduate university programmes; they participate in various migration-related cultural activities; they help popularise scientific research results for the wider public; they educate teachers and children about migrations, and so on. (Drnovšek 2007: 7) The importance of transferring knowledge into practice remains one of the main SMI principles to this day.

The broader spectrum of the SMI projects follows the same common thread: the inclusion, the integration, and the acceptance of migrants. Certain documents and resolutions issued by the Government of Slovenia identify multiculturalism as the first principle of integration, and at the same time often mention active prevention of marginalization of immigrants and xenophobia. (Žitnik Serafin 2008: 164) The concept of multiculturalism can relate to theory (as a category denoting specific relations between ethnic communities living in the same country), it can denote a political programme or movement for the change of established relations, or a principle of official politics’ stance toward indigenous and immigrant ethnic minorities. There are but a few countries in the world today that are not characterised
by multicultural heterogeneity. (Lukšič Hacin 1999: 83–84)

Considering the fact that there has been an increase in discourse on intercultural dialogue since 2008, when members of the EU participated in the European year of intercultural dialogue, one would presume that the multicultural capacities and principles such as “We elsewhere, others with us” (Vižintin 2017: 153) would be more firmly embodied in everyday lives of individuals. However, target audiences of many of the SMI projects perceive such topics only on the abstract level. The collective mindset would, in Žižek’s words, much sooner turn toward tolerance, leaving “the Other” aside, where his or her presence is not intrusive – rather than being open to this kind of “otherness”. (Žižek 2007)

In her Preface to the publication titled Door ajar (Priprta vrata), Tina Cigler wrote: “The majority of us are not even aware of how many worries Slovenia can produce in the first period, when migrants are arranging residence and work permits, let alone later, when Slovenians are somehow incapable of including them. Even though we know that monocultures do not exist anymore, we are yet incapable to live in a multicultural society. Cultural diversity is understood as a necessary evil rather than something that increases development capabilities of our country.” (Cigler 2012: 7)

Nevertheless, many positive practices in this area have been identified in Slovenia, not only those introduced by various organisations but also by certain individuals that help break new ground and bring forth changes in new generations. I will try to highlight some of them in the following presentation of the most relevant SMI’s applied projects.

Implementation of Migration Studies Research Results through SMI Projects

Some of the most visible projects conducted by the Institute concern areas where migrants are most vulnerable and underprivileged. These areas are education and employment. The knowledge and experience the SMI researchers have gathered in the past years have proved invaluable because they can be used, multiplied and disseminated through present SMI activities, and even upgraded for those to come in the future. In some of the projects, members of the team use this knowledge directly, for example when carrying out trainings for target audiences, while in others they can use them as an excellent reference when addressing public officials or, for example, when applying for new projects. In many cases, good practices of previous projects with similar objectives are still used to this day.

Education and Inclusion

One such project was a cross-border educational project titled EDUKA, which included five organisations from Slovenia and five from Italy. The objective was to create among pupils in both countries the awareness of various topics of intercultural education, as well as to create knowledge and tools in order to advocate diversity and develop intercultural dialogue in schools and universities. (EDUKA 2014) The project gave an opportunity for Slovenian and Italian minorities to present themselves in a public space, and offered immigrants in both countries an opportunity to enter this space, for example in schools, where they presented their countries of origin,
their lives, reasons for their leaving home, and so on.

One of the researchers working in this project described its unexpectedly positive impact, especially among children. If many schoolbooks that European children use today express a certain degree of (either subliminal or upfront) ethno-centrism or euro-centrism, negative images of migrants and sometimes even racist discourse (Šabec 2015: 128), the aftermath of this project showed mostly messages of welcome, collaboration and bridging the differences. Furthermore, a significant result of this project is its production of educational and didactic materials on intercultural education, which are still available free of charge to any teacher or educator that might need them. Project coordinators note that many schools in Italy and Slovenia still regularly use them.

The visible impact of this project has inspired other national and international projects in which migration studies research results can be applied to education. Some of the ongoing education-oriented projects, such as Out-Side-In and PREDIS, are based on international collaboration with European educational institutions and organisations. Out-Side-In aims at improving social and economic participation of migrant and Roma youth, especially in reducing dropout rates in formal education, while PREDIS encourages the inclusion of refugees in Slovenia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey and Sweden in adult education.

"Only (with) others are we", on the other hand, is a national project that conducts comprehensive training for expert workers in education, teachers, social workers and other public workers throughout Slovenia as well as Slovenian educational workers living in neighbouring countries. Immigrant children and first generations of immigrants are, as a rule, included in the Slovenian educational process after they move to Slovenia, yet that their first language is not Slovenian. Teachers therefore often tackle various challenges when educating these children. (Vižintin 2014: 72) In collaboration with the Institute for Education and external experts, SMI researchers conduct trainings on topics such as multiculturalism, intercultural education, reduction of prejudices and stereotypes, integration of migrant and refugee children, to empower teachers at their work. They aim at promoting mutual understanding, the culture of open dialogue and respect for various cultural backgrounds that the children in kindergartens and schools are coming from.

However, this is not an easy process. Many times the SMI lecturers tackle demanding issues, such as increasing xenophobia and hate speech, racist elements in opinions expressed by educational workers, and so on. In my interviews, respondents reported of negative feedbacks from within educational collectives of individual schools. Teachers for example sometimes believe that intercultural education is not their business, or that they “do not have enough time to bother with that” on top of the already overburdened curricula. In some cases they do not agree with certain seminar topics or they feel personally threatened by them. Fortunately, there have not been many such cases.

An important turning point in Slovenian public discourse concerning migration was the year 2015, with the arrival of increased numbers of immigrants and
refugees. A great majority of them only passed through Slovenia but still “caused” a lot of anxiety and agitation. Since the aforementioned project started in 2016, the SMI researchers who participate in it as lecturers often unwillingly find themselves in heated debates or are targets of spiteful comments. These are, to their understanding, often based on poorly understood concepts of migration, asylum system, displacement, refugee issues, integration, and similar. One researcher spoke to me about a general problem. His view of the matter was that in most cases there is a complete lack of knowledge of some basic migration-related terms. Therefore he starts his lectures and workshops by trying to introduce those terms to a highest possible number of workers in education.

When talking about migration topics in Slovenia, it has become necessary to highlight the migration paths that many Slovenians have walked throughout their history. As one of the researchers who also had worked on EDUKA pointed out, “Many times Slovenians notice only immigration to their country, and forget emigration of Slovenians …” Generally, accentuating these comparisons tends to be well accepted, especially among those who have their own migrant experiences, or in cases where there have been such experiences in their families. Many lecturers at the SMI seminars have reported about the change of feelings, new ways of perceiving refugees, and even emotional responses, for instance when they talked about their own migrant experience or the experiences of their relatives, parents or grandparents. The reaction is most often a feeling of surprise and a reminder that this is something they knew, yet forgot all about it. My colleagues believe that teachers with such experiences generally have more knowledge on the matter and are more emphatic. The positive response is usually then further redoubled when they invite some successful former immigrants to share their stories with the audience.

One of the most important aspects of such approaches is to remind workers in education that – like so many Slovenians abroad – immigrant children in Slovenian schools also have to learn a new language and new, unwritten social rules. This is definitely a long and complex process that needs a lot of cooperation and help not only from teachers but also from schoolmates, parents, and local environment.

Inclusion through Employment
The question of general understanding of the meaning of migration as well as the public belief that this kind of debate on migration is unnecessary was brought to my attention while interviewing two other researchers. Although both had previously worked on applied and basic research projects concerning different aspects of migration, they have been, for a while now, engaged in promoting national and international discourse on the importance of posted work, health and safety issues of migrant labourers, and general empowerment of the economic integration of migrants. Their latest project with this objective is called POOSH.

When asked about their views on the public opinion about migration, both confirmed that the whole rhetoric on the subject is now essentially different from what it was before 2015. One of them recalled that before the refugee corridor through Slovenia in 2015, migrations were only one of the many topics, floating under the surface. After the refugee corridor, people
have shown more interest in migrations, yet the double-standard perceptions of “our emigrants and refugees” on the one hand, and the incoming immigrants and refugees to the EU nowadays on the other, still remain as persistent as ever. The other researcher, however, feels that migrations are a domain that carries a lot of baggage. She said she could not think of any other research area that would stir such strong emotions on so many different levels. In her opinion, when talking about migrations, people would much sooner think of cultural, every day, social, economic and also political burdens than of the advantages of diversity, opportunities or multicultural values. Another view that I found interesting was her observation on the period during the refugee corridor through Slovenia. She observed that there was much disdain for migrants in general and that during that time even researchers in the field of migrations, with no activist aspirations or affiliations, would be considered as activists. When carrying out fieldwork and collecting data on the subject of refugees, they were labelled as political actors. In her opinion this can be damaging as research in that field can thus lose its neutrality and autonomy. It would be very wrong, according to her, to connect researchers in migration studies with any specific political orientation.

A large ongoing international project of which Slovenian Migration Institute is the leading partner is called DRIM, short for “Danube Region Information Platform for Economic Integration of Migrants”. DRIM’s objective is to enhance the capacity of public institutions for promoting migrants’ economic integration, understood as fair access to employment, work and skills enhancement. Another interregional project led by the Institute, “Urban Diversity”, intends to connect migrant entrepreneurs and their families in Ljubljana, Slovenia and Graz, Austria to enhance and promote diversity through creativity. The goal of the project is the development of the potential and creativity of migrant entrepreneurs and their families through connection and collaboration of both cities, as research show that “many show enormous success and high awareness of community involvement and contribution to local economic growth.” (Bužinkić 2017: 7–8)

As the experience with all these projects shows, one of the most crucial factors in successful migration-related applied projects is active inclusion of the target audience during the writing of the project proposal, especially when formulating the objectives of the projects. Only in this way can the objectives be set in accordance with the target audience’s needs.

Conclusion

The social impact the Slovenian Migration Institute is shown in its continuing transfer of research results to practice, mainly through various educational processes, be it for a particular group of people, such as educators and civil servants, authorities, stakeholders or fellow researchers, or for the broadest Slovenian audiences. Researchers I work with have shown, on a day-to-day basis, impressive perseverance in some at least seemingly discouraging situations. Either due to their keen sensitivity to the subject of migration or a lifelong commitment to the area, the successes their work brings are numerous and encouraging.

A well-deserved reward for the effort can be a project publication that is still
in use years after the project had been completed, or a positive response at the end of a conference when the target audience becomes engaged in such manner that some of the participants ask for more information, stay in touch with the SMI researchers, or recommend one of the SMI seminars or reading materials to other people.

Whatever project the Institute applies for or carries out, it always includes, in some way or other, the collaboration of people whose challenges its field of expertise addresses. An efficient outcome can be observed when experts in migration studies can help connect multiple, albeit sometimes disagreeing sides; when in the long run results of educational training are visible among pupils and their teachers; and when project efforts actually mobilise civil servants and officials to directly and actively connect with their users. All of these impacts that can be clearly observed in practical work with the users make the present and future Institute’s work meaningful and worthwhile.

References


Boise: A Model of a Welcoming City

Imanol Galdos Irazabal

**Introduction: A humble tribute to my parents**

The reason I am here today talking about the model of Boise as a welcoming city is, quite simply, because my parents (Miguel and Tere) gave a great welcome to the group from Boise that came to Oñati back in 1974. This is the image that best represents my life cycle. It is the plaque placed in Boise’s Memorial Park two years ago to coincide with the **Jaialdi** of 2015, in gratitude for the great work my parents did by welcoming people from Boise in difficult times. For many years my home in Oñati was like a small hotel that was the scene of the story I am going to tell you now. Obviously, this story does not explain the whole model I want to show you today. However, it is clearly a central part of a wonderful story that is being written now, in a very difficult context. A finer point and a rectification: Cities, towns, villages and countries are not welcoming in themselves. Their people are, although not everyone. They are usually courageous people who, in difficult circumstances, and often on their own against the opinion of the majority, decide to take very tricky paths. We tend to jump on the bandwagon of success too easily, while in many cases we have been part of the problem. Historic memory is essential to understand the present, and to structure the story of the future.

The real and anonymous heroes are the people who created the conditions for Boise to become an authentic reference for those of us who believe in spaces where people from different social, language, political, ethnical and religious backgrounds can construct authentic models of harmonious coexistence; forward-looking visionary individuals who take risks, and – above all – very generous people. Those who courageously opted for this way forward in the past and now deserve a lot of respect.

Although everything seems to be called into question nowadays, the future will surely involve models along the lines of Boise. There is no other way. They are the cities we all aspire to, hence their enormous potential and attractiveness. Homogeneous cities that turn their backs on new energies are doomed.

**The beginning: 1974**

Pat Bieter, the father of the current Mayor of Boise, was a man ahead of his time. Born in Minnesota, he was posted to Boise for military service, and that is where he discovered the large Basque community in Idaho. A university professor of Irish descent who was familiar with the reality
of the Irish diaspora to the United States, he understood how important it was for the new generations of Basque Americans to learn about the contemporary reality of Euskadi, now very different to the country that their ancestors had left behind years before. This led to the academic program aimed at North American university studies that set out (beyond the learning and improvement of language skills in the Basque and Spanish languages as well as other teachings on different aspects of life in Euskadi) to provide better knowledge of the reality of the Basques at a time when Franco was still in power.

Oñati, the town where I was born and grew up, was chosen by the Universities of Boise and Reno to begin the program that has changed the way relations between Euskadi and the Basque diaspora that are understood, basically in the United States. A new paradigm of relations was born. Everything that has happened since cannot be understood without considering the importance of this program. It was organized in Oñati for around seven years, making it possible for hundreds of North American students to get to know the reality of the Basques and, above all, enabling hundreds of relationships between people from both sides of the Atlantic (marriages, divorces, families, some living here and others there). In 1982, the program was transferred to Donostia under the umbrella of the University Studies Abroad Consortium (USAC).

Franco was in power and Euskadi was a volcano waiting to explode, at a time of great political upheaval. In this context, that first group of students headed by Pat Bieter certainly did not receive a warm welcome. They arrived protected by the Guardia Civil and the reception was hostile. Many people in Oñati (in line with the majority opinion in Basque society) thought that they were a cover for the CIA – that is, allies of Franco. Great courage was shown by my parents and others (people involved in political opposition to Franco and very committed to the defense of Basque language and culture), and very few decided to welcome the Americans who arrived in Oñati with open arms. Thanks to their courage, I am standing here today explaining the welcoming nature of Boise. Likewise, the strong commitment and courage of Pat Bieter should be highlighted. He was a man who knew how to anticipate events in a conservative environment. Those young people who stayed in Oñati are now community leaders in Boise: the Mayor, judges, doctors, university professors. Therefore, we should highlight the great impact the project had on the development of the city of Boise.

Everyone emerged as a winner from that program. Oñati, a historically outward-looking town (it is home to the oldest university in the Basque Country, where Law, Medicine and Philosophy were taught in the 16th century), is now an even more open place, and the role played by the Boise program has been a key factor. Boise and Oñati are, as we shall see in more detail later, isolated places, although in both cases far from being a drawback this has been a key factor in their success. There was no resting on one's laurels; isolation has been a stimulus.

Oñati has one of the lowest unemployment rates in the Spanish State, with companies like ULMA operating worldwide, the International Institute for the Sociology of Law that welcomes Doctorate and Master’s students from all over the
world, and the Monastery of Arantzazu. From that dark year 1974 to now, Oñati and Boise have grown and helped each other, thanks to those courageous people who took great risks and decided that the future of their hometown and their people meant being open towards other cultures and other ways of thinking. The commitment to diversity is the only driving force that makes societies growing, and Boise is a clear example.

Boise: In the middle of nowhere

My first visit to Boise was in 1988. We had to take quite a few flights to get there. As happens with a lot of other places in the world (Donostia and Husum come to mind), being located outside the main routes with not particularly good communications theoretically means greater difficulties. My first impression was that is a small city. Very different from the large city concept that seems to be imposing itself nowadays. In the case of Boise, however, what some consider a major drawback, with the often-repeated complaint about it being far away from where things happen – “Boise is in the middle of nowhere” – its unfavorable location, its dry climate, roasting sunshine in summer, and quite a cold winter – what some consider defects turn into undoubted advantages.

In the middle of the desert, with vast spaces around and infinite potential for growth, Boise has become home to state-of-the-art technology companies, people looking for new life experiences, refugees and emigrants in search of freedom. Micron, Hewlett-Packard and White-Cloud Analytics have converted Boise into a ‘Techy Boomtown’, as TIME magazine described it. In March 2014, TIME Magazine featured Boise as #1 region “Getting it Right”. As they explain in their feature called Red-Hot Town,

#1 Boise, Idaho: Once the gateway to remote mining camps, Idaho’s capital has become a technic boomtown with a thriving cultural scene. An economy boosted by mega-grocer Albertsons, the multinational Micron Technology and the potato giant J.R. Simplot has helped jump-start a fast-growing real estate market.

From all perspectives and angles, Boise’s ability to attract is undisputed. The city has become the incarnation of the American Dream of the 21st century on its own merits. With a population of 676,929 (2015 Estimate), there are more than 101,800 people employed in professional services occupations. One of the fastest growing regions in the country, the Boise MSA ranked #3 (excluding Florida) for the highest net domestic in-migration rate in 2014 behind Austin, TX and Charleston, SC.1 As well as technology companies and North American citizens in search of new experiences or simply tired of living in large cities (20% of new residents in Boise have come from California), Boise’s rather isolated location has not stopped thousands of refugees from starting a new life there. On paper, other destinations might seem more attractive to those who have chosen Boise, or who arrived in a little-known place as a result of established quotas. They all praise the city that is now their home.

Boise, Idaho, offers a calmer perspective. Here at the base of the Rocky Mountains, in one of the whitest of American places in one of the
reddest American states, 13,000 refugees from at least 53 countries are rebuilding their lives.²
Many different factors, causes and reasons, and the need to overcome major obstacles (location, stereotypes³), led the city authorities to adopt a rather unconventional project by discarding traditional approaches. Nowadays, however, the project has all the elements to become a model that transcends the frontiers of the USA. In an age of uncertainty, upheaval, doubts, questions and generalized fatigue, Boise proposes something very suggestive, unusual and attractive, despite its location in the middle of the desert. Proximity is important for many small to mid-sized cities. Not all amenities generally exist within the city limits, which is fair. Not every city can be New York City. It’s rare to hear a mayor say that one aspect that makes his city so great is how far removed it is from other cities.

Yet, that’s exactly what Boise’s mayor David Bieter suggested. “I think our isolation has been good for us,” he says. “Salt Lake City, Portland and Seattle are six to eight hours away. You can’t drive an hour and go the symphony or theater in another town. You have to build it here”. Boise, therefore, needs to provide for itself. It has the Boise Philharmonic. It has a theater. It has a state capital and a military base. Its university has added “football powerhouse” to its already-impressive resume. The natural amenities are perhaps even more impressive than the cultural ones. Boise sits at the intersection of desert and mountains with the Boise River running through downtown. The climate is mild year-round, but still varied throughout the year. “Unless you don’t like seasons,” Mayor Bieter says, “we’re a very good place to live.” The isolation can be a downside, too. Getting people to Boise can be a challenge. The city must be an intentional destination. It is not really on the way to or from anywhere. But once people see it, they tend to fall in love and want to stay, Mayor Bieter says.⁴

Why is Boise attractive?
It is paradoxical that, at a time when there is a tendency towards retreat and the challenging of open, integrating approaches depending on the flow of events, the great driver behind Boise is its diversity. Without a doubt, this is what makes it so attractive. There are also other elements to explain the meteoric rise and growth of Boise. It is a city whose population has increased from 74,990 in 1970 to 102,249 in 1980 and to 216,282 in 2014. Its present population is 223,154, just a little bigger than Donostia. The reasons that could explain this spectacular growth lead us to analyze them one by one. It is a long list, for sure. According to a study made by Boise Metro: “Reasons for Growth? 1) Quality of Life – Live the American Dream, Own a Home; 2) Affordability w/ Premium Schools, Recreation, Safety; 3) Quality of People; 4) Vibrant Downtown.”⁵ Quality education is another key factor in the major immigrant flow into Boise that is taking place. Mayor Bieter says:

Many of the schools in town are highly rated, which helped Boise rank on our Top 10 Best Cities for Kids list. In our discussion with
business that is looking to relocate, they always ask about the educational system. Our advantage is that our public-school system is the default school. We have private schools that are quite good, but you choose them if you want to, not because you have to. The classrooms are diverse, due to a large population of refugees from all over the world.  

Seen from the outside, and in the light of stereotypes, nobody who is not from the Boise Valley could imagine diversity as its main feature when it comes to describing the place.

More than 90 different languages are spoken in the Boise School District. The Boise Valley is home to one of the oldest synagogues in the western United States. 800 new citizens seeking refuge from circumstances in their homeland are welcomed to the Boise Valley each year from over 20 foreign countries. Idaho is home to the second largest Basque population in North America. Over 70% of the population has some college training or above (12.7% above the national average).

The Boise Valley is home to the fastest-growing community college in the country, College of Western Idaho, which is currently servicing over 20,000 students. The Boise Valley maintains a wealth of cultural, spiritual and ethnic diversity throughout the area, and is proud to actively promote and foster a spirit of inclusion that embraces the diversity found in the valley. From cultural events such as the Soul Food Extravaganza to the San Inazio Festival or Deli Days, to ongoing activities and programs at the Black History Museum and the Hispanic Cultural Center, the Boise Valley celebrates our residents’ diversity year-round.

In any event, the favorable position held by Boise in most rankings is a clear sign of:
1. A Getaway: Boise was ranked as one of the top five “Best Travel-Worthy State Capitals” by USA Today for 2016.
2. A Recreation Paradise: Boise was named one of the 10 “Best Big Cities for Active Families” by Outside Magazine.
3. A Cultural Hub: Boise recently nabbed the #2 spot as one of the “Most Artistic Mid-Sized Cities in America”.
4. An Economic Powerhouse: Boise was named on the top ten lists of cities with job growth potential.
5. A Downtown Trendsetter: Livability ranked BoDo as #6 in their list of “Top 10 Downtown Scenes”.
6. A Growing Market: Boise has been repeatedly named as one of the “Hottest Housing Markets” for 2016.
7. A Caring Community: Not only was Boise recently chosen as the “Most Caring City in America”, it also ranks 2nd in the nation for volunteerism and community outreach.
9. An Educational Leader: Boise has been repeatedly ranked as a top ten college town, among other accolades.
10. 2017’s Best -Worst-Run Cities
in America.\textsuperscript{8} 

11. Best cities for raising a family\textsuperscript{9}, with Boise in second place. 

12. Boise also ranks #2 as an “Up and Coming City for New Grads”, and as one of TIME Magazine’s “Best Towns for College Football”. 

Regardless of any classification, Boise represents the future. It is a new city without prejudices or baggage, a unique energy and a natural setting that is an essential element in a very attractive project. Its inhabitants show much greater pride in the city than those from other places.\textsuperscript{10} 

What used to be an insignificant city is now seen as one of the great benchmarks for the future. It has found its place despite all the difficulties that it has experienced (and still does). In this process, a clear, generous and unequivocal commitment to the enthusiastic welcoming of diversity has been, without doubt, what has placed it in such a favorable situation. Its success is based on a set of intangible values that comprise a unique model: pride, an outward-looking approach, diversity, happiness. That is where we need to look to carry out any analysis: 

\textit{The Best City in America is Actually Right Here in Idaho} 

The old adage of “location, location, location” is just one reason why Idaho as a whole has been recently making headlines as a blossoming national icon. The Gem State’s idyllic intersection of desert, mountains and river oases creates an environment that offers something for everybody, while also quietly resting in close proximity to the urban centers of Seattle, Portland, and Salt Lake City. But Idaho’s capital is making a name for itself for much more than its beauty and convenience. 

With the goal of becoming the most livable city in the country, Boise is a bustling metropolis that has changed dramatically in the past decade or so, rising from a “bait and bullet” town, as it was called by the \textit{New York Times}, to a thriving center for art, green initiatives, and community development. But it is in its uniquely isolated setting that Boise has truly found its niche as a hip, urban hub that is being praised by nearly every nationally published top ten list. 

Idaho is a one-of-a-kind haven all on its own, but Boise as a blossoming metropolis offers everything you could ask for in a modern community – superb dining, quality education, entrepreneurial initiative, and so much more. 

But Boise does so without the high cost of living, over-development, or pollution that one finds in its more populated urban counterparts. Whether it is the City of Trees’ unique festivals, incredible art scene, or vibrant nightlife, Boise is a fantastic place to visit or call home.\textsuperscript{11} 

\textbf{A long history of welcoming: Refugees transform the City of Trees} 

It would be wrong to say that the path has been strewn with flowers. Resistance has existed, and still does in places. The polarization that western societies suffer nowadays does not help to create a calm debate. The natural, necessary and desirable diversity of opinions is often
replaced by exaggeration, manipulation and over-generalization.\textsuperscript{12} There is another important nuance: the deliberate confusion of the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘immigrant’\textsuperscript{13} does not help to mark out and clarify the debate.

History repeats itself, as Dave Bieter reminded us in an article published in December 2016\textsuperscript{14}, in which he strongly defended his position. From a historical perspective, he highlighted the benefits that the presence of immigrants and refugees has represented in Boise’s growth. Mayor Bieter, who considers himself an outsider, a Catholic in a Protestant city and a Democrat in a Republican state, is a good example of a typical life journey in Boise today:

I’m the mayor of Boise, where immigrants have played a significant role since before statehood. My own life is an example of how the immigration experience in the United States has worked. My grandfather immigrated to Boise from the Basque region of Spain in 1912, along with thousands of others. He herded sheep – tough, solitary work that few native-born Americans wanted. He met my grandmother, another Basque immigrant, here in Boise and they built a life for my mother and her two sisters. Their story was similar to those of thousands of Basques who succeeded in Idaho. Today, it is easy to forget that in 1909 a local newspaper described Basque immigrants as “filthy, treacherous, and meddlesome, clan-nish and undesirable”. Fortunately, most Idahoans ignored that. Thousands of Latino immigrants have pursued similar paths through hard, unpopular work on the road to better lives in the Boise Valley. Like Basque immigrants to Idaho, Latinos have not always faced an easy road. As late as the 1950s, signs posted outside some doors in the area warned “Mexicans, Negroes, Jews, Indians and dogs” to stay out. Again, fortunately, most Idahoans ignored that. The Latino contribution to our lives is unmistakable. Without them, many of Idaho’s most important industries would have collapsed long ago.

And so it is today with refugees. Boise is home to Bosnians, Somalis, Iraqis and Syrians. Our city government reaches out through nearly all departments – police to ensure refugees know they are safe; parks and recreation programs help refugee children enjoy our outdoors, like all our children do; library programs help with access to computers and other learning tools; our arts and history programs help with cultural activities. We offer these same programs to all Boiseans. We do not debate about who is more worthy or where they’re from. We are a welcoming city. We all have work to do. Refugees enrich our city. They are some of the hardest working Boiseans. They give vibrancy to our schools. Some have even opened new businesses in older parts of Boise. Our city gets back many times over what it gives.

Boise does not welcome our newcomers just out of goodwill and the bottom line. We also do so because we understand that the constant
addition of new and energized people
from many places around the world
is this country’s oxygen. That does
not mean things are easy.
But the United States has never taken
the easy route, through wars and
depressions and the shifting world —
and that’s why we are the United
States. From our city’s beginnings
in the 1860s, Boise has benefited
from the energy and hard work of its
newcomers from all over the globe. It
would be a mistake to shut that off.15

The journey has been a long one and not
without its difficulties, similar to those that
still prevail, far from unanimity, and that
gives the present scenario even more value.
Opposing stances that have propitiated a
process that has always been alive:

Both an in-migrant city and an
anti-in-migrant city, Boise, histor-
ically, had shunned prejudice but
also endorsed it depending on what
was at stake. In 1893, the Japanese
laborers who laid rails to the 10th
Street depot were confined to shiver
in box cars when threatened by mobs
downtown. In 1901, a Bavarian
in-migrant mayor named Moses
Alexander allied with a British sher-
iff to roughly remove the Chinese.
That same immigrant built an ornate
synagogue and became the nation’s
first elected Jewish governor. Boise
beckoned, but Boiseans sometimes
repelled.16

Pitchfork nativism, even so, never played
well in Boise. In 1924, when the Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan rallied on Boise’s
Main Street, the city council insisted that
the hooded marchers expose their faces in
honest daylight. In 1948, when an Idaho
senator shunned “whites only” and was
arrested in Alabama, Boiseans applauded
the rebuke of Jim Crow. Today, like a
hundred years ago, different visions and
approaches exist on the issue, as Professor
Todd Shallat points out:

Idaho’s governor had previously
joined two dozen others in demand-
ing a halt to “rubber-stamped”
immigration/refugee programs. No
matter the confusion between refu-
gees (who are forced to migrate) and
in-migrants (who are not). No matter
that refugee issues were far removed
from the governor’s jurisdiction.
“Frustration runs high in Idaho”,
said Otter. The narrative seemed to
confirm that strangers were evil and
that refugee resettlement was a top
spun out of control.
Two blocks from Otter’s State-
house — shouting distance but po-
itical light-years from the governor’s
office — Mayor David H. Bieter
ignited his own fiery headline by
drafting a defiant response. “When it
comes to immigration and refugees,”
wrote Bieter to his fellow mayors,
“Presidents and Congress get to say,
but mayors have to do”.
Boise’s mayor rejected the notion
that people from distant places posed
a threat to public safety. Boise was
live-and-let live, said Bieter. It was the
kind of place where artists painted
the utility-boxes, where an overpass
sheltered a skate park, where motor-
ists allowed people to merge so long
as they waved back to acknowledge
the kindness. “We are nationally
known as a welcoming city”, Bieter continued, “We can all be proud”.17

The debate is ongoing, but the commitment has been made in Idaho for a long time. There is a deeply-rooted culture that is interiorized and assumed by its institutions, civil society, and citizens:

In Idaho meanwhile, an informal refugee program began at Boise State University in 1975, and Governor John Evans formally established a state-level refugee center in 1979. The program later passed to Idaho’s Department of Health and Welfare in 1997, to a private nonprofit, Jannus Inc., named in tribute to the Roman god of new beginning. It houses the resettlement agency. The Idaho Office for Refugees (within Jannus) receives federal grant money and administers statewide programs.18

At the end of each war, given its status as a sanctuary19, Idaho is one of over 200 resettlement communities across the U.S. providing safe haven to refugees from war-torn countries across the world; Boise has welcomed citizens from all over the world, most of whom did not know it existed. People from Indochina, Vietnam, Korea, Somalia, the Congo, Syria or Iraq20 are among those who have rebuilt their lives in Boise and Idaho. Let’s mention only a few countries of origin and numbers for Idaho refugees from 2016: Democratic Republic of Congo (602), Syria (148), and Iraq (122).

The war in the Balkans led to the arrival of another large wave of refugees from Bosnia, possibly one of the communities with the greatest impact on the area in recent years. Very few of them could tell you where Idaho was on the map. Around 3,500–4,000 people21 (mostly Bosnians, with small communities of Serbians and Croatians) make up a highly vibrant and enterprising community, particularly in the construction sector and as university professors. The story of Refik Sadikovic shows the importance of an experience that has allowed him to work a personal miracle that has enriched Boise. Mutual enrichment and benefit: “Chosen to Survive. A Bosnian, cut down by shrapnel, sees his life as a miracle”.22

In Donostia, the city where I live, the number of Bosnians arriving in the city can be counted on one hand; not even a dozen. They have integrated wonderfully, and I often wonder why our ability to attract people like that is so low. With just a quarter of those who arrived in Boise, Donostia would undoubtedly have been a much more enriched city. Boise’s example should make us sit up and think.

Regardless of the particular circumstances and the (worthy) opinions that exist on the subject, Boise continues on its way. There will be turbulences, quota reductions, some hiatus, but it will be difficult to stop something that belongs to the DNA of the city and its citizens.23

In 2014, Full Circle Exchange launched a new “Job Readiness” program in Boise. It assists local refugees and women in transition by providing immediate income and developing daily hands-on skills such as team-building, problem-solving, language acquisition, and vital enrichment opportunities needed to overcome barriers to employment; creating a new future – for them-
selves, their families, our community and our economy. [...] Nearly 6,000 people from 35 countries call Boise their home.24

A shared public-private initiative
The community of Boise, Idaho has made a commitment to welcoming refugees through its impressive Refugee Resource Strategic Community Plan. EMM’s affiliate partners at the Agency for New Americans have partnered with city agencies, transportation officials, health care providers and many other stakeholders to adopt a model of communication and creative problem-solving that is benefiting the entire community. A program that teaches refugees how to drive is just one of many positive offshoots to emerge from this collaboration. What has given Boise its undisputed status as a benchmark?

25 Communities Selected for Gateways for Growth Challenge Round II
Building on the increasing demand from local government, business, and civic leaders who aim to develop concrete strategies to integrate immigrants and foster economic growth, New American Economy (NAE) and Welcoming America are pleased to announce the 25 communities who will receive Gateways for Growth award in the second year of the initiative.

Launched in December 2015, the Gateways for Growth Challenge are a competitive opportunity for local communities to receive direct technical assistance from New American Economy and Welcoming America to develop multi-sector plans for welcoming and integrating immigrants. New American Economy also provides tailored research on the contributions of immigrants and matching grants to select communities as part of the Challenge.

This year’s Gateways for Growth awardees demonstrated a strong commitment from local government, business, and civil society partners to recognize and highlight the contributions immigrants are making—by bolstering population growth, increasing the tax base, starting new businesses and creating jobs, and adding vibrancy and culture to our social fabric— and to develop concrete strategies and recommendations to maximize these contributions.

“What has given Boise its undisputed status as a benchmark? The community of Boise, Idaho has made a commitment to welcoming refugees through its impressive Refugee Resource Strategic Community Plan. EMM’s affiliate partners at the Agency for New Americans have partnered with city agencies, transportation officials, health care providers and many other stakeholders to adopt a model of communication and creative problem-solving that is benefiting the entire community. A program that teaches refugees how to drive is just one of many positive offshoots to emerge from this collaboration. What has given Boise its undisputed status as a benchmark?”

“While Congress debates the value of immigration, in city after city, the evidence is already in immigrants revive neighborhoods and drive economic growth,” said John Feinblatt, President of New American Economy. “The Gateways for Growth Challenge offers local leaders blueprints for attracting immigrant talent and jump-starting their economies.”

“These communities are leaders in the broader and growing trend to be more inclusive, offering an alternative to the divisive rhetoric around immigration and showing how inclusion is good for our economy, neighborhoods, and future,” said David Lubell, Executive Director of Welcoming America. “Inclusive economic growth strategies that take into account both U.S. and foreign-born communities make cities more vibrant, attractive places for all residents.”
Following a rigorous application process, 25 communities were selected: Alexandria, VA, Austin, MN, and Boise/Ada County, ID [...]. This year, the Gateways for Growth Challenge will again offer resources to communities that demonstrate a public-private commitment to the development of a community-wide strategic plan. Those resources include: – Customized quantitative research reports from NAE on the demographic and economic contributions immigrants their communities; – on-the-ground technical assistance from NAE and Welcoming America to help communities draft, execute, and communicate a multi-sector immigrant integration strategy; – planning grants from NAE that local partners have committed to match.

NAE and Welcoming America also maintain an interactive map outlining initiatives across the United States that support immigrant and U.S.-born entrepreneurs promote citizenship and financial empowerment, improve public safety and access to services, and advance education and workforce goals to help regions compete in the global economy. The map provides detailed information about and examples from the communities that have embraced this work, as well as guidance for those seeking to replicate successful programs and policies.25

The reasons behind this approach and positive action vis-à-vis the arrival of refugees (the case of immigrants has to do with other reasons) are different in nature. The particular geographical, social and economic characteristics that Boise and Idaho show have enabled a highly noteworthy model:

Jan Reeves, 71, the longtime director of the state’s refugee office, leans back from piles of printouts in the Jannus building behind a North End strip mall. “We have a receptive community”, says Reeves in response to the question as to why refugees come to Boise. “We have resources. There are opportunities here. There are many community partners that are engaged in the resettlement process. Refugees have an opportunity here to start their lives on a solid footing with a positive future ahead of them. And that’s what we want.”26

Transcending to the political sphere
To try and explain this phenomenon according to the logical of political party lines is a waste of time. Undoubtedly, the two dominant ideological currents in Boise or Idaho generally mark out the two main approaches to the subject. In between, however, there are many nuances to take into account that escape this rigid political framework.

Donostia City Council is made up of 27 councilors belonging to political parties, and all of them work full-time. Boise is headed by a Democrat mayor in a Republican area, as we mentioned earlier. He is assisted by a team of five councilors, none of whom work full-time for the city council. Four of them can be considered close to the Democratic Party, while the fifth, Scot Ludwig, is close to the Republican Party and recently presented a
resolution to condemn the acts of violence in Charlottesville.27

“Racism is an affront to the ideals of our nation and the conscience of our residents,” the resolution reads. “The Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, white supremacists and other hate groups do not represent the opinions and values of the people of Boise.” Ludwig, the rare Republican at City Hall, said he wanted to bring the resolution forward earlier, but planned to wait until after Mayor Dave Bieter’s State of the City address, which was scheduled for late August. Then Bieter’s address was delayed until November because of the death of former Idaho Gov. Cecil Andrus. The resolution echoes a proclamation the City Council unanimously approved in January declaring that Boise welcomes refugees and other immigrants. Councilwoman Lauren McLean was that proclamation’s primary author.

The City Council unanimously approved Ludwig’s resolution Tuesday night. Indeed, in January 2017, the proclamation of Boise as a city that welcomes refugees and immigrants was unanimously approved. On Tuesday, though, Mayor David Bieter allowed a crowd of a few dozen to rise to their feet and clap after the council unanimously passed a resolution proclaiming that Boise is “committed to being a Welcoming City and creating a community where all of our residents feel welcomed, safe, and able to fully participate in, and contribute to, our city’s economic and social life.”

“We urge all residents of Boise to do their part in reaching out and welcoming all those who live in and visit our great City,” states the resolution.28

There is, therefore, a clear will to point out a route map unequivocally supporting the arrival of immigrants and refugees, particularly to Boise. Boise is an island inside a deeply Republican state, but a city where the Mayor received the support of Pat Cenarrusa, the former Secretary of State and a Republican.29 Pat Cenarrusa enthusiastically supported Obama. These are signs of a political pluralism that many Basques find difficult to understand, for example, the fact that most of the Basque community in Idaho are Republican sympathizers. It is a state where Democrat-oriented Sun Valley coexists alongside a North that has changed from being a traditional Democrat area to a mainly conservative one with the arrival of many Californians (many of them from the Orange County Police Department). Then there is the strongly Republican Twin Falls, but where clear initiatives emerge in favor of tolerance and diversity from religious organizations such as the First Presbyterian Church.30 It is worthwhile, therefore, getting out of one’s comfort zone and trying to find references that help to complete any analysis. The role played by civil society in general is also a key factor here:

Boiseans extend hands and open their hearts through soccer leagues, churches, and charitable foundations. A clearinghouse called united links 16 government offices and 30

There is no doubt that a range of stakeholders and institutions of different color guarantees the solidity and across-the-board nature that makes Boise a model very distant from the usual stereotypes:

**Welcome the Stranger**

Boise’s embrace is proof that right and left, secular and religious, can share common goals for different political reasons. Secular pluralism can fuse with the evangelist sense of service when people of every stripe yearn to connect with the world.

Cole, a humanitarian pioneer, rises above denomination with a family mentoring service. Mentors meet families once a week to teach the Boise basics: how to list in Muslim shops, pay bills, barbecue, and bike to the zoo. Annually the church sponsors hold an ecumenical “peace feast”. Half the guests are Muslims. Lamb killed by hand is blessed and prepared according to Islamic halal practices.  

The diversity of voices does not prevent unusual joint action in other places and areas of societies, where extreme polariza-

Marla Olsen of Boise credits this church at Maple Grove and Ustick as the model for programs she coordinates for eight congregations of Latter-Day-Saints. “When it comes to service,” says Olsen, “we are not Mormon or Catholic or Jewish. We are all just trying in the gaps”.

Recently she encountered a Rabbi while tutoring a refugee in a classroom provided by Boise’s Temple Beth Israel. “Here,” said the rabbi, smiling, “we have a Mormon in a Jewish synagogue teaching English to a Muslim.”

The teaching goes two ways, says Donald Batubenga, the Congolese pastor of New Christian Church. “They (the refugees) have shifted the social life of this community”. Batubenga alternates sermons in English and Swahili, his parishioners are Zambian, Sudanese, Ethiopian, Nigerian, Rwandan, Caribbean and Idahoan. Church music plays in Lingala, Bemba, Zulu, Creole, English and French...

“Red or blue, victory or not, we need each other,” says Rev. Sara LaWall, a Boise Unitarian. Her voice was strong in December 2015 at a rain-soaked vigil on the stairs of the Idaho Statehouse. Singing “This Land is your land” and waving bike lights and glow sticks, there was no mistaking the political message. “Faith calls us to value love over fear,” said La Wall. “All of our faith teachings have a strong presence of refugees.”

Exclusivity in the characterization of a
strongly interiorized policy in Boise is certainly not its main feature. In each analysis we find data, that express desire that is taken on by different leaders in different fields. Patrick Hunter, PR & Strategic Engagement Manager in Hewlett-Packard, says:

Our commitment to diversity through hiring is seen through key partnerships with the Society of Women Engineers (SWE), National Society of Black Engineers (NSBE), Society of Hispanic Professional Engineers (SHPE), and Universities around the country. These partnerships provide opportunities to attract top talent from around the world representing diversity of geography, gender, age, sexual orientation and ethnicity to Boise. Combined with employee resource groups such as our vibrant Young Employee Network, we are able to retain the talent that we attract.  

Conclusion: Boise is not paradise
In a turbulent world that lacks references, there are no paradises. Boise does not aim to be one, but a magnificent experience is emerging that offers highly useful teachings. From the Basque perspective, Boise is one of the great references in the universe of Diasporas. It occupies a unique position there. Work well done has meant that it has become a benchmark for many Basques, a kind of Mecca, the place that all Basques would like to visit once in their lives. However, we should not forget about our other diasporas, all of them are worthy of our respect.

However, I feel that the interest in Boise goes beyond its status as the center of one of the great Basque communities abroad. And there is no doubt that, in the story of Boise as a welcoming city, the Basque community has also played a key role. The things that Boise continually teaches us need to be taken very much into account. I live in a region and a city with one of the lowest birthrates in Europe. Europe, and western societies in general, are facing one of the greatest challenges to their survival. Russia and Italy, to mention two examples that the media have highlighted, are facing up to historic challenges in this respect, and Euskadi is not affected by this very worrying scenario. From this perspective, it would even be good if Euskadi could elaborate some kind of strategy. Beyond the restrictive quotas imposed by Europe, Euskadi is at a historic crossroads. Our survival as a people is on the line. Either we improve the birthrate or we start to welcome new energy from outside. Some people in our country see risks to our identity in the arrival of other identities, cultures and languages. New sensibilities, new perspectives, new energies. Boise shows us that these fears are unfounded. Boise is showing us that a commitment to welcome this great diversity is the best option that any city can make nowadays. Beyond the statistics and responding to structural deficits, Boise has gone for creating a happier, more attractive and more diverse society. That is the great attraction of cities like Boise or Toronto. In Donostia, the city I live in, apart from this serious demographic problem that we need to face up to, we may even be facing a bigger one. Living in a city that is close to perfection, with an almost unbeatable quality of life, with top-level cultural, sports, health and educational
facilities, with people who believe they live in the best city in the world; this can be a serious obstacle. The lack of incentives to get out of one’s comfort zone could be the beginning of the end. Boise, with everything still to be done and isolated from the world, understood the need to call on many people who wanted to start out on a new life; preferably people who were a depository of cultures, languages, religions and different races. That is the grandeur of Boise, and its great attractiveness.

In my city there are sectors of the population that feel fear of the arrival of new energies, whether they would be tourists or visitors. The anti-tourist campaign we have seen this summer is the best example of that sector of the population that defends closing borders. Some communiqués, or opinions expressed by ‘spokespersons’ of some of the city’s neighborhoods are poles apart from the Boise model. What is so contradictory is that people belonging to those who consider Boise as the great hope of the Basque people are acting precisely oppositely to the criteria that have taken Boise to the levels of excellent it has reached. The admiration Boise arouses among us is a complete package, you cannot just cherry pick. That is cheating.

Fortunately, there are many among us who welcome the arrival of different people and cultures. When we visit the Historic Quarter of Donostia and hear different languages and people that give us hope for the future. Euskadi will have a future if it follows the path taken by Boise. Boise is not only one of our references in the Basque diaspora. Two years ago, I gave a talk in a congress in Boise titled “Boise: the future of the Euskadi of the 21st century”, in which I tried to explain the great teachings that Boise offers us as a model for society. Like all societies, Boise is faced with the same problems and similar challenges in the context of uncertainty that affects us all. It is, however, marking out an interesting way forward for other societies. That said, it has been able to – and still does – turn difficulties into opportunities. Boise has made a strong commitment, fearlessly and without complexes. It can still improve enormously and continues to do so.

I come from a city that borders on perfection, one in which many of its inhabitants are terrified by any change. The risk this mentality holds is very great, and above all it jeopardizes the future of our children. The egoism of a generation could ruin our children’s future. Boise gives us a fine lesson in solidarity, generosity and broad vision. On a daily basis, Boise offers us a great lesson in hope and enthusiasm. Above all, it is a breath of fresh air. Open societies survive and prosper. Boise has assured its future. We have a mirror to look at ourselves in.

Notes
3. In ibidem, p. 10.
8. wallethub.com/edu/best-run-cities.
15. Idem.
18. Idem. P.16
21. Idem, p.82.
29. Stapilus, Randy “Paradox Politics. People and power in Idaho”.
31. Shallat, T., ibidem, p. 17.
32. Idem.
33. Idem.
Cautionary Lessons from the Americanization Movement of the Early 20th Century

Christina A. Ziegler-McPherson

Of all the movements of the Progressive Era of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Americanization was perhaps the most ambitious. Not content with structural political reform or economic regulation, Americanization sought the transformation of the individual – culturally, emotionally, spiritually – from alien to American. I make a distinction here between “Americanization” and assimilation. Americanization was a social movement to improve the status of immigrants in American society between 1900 and 1920s. I define assimilation as being processes by which a society becomes more homogeneous and individuals in a society come to see themselves as sharing a common identity. I use the term “assimilation” when discussing early 20th century programs, because that is the term policy makers used, and I use “integration” in relation to modern “Americanization” programs.

The Americanization movement of the early 20th century connected citizenship and national identity to a social reform program that promoted adult education and improved labor and housing conditions as a way of creating a more homogeneous society that was also more tolerant of ethnic and cultural diversity. In the early 2000s, several American states, many of which had had Americanization programs in the early 20th century, began developing new social welfare policies to integrate immigrants. Yet policy makers in these states are working in a vacuum of historical knowledge of both policy and context. Their failure to know history weakens their policy making.

Before 1917, only New York and California had social welfare programs specifically designed to encourage immigrant assimilation. In the summer of 1917, Massachusetts started its program, and between 1917 and 1920, 35 states initiated some kind of Americanization policy. These Americanization programs fell into two general categories, what I call “environmental” and “educational.” Environmental Americanization policies sought to reform the social environment in which immigrants lived and worked, with the hope that the improved environment would then change the immigrant and encourage him or her to assimilate into mainstream American
The idea behind environmental Americanization programs was that immigrants could not be expected to embrace an American lifestyle, or would even know what true American values and behaviors were, until those values and behaviors had been demonstrated to them by native-born Americans. Environmental Americanization programs included monitoring piers and train stations to prevent crime and fraud; inspecting labor camps for health, safety, and sanitation; inspecting and regulating housing conditions, and mediating and resolving disputes between immigrants and their American employers, landlords, and neighbors. These programs focused on changing the behavior of the native-born more than that of the foreign-born, and were often part of a larger progressive effort to develop a modern welfare state.

Educational Americanization programs alternately sought to change some aspect of the immigrant’s culture through classes that taught English, American history, civics, and home economics. Many educational Americanization programs targeted women, although there were also factory classes for both men and women that combined safety training with English literacy. There was a fair amount of variation across the states, but in general, Americanization activists equated Americanization with immigrant social welfare, usually couched in terms of education, job services, legal aid, and the regulation of working and housing conditions. Pre-war Americanization programs tended to focus more on regulating working and living conditions, while wartime- and immediate post-war programs emphasized education, particularly English language instruction.

The goals of states’ Americanization policies were greater social stability, cultural homogeneity, educational opportunity, and economic efficiency, as well as a stronger social welfare state that could successfully mitigate the destructive consequences of laissez-faire industrial capitalism. State-based Americanization activists focused on the passage and enforcement of stronger protective legislation in order to create a more just and humane social environment into which immigrants would want to assimilate. State-based immigrant welfare policies were based upon the assumption that the foreign-born faced unique challenges in adjusting to life in the U.S. and so deserved special protection and assistance that only government could provide. State Americanization activists insisted that immigrants’ poor living and working conditions were the result of prejudice and discrimination by the native-born, not the cultural or racial deficiencies of the immigrants themselves. These officials and activists argued that, actually, it was the native-born who needed to be “Americanized” to be more tolerant of the foreign-born. And if Americans were unwilling to reform themselves, then Americanization agencies would compel them to treat immigrants more justly.

1919 was the high point of the Americanization movement, after which the movement began to collapse as a result of the loss of federal support and attacks by conservatives, who argued that the solution to America’s immigration issues was restriction, not government-subsidized assimilation. Some state Americanization programs, including in New York, California and Massachusetts, however, continued into the 1930s and even 1940s.
New Americans Initiatives
Between 2005 and 2008, after more than 30 years of increased immigration, several American states began again to promote social welfare policies for immigrants. These Americanization programs were often called “New Americans” Initiatives. The states that were most active were Illinois, California, Washington, and Massachusetts. The governors of these states created advisory and policy councils that were charged with working with immigrant advocacy groups, foundations, research think tanks, and other not-for-profits to provide a variety of services to immigrants, particularly non-English speakers. There was also a strong focus on the creation of standards and “best practices” against which government agencies would be measured in their delivery of services to immigrants. The main goals of these New Americans Initiatives were to improve immigrants’ access to state and local government services; improve the delivery of government services to immigrants; provide English language classes, and help immigrants with citizenship applications.

Examples of “New Americans” Initiative programs range from offering educational and legal assistance in applying for naturalization; allowing undocumented immigrants to receive driver’s licenses and other forms of state identification; allowing undocumented immigrant students to attend state-funded universities at state resident tuition rates, and in some cases, allowing undocumented immigrant students to receive academic scholarships. Other “New Americans” Initiative programs offer free or discounted health care services in immigrant neighborhoods.

“New Americans” Initiatives are currently to be implemented in Illinois, California, Washington, and Massachusetts, and other states with pro-immigrant leadership have passed laws designed to encourage the integration of immigrants, especially undocumented ones.

Americanization Programs vs. “New Americans” Initiatives

Similarities
Both were initiated by states in response to perceived inadequate federal attention to the status of immigrants already in the country. Both were concerned with assimilation or, as it is now called, integration of immigrants in various ways: socially, economically, and politically (i.e., through naturalization and citizenship education). Both claimed that their goal was “two-way” or mutual assimilation but both focused primarily or exclusively on immigrants. Due to funding limitations, both focused on providing social welfare to working class or poor people, with the hope and assumption that they would reach many immigrants who fall into those categories. Both relied extensively on assistance from private organizations. Both were heavily dependent on political leadership and support, particularly from governors. When the political leadership of a state changed, both policies were vulnerable to budget cutbacks and either political pressure or neglect.

Differences
The goals of “New Americans” Initiatives are more limited, focusing primarily on naturalization. The primary definition of assimilation (or “integration”) is the acquisition of political citizenship, not social or residential integration, em-
ployment in the mainstream economy, English fluency, or inter-marriage with U.S. citizens. The distinction between legal and illegal immigration, and the many consequences of these different legal statuses, did not exist in the early 20th century. So, “New Americans” programs must tailor their services according to the legal statuses of their targeted audiences, because undocumented immigrants are not eligible for citizenship.

The larger goal and methodology of the “New Americans” Initiatives – the improvement of the delivery of government services through the establishment of standards and best practices – is not clearly related to immigrant integration, and could be applied to any other group in society – women, children, other ethnic or racial minorities, the disabled, etc. “New American” programs claim that they promote “two-way” integration. Yet since few if any “New Americans” programs impact the native-born, it is unclear how this is “two-way.” “New Americans” Initiatives include immigrant organizations much more than past Americanization agencies did. Americanization in the 1910s and 1920s was much more “top down” directed and run by native-born elites and university-educated first-generation Americans.

The “New Americans” projects were often initiated by pro-immigrant advocacy organizations and the programs frequently included on-going public-private partnerships. Once a project was started, the initiating organization did not disappear, but continued to work with the state in implementing the policy. This was less common with Americanization programs, although not unheard of. “New Americans” programs often have an evaluation component that focuses on improving the delivery of government services to non-English speakers; the social science evaluation of program effectiveness did not exist in the Americanization movement.

“New Americans” Initiatives are much less developed ideologically than Americanization programs were. There is little deep consideration of the meanings of American citizenship or theories or methods of assimilation. As noted before, the target audience of “New Americans” Initiatives could often be easily shifted to another perceived disadvantaged group in American society. “New Americans” Initiatives and other current immigrant social welfare policies are being implemented in ignorance of the earlier Americanization movement, or of how scholars measure the assimilation of earlier immigrant groups or the persistence of pluralism in American society.

What policy makers can learn about immigration, and policy making, from studying history?
The most important use of historical knowledge in policy making is not re-inventing old policies or programs to fit new situations, but using history as a guide to recognizing crucial differences in context. The context of American immigration today is different from that in the 19th and early 20th centuries, both in terms of policy and in the nature of society and the economy. What is not different are people’s motives for migration: economic opportunity and mobility, political stability, personal freedom, family unification, escaping war, violence, and other turmoil. Immigrants’ challenges in adjusting to life in a new country are also surprisingly similar, although clearly not
identical, across time periods.

“New” policies are rarely new. In fact, they often contain remnants of older policies. When designing new policies or writing new legislation, policy makers and policy scholars should consider whether policy measures designed for an older time and/or with different motives are worth keeping. They should ask: has a policy or elements of a policy outlived its usefulness? How is today’s society, economy, and immigration policy different from those of the past?

One cannot answer this question without first knowing what the origins of the policy are, and most of the time, policy makers are not even aware that a policy has a history, much less know what that history is. Studying the history can teach the policy maker the true distinctions between historical contexts, and expose false differences as well. So, I would, for instance, argue that there are not significant differences between immigration from Europe in the 19th century and immigration from Asia in the 20th and 21st centuries in terms of ethnicity/race or class. But what is different is the legal regime that controls that migration and the changes in the American economy that provide opportunities for migrants.

And finally, the study of immigration history and policy liberates the scholar and policy maker of contemporary immigration by revealing past options, solutions, and failures that are not considered today primarily because they challenge conventional wisdom. Simply knowing that things have been different in the past can enable one to see contemporary policy in new ways. As with the Americanization movement in the early 1920s, the “New Americans Initiatives” and other immigrant social welfare programs at the state level are being implemented without much coordination or guidance from the federal government, and what knowledge-sharing that occurs among state bureaucrats, activists, and scholars is the result of their own initiatives and outreach to one another. Knowledge of the successes, failures, and context of the earlier Americanization movement would improve the policies of the New Americans Initiatives and other immigrant integration programs of the early 21st century.

Bibliography
Care for Diasporic Communities: The Case of a Bilateral Agreement between Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Janja Žitnik Serafin

Introduction

Cultural production of immigrants or members of ethnic, national or language minorities is one of the basic elements in the formation and maintenance of their cultural identity. At the same time, their cultural production is a bridge between cultures, a path to intercultural exchange and a means of cultural affirmation of a minority community in its mother country as well as in the country of its residence. The impact of cultural production of the Slovenian community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Bosniak community in Slovenia on the cultural identity of their members, the cooperation between these communities, and the ways in which they promote their cultural achievements in both countries, had not been subjects of systematic research until recently.\(^1\)

In Slovenia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, only some broader research projects in the field of ethnic and migration studies have touched upon these topics. Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina coexisted in a federative state that practiced the policy of systematic intercultural exchange. Slovenian language in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Slovenia were “brotherly” languages. They obtained the status of foreign languages only after the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, when their speakers found themselves in an entirely new position.

In my paper I wish to explore organizational patterns used by the Bosniaks in Slovenia compared to those used by the Slovenians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the cultural production of the former and the latter in the framework of their ethnic cultural societies and associations, and their access to various financial resources including those necessary for (co-)organising lessons or courses of their mother tongues. I am also interested in how the minority status of the Slovenians in Bosnia and Herzegovina is reflected in their cultural life and, on the other hand, how the absence of the minority status shows in the cultural life of the Bosniaks in Slovenia.

The paper is based on extensive fieldwork carried out under my supervision between 2012 and 2017: a survey carried out among the Slovenian cultural societies
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SMI Survey 2012); interviews with teachers of the Slovenian language and culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and interviews with representatives of both minorities (i.e. representatives of their cultural societies and associations) in Slovenia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively. This empirical research was a longitudinal upgrade of a previous fieldwork under the same supervision which started in 2005 with a survey on the position of immigrants and members of the so-called “new minorities” in Slovenia, their offspring, and their cultural production. Two of my interviews were especially significant for this paper: with the Secretary and Projects Leader of the Bosniak Association of Slovenia, Admir Baltić (Žitnik Serafin 2014b), and with the Chair of the Association of Slovenian Societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Darko Mijatović (Žitnik Serafin 2014c).

For the purpose of this publication, the paper has been additionally upgraded, using the results of a most recent target research project titled “Sodobne strategije slovenskih izseljencev za ohranjanje etnične identitete” (Contemporary strategies of Slovenian emigrants for the preservation of ethnic identity, 2016–2018), published in its Final Report (Žitnik Serafin, Kalc, Mlekuž, Vižintin 2018).

In the so-called “Dayton Constitution”, Bosnia and Herzegovina established the “domination of three constitutive nations” (Kržišnik-Bukić 2014: 135), and placed the Slovenians in the ethnic category of “others”. Later on, in the Law on the Protection of the Rights of the Minorities in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Zakon … 2003), the Slovenians were explicitly named as a national minority. This means that – similarly as the Slovenians in Croatia and in Serbia – the Slovenians in Bosnia and Herzegovina have obtained the status of a national minority whereas members of the nations from these countries in Slovenia are still striving for the acknowledgement of such status. Nevertheless, a mutual promise to support the preservation of the languages and cultures of the national minorities is a part of all the bilateral agreements between Slovenia and other successor states of the former Yugoslavia relating to science, culture and education (Komac 2014: 120).

On February 1, 2011, the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia passed the Declaration of the Republic of Slovenia on the Position of the National Communities of Members of the Nations of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Republic of Slovenia (Pravno-informacijski sistem 2011). Three months later, a government committee on the questions of the national communities from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established on the basis of the Declaration. Only a year later, the new government led by the Prime Minister Janez Janša abolished this committee along with a number of others. The Bosniaks and members of other Yugoslav nations in Slovenia – joined within the Association of the Associations of Cultural Societies of the Nations of the Former Yugoslavia in Slovenia – have been pleading their right to attain the status of national minorities since 2003, when the Association was established. The president of the Association, Ilija Dimitrijevski argues that these communities cannot consent to their status of ‘newcomers’ as they are in fact a product of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The
constitutonal acknowledgement of the national minority status, Dimitrievski continues, would be prerequisite for the preparation of further legislation on the assertion of their special collective rights in terms of the preservation of their languages and cultures, the access to public media, political participation, and the dignity of these groups of Slovenian citizens. Today, he says, there are almost a hundred cultural societies in Slovenia contributing to the preservation of the cultural heritage of the nations of the former Yugoslavia (Dimitrievski 2014: 17–19).

Members of Slovenian academic circles have different views on the possible change of the Slovenian Constitution aimed at the recognition of the national minority status for these communities. Some authors support such recognition; others are more or less sceptical about it or even explicitly oppose the idea. The change of the Constitution seems unnecessary even to some members of these minorities or their descendants, for example the nationally awarded writer and film director, Goran Vojnović (his view is quoted in Milharčič Hladnik 2014: 90–91). Nevertheless, some highly esteemed experts in minority issues speak in favour of it, among them the European Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muiznieks (quoted in Kržišnik-Bukić 2014: 10–11), and the Head of the Institute for the Constitutional Law in Ljubljana, Ciril Ribičič (2014: 199).

A Statistical Comparison between the Two Minorities

The Slovenians in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The number of the Slovenians in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been constantly decreasing since 1961 (Statistički godišnjak/ljetopis Federacije BiH=Statistical Yearbook 2013: 69). A comparison between the number of the ethnically declared Slovenians in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the number of the members of the Slovenian societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that there are actually more Slovenians in Bosnia and Herzegovina than those specified as such in the census. On the other hand, a three times larger number of the members of the Slovenian societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina indicates that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA</th>
<th>The Federation of B&amp;H</th>
<th>The Republic of Srpska</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of the ethnically declared Slovenians</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2011–2013*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of the members of the Slovenian societies</td>
<td>3,083</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td>1,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

these societies also accept members of other nations (table 1), which was confirmed by the 2012 SMI Survey results.

If we compare the data from table 1 with the data from table 2, it becomes clear that such a distinct disproportion between the census numbers relating to the members of the Slovenian minority and the number of the members of the Slovenian ethnic societies (in favour of the latter) is – if we consider only the so-called Yugoslav region – characteristic only of Slovenians in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The number of the members of the Slovenian societies in other countries of this region exceeds the census number of the Slovenians living there only in Serbia and Macedonia (besides Bosnia and Herzegovina), and in both the difference between those numbers is almost negligible (table 2). This unique case of the large number of the members of the Slovenian cultural societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be explained by the fact that in this country the interest in the study or employment in Slovenia is still relatively larger than in other countries of the region, and that a certificate confirming one’s active membership in a Slovenian cultural society is taken into account in the Slovenian naturalisation process.

The Bosniaks in Slovenia

The number of the persons whose first residence was in other republics/states of the Yugoslav region that had moved to Slovenia by 2001 shows that most of them came from Bosnia and Herzegovina (67,670 out of 150,763 persons, table 3). I am using the data from the last classical

Table 2: Slovenians in other successor states of the former Yugoslavia and the membership of Slovenian ethnic societies in these countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Number of the Slovenians, the latest census, 2011–2013*</th>
<th>Number of the members of the Slovenian cultural societies, 2012**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>10,517</td>
<td>6,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>4,033</td>
<td>4,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3: Residents of Slovenia from Bosnia and Herzegovina (by the year of immigration)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>2,227</td>
<td>7,842</td>
<td>26,227</td>
<td>17,517</td>
<td>12,661</td>
<td>67,670</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Slovenian population census in 2002, in which ethnicity, mother tongue and religion were systematically registered for the last time in that country.

Among those who migrated to Slovenia from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the largest groups consisted of the Bosniaks (13,876 persons), the Muslims (as an ethnic option: 6,332 persons), the Bosnians (5,869 persons), the Croats (7,120 persons), the Serbs (15,612 persons), and the unknown nationality or those who did not wish to answer (14,639 persons) (Popis 2002 / Population Census 2002). If we add to those who declared themselves as Bosniaks in the 2002 census (21,542 members of the first and the second generation) at least some of those who ethnically declared themselves as Muslims or Bosnians – something that Admir Baltić argues as justified, we get a group of almost 40,000 persons (immigrants and their descendants) with many common characteristics (tables 4–5).

Admir Baltić, the Secretary of the Bosniak Association of Slovenia, believes that the problem of three different names for Slovenian Bosniaks can be explained with the frequent change of the name used for this ethnic group in Slovenian population censuses:

The 2002 Slovenian population census noted 21,542 Bosniaks, 10,467 Muslims [as an ethnic option], and 8,062 Bosnians. A closer look at some additional characteristics of these three groups shows that we are dealing with very similar groups of population who share, to a great extent, their Bosnian-Herzegovinian origin, the Bosnian language as their mother tongue, and the Islam as their prevailing religion. On the basis of these common characteristics it can be concluded that in the case of these three supposedly different ethnic groups we are actually dealing with one nation; the nation that since 1993 has been officially called the Bosniaks, before that it was called the Muslims, and on the informal every-

| Table 4: Ethnically declared Muslims in Slovenia, population censuses 1953–2002* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1,617 | 465 | 3,197 | 13,339 | 26,577 | 10,467 |
| * There were no options called Bosniaks or Bosnians before the 2002 census. Source: “Popis 2002” (Population Census 2002). |

| Table 5: Bosniaks, Muslims and Bosnians in Slovenia, population census, 2002 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bosniaks | Muslims (ethnic option) | Bosniaks (regional option) | Altogether |
| 21,542 | 10,467 | 8,062 | 40,071 |
day level – especially in Slovenia – it was called the Bosnians. This triple naming used in different censuses confirms that the Bosniak national consciousness is still developing and that it has not yet been stabilised in its full potential. [...] Danilo Dolenc, a Slovenian demographer working on statistical data based on population censuses, observes that no other nation has been faced with so many changes of its name as the Bosniaks (Baltić 2009: 25–26).

The assumption on the triple naming of members of the same group sharing the Bosnian-Herzegovinian origin, the Bosnian mother tongue, and most of them also the Islamic religion, is partly confirmed by the Slovenian census data on the persons who immigrated to Slovenia from Bosnia and Herzegovina (table 3) and the last classical Slovenian population census data (2002) on religion and mother tongue (table 6). There are, of course, members of other nations among the Islamic believers in Slovenia. But – as Špela Kalčić (2006) observes – 99 percent of the members of the Islamic Community of Slovenia originate from the former Yugoslavia, and 90 percent of these from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even the refugee “corridor” through Slovenia in 2015 did not essentially change this proportion. Nevertheless, the large number of those who in the 2002 Slovenian census refused to state their religion is also quite telling (307,973 persons, table 6).

If we want to compare the shares of the members of both minorities that are also members of their ethnic cultural societies, an approximate estimation of the number of the members of the Bosniak societies in Slovenia is needed. According to Baltić (in a letter to the author, December 2, 2014), the number of the members who regularly pay their membership fee, together with their family members, is between 3,000 and 4,000.

### A quantitative comparison

There are 1,100 declared Slovenians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and there are approximately 3,000 members of Slovenian ethnic cultural societies in that country (table 1). On the other hand, there are 21,542 Bosniaks in Slovenia according to the last classical population census, i.e. approximately twenty times more than the former, while only between 3,000 and 4,000 of them are members of the Bosniak cultural societies in Slovenia – the same number as in the case of the much smaller Slovenian minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most Slovenian Bosniaks are members of the Islamic Community of Slovenia rather than the Bosniak cultural societies or the Bosniak Association of Slovenia. When Ahmed Pašić, head of the Islamic community of the city of Jesenice was asked about how many Muslims there were in Slovenia, he replied: “Officially, according to the census: 47,500; unofficially: around 60,000.” (Pašić in Nežmah 2004) Baltić explains the reasons for such an obvious disproportion between the members of both minorities.

| Table 6: Slovenian population census, 2002: religion and mother tongue |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| religion                        | Islamic         | 47,488          |
|                                 | no answer       | 307,973         |
| mother tongue                   | Bosnian         | 31,499          |
|                                 | unknown         | 52,316          |
membership of the Islamic Community of Slovenia and the membership of the Bosniak cultural societies in Slovenia:

The Islamic Community comprises the largest number of the Bosniaks, which can be explained by the fact that the Islamic religion was a key factor of distinction from the neighbours belonging to the Orthodox or Catholic religion also in Bosnia and Herzegovina. [...] Thus, the Bosniaks formed their national consciousness based on the Islamic tradition with a certain delay; yet, the religious belonging to the Islam is not a requirement for being declared as a Bosniak as there are numerous agnostics and atheists who also consider themselves Bosniaks (Baltić in Žitnik Serafin 2014b: 1).

In spite of these noticeable quantitative differences between the two minorities, many similarities can be observed in their organizational patterns and cultural activities. In the following sections I will try to look into the cultural situation of both minorities in the light of their organization and cultural production.

Comparison between the Organizational Patterns and Cultural-Artistic Activities of the Two Minorities

Parallels

The first and the most obvious similarity is in the time of the formation of the present cultural societies. The existing Slovenian societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina were established in two waves: the first six of them were founded between 1992 and 1994, the rest around 2003; only Triglav, the largest Slovenian society in the Republic of Srpska was registered between both waves, in 1998. Two almost identical waves are also characteristic of the establishment of the Bosniak societies in Slovenia: the first ones were formed at the time of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995), the rest of them in the new millennium. The role and the purpose of the former and the latter were practically the same: the early societies were formed to organize aid in war conditions, to help with the evacuation of a number of families from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to take care of the refugees in Slovenia. After the war, the mission soon changed from humanitarian engagement to the preservation of language and ethnic cultural traditions.

By March 2003, there were 16 registered societies established by the Muslims in Slovenia (Klopčič, Komac and Kržišnik-Bukić 2003: 207–208); in the meantime, some of them have changed their names adding the attribute Bosniak – e.g. the cultural society in Jesenice called Biser. Three from five founding societies of the Bosniak Association of Slovenia no longer exist but many new ones have been formed since. Between 2005 and 2013, new Bosniak cultural societies appeared in the cities of Velenje, Ljubljana, Koper and Maribor (Baltić in Žitnik Serafin 2014b: 5). There is though one significant difference between the Slovenian and Bosniak ethnic societies: as opposed to the Bosniak cultural societies in Slovenia, some of the present Slovenian societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, e.g. the Sarajevo Cankar and the Banja Luka Triglav, have a really long tradition of predecessors.6

An important parallel can also be found
in the beginnings of the associating of the societies. The Bosniak Association of Slovenia was registered in 1997, but its prehistory reaches back to the times of co-operation and association of early Bosniak societies in the Gorenjska region and in central Slovenia. Only one year after the Bosniak societies in Slovenia joined into the Bosniak Association, Slovenian societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina joined into the Coordinating Committee of the Slovenian organizations (1998), a forerunner of the present Association of Slovenian Societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina “Evropa zdaj” founded in 2010. Both associations, the Bosniak and the Slovenian one, include the same number of member societies: nine each. In both cases only one other society exists in the country outside the association. Both associations have very similar roles and more or less the same number of annual projects.

Both ethnic societies, Slovenian and Bosniak, are organized according to the national legislation: (almost) all have their president, secretary, treasurer, steering/executive committee, board of trustees, assembly and court of honour. Their further division into very similar sections in both countries also constitutes parallel organizational patterns. The forms and ways in which they maintain their cultural traditions and mother tongue are virtually identical: participation in the organization of language classes, society libraries, celebration of national holidays, celebration
of some religious holidays, ethno and folk music, traditional dances cultivated by folklore groups, national costumes, national dishes and traditional handcraft.

Other activities are also similar in both minorities: both associations of societies have their own website which is occasionally inactive because they lack a qualified webmaster. Due to the same reason, there are only a few individual societies that have got their own home page with a link to their online periodical. As opposed to most Slovenian societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the majority of the Bosniak societies in Slovenia have their own Facebook profiles because they find it easier this way to keep in touch with their members. Only the largest societies on both sides publish their own newsletter, almanac or similar. These are usually the same societies that have got some experience with other publishing as well. All the societies have regular society meetings and picnics. Larger societies also organize various trips, outings or visits of their mother country while the smaller societies are invited to join them. The same applies to the celebration of national holidays. About one third of the societies in both cases are also active in organizing sports activities and other competitions. Three societies on each part have choruses, and the share of the societies that organize various exhibitions and lectures is also similar on both sides. Both minorities have produced some regular radio programmes of their own in the past (e.g. Slovenians in Prijedor, Banja Luka ..., Bosniaks in Ljubljana, Maribor, etc.) or they still produce them.

On the other hand, there is an important difference between cultural productions of these two minorities: the strong point of the Slovenian societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina is their choruses, and the strong point of the Bosniak societies in Slovenia is their folklore groups. The latter also have more drama groups than the former. Visual arts are more or less regularly performed in three Bosniak societies and in one Slovenian society (in Tuzla), which has its own group of painters and which now organizes regular artists’ colonies.

Both, the Bosniak and the Slovenian ethnic societies usually invite other Bosniak/Slovenian societies to their events. This means that their cooperation does not necessarily take place through the Association but also directly, between individual societies. Both minorities pay more and more attention to the inclusion of children and youth – in some Bosniak societies, e.g. in the Jesenice Biser, the share of the members aged between 5 and 25 was no less than 85 percent (Balagić 2009: 101–109).

From the perspective of intercultural
cooperation and exchange, both communities act – on the local and national levels – in a cohesive way. In spite of the relatively small number of its members, the Slovenian community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is among the most active minorities there. As the Chair of the Association of Slovenian Societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Darko Mijatović says half in jest, the Slovenian Triglav Society in Banja Luka, which shares its office room with 15 other minorities of the Republic of Srpska, is lucky because other minorities are less active, which leaves the Slovenian community more space in the office room (Mijatović in Žitnik Serafin 2014c: 5). The truth is they cooperate with the local artists of other national provenance who are members of either the national majority or of other minorities, which makes their events much more interesting for the media (ibid.: 8). Similarly, there is a lot of cultural cooperation between the Slovenian Bosniaks and other ethnic communities as well as with the Slovenian majority. As a best practice of such cooperation, Baltić mentions a member society of the Bosniak Association of Slovenia, namely the Sevdah Society from Ljubljana, which regularly organizes events in which they even manage to combine artists from individual Serbian and Kosovo-Albanian ethnic societies – which, to his knowledge, is a rare phenomenon (Baltić in Žitnik Serafin 2014b: 8).

Differences
The first difference between these two minorities can be noticed in their self-definition. Baltić says: “My definition: a Bosniak is anyone who declares himself as Bosniak and who sees Bosnia and Herzegovina or Sandžak as his mother country or the mother country of his ancestors.” (Ibid.:
1) Mijatović, on the other hand, says, “We abide by the Slovenian legislation. It matters when our members apply for Slovenian citizenship. Until last year they were able to apply as Slovenians if they could prove Slovenian roots up to four generations back. This has changed, now only those can apply as Slovenians whose Slovenian roots go two generations back.” (Mijatović in Žitnik Serafin 2014c: 1) This would mean that for the Bosniaks in Slovenia (and this is also common practice in most population censuses), ethnic affiliation is a matter of personal choice whereas Slovenian ethnic affiliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be proved through one’s genealogy. Due to this change in Slovenian naturalisation legislation, the Slovenian Triglav Society in Banja Luka reduced the number of their members from 1,300 to slightly over 700 (ibid.). There has been much discussion on the problematic politicizing of ethnic affiliation and membership in Slovenian societies abroad, politicizing caused by the fact that – as already mentioned – a certificate on one’s active membership in a Slovenian cultural society is taken into account in the process of obtaining Slovenian citizenship. But the discussion on this issue between researchers and policy makers has not been very fruitful so far.

A second difference is in the organization and funding of minority language classes. Slovenian ministry responsible for education co-finances Slovenian language classes for young members of Slovenian communities abroad, including Slovenians in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most of the teachers are sent from Slovenia. Owing to this fact, regular Slovenian language classes are organized in almost every city of either the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Republic of Srpska where a Slovenian cultural society exists. In Slovenia, on the other hand, classes of Bosnian language are organized in the framework of various projects only in Ljubljana, Jesenice and Velenje. They have been financed from the Swiss Contribution, Norway Grants and EEA Grants. As opposed to Slovenian language classes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the question of systematic organization and long-term funding of Bosnian language classes in Slovenia remains unanswered although the promises contained in the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the cooperation in culture, education and science (Sporazum 2000) follow the principles of reciprocity: “Contractual partners will offer organizational and financial support for supplementary lessons of the mother tongue and culture for the children and youth of Slovenian nationality in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the children and youth from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Slovenia.” Emil Vega (2013: 11) writes, “Our country, which provides classes of Slovenian language for Slovenians abroad, expects reciprocity – the classes of Bosnian language should be financed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. But Bosnia and Herzegovina, which after the war lost one third of its population as they left the country, and facing its own economic and political challenges, is unable to cope with this task.”

A third difference is in the funding of the two minorities’ cultural activities. As this question is closely related to my suggestions contained in the conclusion, I will discuss it later. There are of course many other parallels and differences be-
between these two minorities in the area of their organizational schemes and cultural production, but I was able to present in this paper only the most significant ones.

**Conclusion**

Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina share a long history of belonging to the same state: first to the Austrian-Hungarian empire, then to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and finally to the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Thus it is not surprising that there are more similarities than differences between their minorities living in the other country. This is also the reason why a Slovenian feels more or less at home in Bosnia and Herzegovina, just as does a Bosniak in Slovenia – despite the fact that in both cases we are talking about national, religious and language minorities, which means that they both differ from the majority society at least in terms of three different parameters. Parallels between the two minorities are evident not only in all areas of their cultural interests but also in the range of possibilities for the fulfilment of those interests. Further parallels can be observed in their organizational patterns (ethnic cultural societies and their internal organization, associations of these societies, their history...), the diversification of their cultural production and its pronounced significance for cultural identity of the members of these minorities (Baltić in Žitnik Serafin 2014b: 7; Mijatović in Žitnik Serafin 2014c: 7). Both minorities nourish their mother tongues through a wide range of their societies’ activities as well as their cooperation in the organization of language classes and courses.

Both countries have a similar stand on the recognition of collective rights in the area of cultural activities of the minorities living within their state borders. Cultural projects of ethnic societies and associations are co-financed from various sources. The Slovenian cultural societies in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have partly been co-financed by municipalities and by some cantons, for example by the Ministry of Culture of the Canton of Sarajevo, occasionally also by the Zenica-Doboj Canton. In the Republic of Srpska they have also been co-financed by the municipalities and by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Srpska (SMI Survey 2012). The Bosniak cultural societies in Slovenia have been co-financed by their local municipalities as well as by the Slovenian ministry in charge of culture and/or by the Public Fund for Cultural Activities of the Republic of Slovenia. The Slovenian and the Bosniak ethnic societies are both more or less unsatisfied with the state funding whereas they feel more comfortable with their cooperation at the local level, i.e. with the participation of their municipalities, which – besides their public calls for cultural-artistic and publishing projects, conferences, infrastructure, etc. – often provide free or subsidised use of the societies’ office rooms or other premises. On the other hand, the care for one’s own minority in the other country has been much more substantial in the case of Slovenia’s care for the Slovenian minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina compared to the care of the latter for the Bosniak minority in Slovenia. The activities of the Slovenian societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been considerably co-financed by the Slovenian Government Office for Slovenians Abroad while the Slovenian ministry in charge of education has been...
co-financing Slovenian language classes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been unable to offer this kind of support to the Bosniak minority in Slovenia.

Darko Mijatović stresses that the minority status of the Slovenians in Bosnia and Herzegovina ensures them better access to Bosnian-Herzegovinian local and state funds. If the Slovenian community had not been officially recognised as a minority by Bosnia and Herzegovina, he says, it would be much more difficult for Slovenian societies and their umbrella organization, the Association to apply for public funds in the country of residence (Mijatović in Žitnik Serafin 2014c: 9). Admir Baltić, on the other hand, is more sceptical in the case of the Bosniak community in Slovenia: “If the (official minority) status should regulate this issue, then yes. The status in itself does not necessarily generate more favourable chances for the financing of the societies’ activities; but from our perspective, this is precisely the main purpose of the status.” (Baltić in Žitnik Serafin 2014b: 9)

I believe Slovenia should acknowledge the minority status of members of the nations of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia, including the Bosniaks, and treat the public funding of their ethnic societies the same way it treats the funding of cultural programmes and infrastructure of the so-called autochthonous minorities in Slovenia, recognized by the Slovenian Constitution. Furthermore, I also believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina should – at least in a very modest degree – comply with the existing bilateral agreement with Slovenia on the reciprocal funding of each minority’s mother tongue classes in the other country. The financial and moral effect of these changes upon the Bosniaks in Slovenia would be favourable, and the burden and the benefits of the support intended for one’s own minority in the other country would be a bit more equally distributed between both countries. It will probably take a considerable period of time before these goals can be reached. But as first steps in this direction were made many years ago, it is doubtlessly time for some further steps now.

References


Notes
1. The paper was presented at the Turin AEMI conference in 2015. Parts of a previous Slovenian article by the author (Žitnik Serafin 2015) are also focused on the subject of this paper.
2. These interviews were conducted in the framework of the following research projects: “Poklicne migracije Slovencev v prostor nekdanje Jugoslavije: od naseljencev do transmigrantov” (Slovenian labour migration to the countries of the former Yugoslavia: From settlers to transmigrants, 2011–2015), “Ohranjanje slovenstva med mladimi člani slovenske skupnosti v jugoslovanskem prostoru” (Preservation of Slovenian identity among young members of Slovenian communities in the area of the former Yugoslavia, 2013), and “Pomen kulturne produkcije Slovencev v BiH v pripadnikov narodov BiH v Sloveniji” (The significance of the cultural production of Slovenians in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of members of the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Slovenia, 2014–2015).
3. The Slovenians in Serbia and in Croatia are even granted the possibility of being specifically represented in the parliament.
5. Compare different views of the authors in Kržišnik-Bukić (2014a) and Kržišnik-Bukić and Josipovič (2014).
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